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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the application of integrated logistics support (ILS) 
techniques to the design and management of resilient civil engineering infrastructure.  
 
It is recognised that the fast developing discipline of asset management, with its adoption 
of ILS tools as one of a variety of techniques likely to be useful in enhancing the 
resilience of assets to service level failures, is a useful vehicle to disseminate these 
techniques. The main question to be addressed is whether ILS techniques can, when 
suitably adapted and applied, be of value in improving understanding and efficiency of 
resilient infrastructure design and maintenance regimes for infrastructure assets.  
 
This has been tackled in three main stages: 
Stage 1 of the research assesses the varying maturity of asset management planning across 
civil engineering infrastructure sectors. Important factors are found to be the attitude and 
nature of industry regulators and the degree of inter-company regulation. 
Stage 2 is a direct comparison of two sectors in terms of their progress in implementation 
of asset management planning; roads and water. The water sector is further advanced than 
roads and features and reasons are listed in section 4.    
Stage 3 is a detailed ILS application to a case study with a view to identifying and 
quantifying the added value, including resilience benefits.  
The value of the exercise is judged against the 4 objectives below: 
1/ To review asset management plans for different infrastructure sectors in order to 
understand a/ the extent to which risk based asset management is implemented and b/ to 
explore any difference in the maturity of asset management planning across different 
sectors. If differences are identified a secondary objective is to explore the reasons why. 
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2/ To determine whether the application of integrated logistics support (ILS) to 
infrastructure projects offers a practical tool within the risk based approach recommended 
in PAS 55. 
3/ To compare the results of an FMECA analysis at a system and unit level of detail for 
the risk based assessment. To assess what level of detail is required for the structural 
breakdown system in order to allow an effective yet robust FMECA analysis to be carried 
out. 
4/ To determine whether ILS can be applied efficiently to an assessment of the resilience 
of infrastructure assets. 
 
Objectives 1,2 and 3 have been largely fulfilled, within the parameters of the data 
available, and bearing in mind the limitations of one case study. Objective 4 will require 
further monitoring of effectiveness over a longer time span. 
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1 Introduction and background 
1.1 Introduction  
Western societies have current concerns which will impact upon civil engineering 
infrastructure design, construction, maintenance and operation. These include carbon 
emission reduction programmes, budgetary restraints, adaptation measures to cope with 
predicted climate change, sustainability pressures, the need to ensure reliability and 
resilience for all essential infrastructure in the face of shock events with either natural or 
man-made causes. There are also on-going needs to avoid ‘bottlenecks’ in capacity which 
would adversely affect economic growth. Recent and on-going government led reports 
(Infrastructure Cost Review 2010; National Infrastructure Plan 2010 Government 
Construction Strategy 2011) are evidence of the importance currently accorded to these 
factors.  
Adoption of whole life costing practices in order to put more emphasis on maintenance 
costs is being encouraged by government procurement through the private finance 
initiative (PFI) route (e.g. M74 design, build, finance and operate consortium in Appendix 
A1) Contracting organisations are having to price in operating and maintenance costs and 
compete on that basis. This competition should encourage wider collection of 
infrastructure cost and lifespan data and help to drive down whole life costs. The 
expansion of asset management planning across the UK is also motivated by the same 
drivers. Increasing efficiencies and interdependencies, however, also carry increasing 
risks of system failures arising due to unforeseen or non-routine events. System resilience 
threats increase accordingly and must be similarly considered.   
Some current research programmes related to civil engineering infrastructure 
(resilientfutures.com and www.itrc.org.uk) are focused on the resilience of infrastructure 
and take account of the increasingly interconnected nature of infrastructure sectors. For 
example, the increasing use of telecommunications for monitoring the condition and 
operation of highway signage and water supply operations makes these networks 
vulnerable to cyber-attack. More extreme weather events, due to climate change, are 
forecast to put increasing strain on our national infrastructure and this, combined with 
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public intolerance of network breakdowns, has led government and infrastructure 
operators to assess the weaknesses and risk factors inherent in their networks. Research is 
attempting to model some of the critical interconnections (NIAC 2009 and AEA 2010).  
A UKWIR 2013 report ‘Resilience Planning: Good Practice Guide’ contrasts an over-
arching ‘top down’ approach (for large and complex assets) to a ‘bottom up’ approach 
using ‘ a systematic analysis of the implications of a series of individual hazard events at 
critical assets that could trigger system failure’. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) tools 
(refer to Glossary) are highlighted as an important methodology for a ‘bottom up’ 
approach and this study aims to establish some evidence of their utility in such 
applications.  
1.2 Research objectives and background 
 
The initial aim of this research was to interrogate the barriers and advantages associated 
with the application of ILS tools to civil engineering infrastructure, with a view to 
enhancing resilience. Given the increasing adoption of asset management practice 
throughout the industry and the inclusion of ILS as a suggested leading tool in the asset 
management toolbox of techniques, it was recognised early on that the asset management 
framework offered a useful vehicle to test and advance the application of ILS within the 
civil engineering industry.   
 Previous research work within the Construction Management Research Unit in the Civil 
Engineering Division at the University of Dundee has applied Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) techniques to cost effective maintenance strategies for buildings (Marenjak 
2004, El-Haram & Horner 2002 and 2003). Much work has been done in order to a) tackle 
some of the barriers preventing wider application of the techniques in construction and b) 
establish the scale of potential financial savings. This study will proceed with similar 
aims, but in the infrastructure rather than the building sector. 
This study is funded by both the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and 
CH2M; CH2M also provided support in terms of input to the scope of the study, staff 
time, access to infrastructure operators, case studies and asset management data. 
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A ‘problem formulation’ meeting between CH2M directors, CH2M Scottish office staff 
and the research team from the University of Dundee formulated 3 preliminary work 
programmes.   
1/ Compiling maintenance strategies, needs and opportunities across the UK's 4 primary 
infrastructure sectors: water, energy, transport, communications.  
2/ Comparing risk-based asset management decision-making between the water and 
highways sectors. Following on from Task 1 above, asset management practices between 
these two sectors will be contrasted by studying current Scottish Water and Transport 
Scotland practice. 
3/ Development (process and criteria) of resilience and cost effective asset management 
of existing strategic assets. This work will use ILS tools to assess the resilience of a 
sample section of infrastructure; the Tay Road Bridge. 
 The three main strands of the research, described as stages 1, 2 and 3 in this study, are 
envisaged to be linked diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1. This shows the 4 main 
physical infrastructure sectors surmounted by the ILS investigative tools, flanked by the 
main topic of system resilience and its constraining counterpart of cost efficiency and all 
included within the embrace of the developing discipline of asset management whose 
potential for increasing the quality of decision making is the driver for better data 
collection and management, which is key to supporting the use of ILS. Double headed 
arrows identify the 2 way links between the bodies of knowledge. 
The objectives of this research were then developed as: 
1/ To review asset management plans for different infrastructure sectors in order to 
understand a/ the extent to which risk based asset management is implemented and b/ to 
explore any difference in the maturity of asset management planning across different 
sectors. If differences are identified a secondary objective is to explore the reasons why. 
2/ To determine whether the application of integrated logistics support (ILS) to 
infrastructure projects offers a practical tool within the risk based approach recommended 
in PAS 55. 
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Figure 1 Project connections 
3/ To compare the results of an FMECA analysis at a system and unit level of detail for 
the risk based assessment. To assess what level of detail is required for the structural 
breakdown system in order to allow a sufficiently robust FMECA analysis to be carried 
out. 
4/ To determine whether ILS can be applied efficiently to an assessment of the resilience 
of infrastructure assets. 
Stages 1 and 2 form the basis of fulfilling objective 1. Objectives 2, 3 and 4 are 
considered in stage 3. 
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1.3 Layout of the Thesis 
 
The study was undertaken in three stages. 
1/ Comparing maintenance strategies, needs and opportunities across the UK's 4 primary 
infrastructure sectors: water, energy, transport, communications.  
a/ This took the form of a literature search to record and compare UK asset owner practice 
in each sector. Reference was made to leading UK and international guidance documents.  
b/ Comparative sector progress in compiling and operating effective asset management 
plans was recorded. Approaches towards incorporating the need for resilience in 
maintenance strategies were examined.  Use was made of CH2M project experience and 
access to guidance documents and operations staff where appropriate.  
c/ The extent of any current ILS adoption was recorded.   
2/ Comparing risk-based asset management decision-making between the water and 
highways sectors.  
Task 1 above allowed asset management practices between these two sectors to be 
contrasted. Attention at this stage focussed on Scottish Water and Transport Scotland 
highways practice, utilising case studies and examples. 
3/ Development (process and criteria) of resilient and cost effective asset management of 
existing strategic assets.  
i) ILS was introduced at this stage by modelling a trial section of infrastructure in terms of 
functionality and service levels and then applying failure modes, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) and reliability centred maintenance (RCM) in order to test resilience 
against projected natural and accidental threats. The threat levels varied by failure mode 
and by consideration of the recovery effort required in the event of such a failure.  The 
modelling is analytical but the ILS applications are essentially qualitative albeit numerical 
assessments.  
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ii) FMECA and RCM toolkits were tailored for this application but also with a view to 
future applicability for other infrastructure resilience audits. 
iii) The verification of the ILS results required expert input from bridge operations staff 
and this was co-ordinated by the University research team. The review panel considered 
the critical network areas, anticipated threats to service levels, and other factors affecting 
the resilience of the infrastructure networks. 
iv) An example of a possible solution to a vulnerability was costed and tabled for 
engineering assessment.  
 
A 7 stage process was applied at stage 3 as below. This is based on a combination of 
industry standard guidance for the application of Integrated Logistics Tools, plus the 
previous modelling undertaken in the reference in number 3. 
1/ Define the boundaries of the asset so it is clear which physical limits we are working 
within. 
 
2/ Define the level, stage and scale of assessment to be applied to the example or project. 
e.g. conceptual, design, construction, operation, demolition. This will depend on the stage 
of the project and the level of available detail. Establish standards of service levels and 
business consequences of temporary failure to meet these. 
 
3/ Construct a functional/physical model (ref mil-std-1629A & Elharam & Horner 2002). 
This should include interconnections with supporting systems.  
 
4/ Define the type and scale of threat envisaged, using climate predictions and scenario 
planning. 
 
5/ Establish an expert review panel. Undertake a threat and vulnerability study (business 
impact analysis), using FMEA structure and format, to list and quantify failure 
mechanisms, locations and consequences.  
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6/ Undertake a criticality analysis to prioritise vulnerabilities based on failure 
consequences. A common measurement scale will be required to allow trade-offs between 
consequences in different business areas e.g. between environmental and reputational 
damage.  
7/ Investigate protective solutions. These could range from retrospectively applied 
physical refurbishments, increased security controls, future specification enhancements, 
provision of redundant links or spare equipment held in reserve. 
 
The rest of this document is laid out as below: 
1/ Chapter 2: The literature review tackles infrastructures, resilience, asset management 
and integrated logistics support. Also included are data collections for the 3 work stages. 
2/ Chapter 3: Methodology includes the detailed steps included in all 3 stages. 
3/ Chapter 4 sets out all the results 
4/ Chapter 5 lists conclusions and recommendations 
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2 Literature Review  
2.1 Civil engineering infrastructures 
2.1.1 Definition and classification 
 
 “Infrastructure can be succinctly described as the systems and organisations required for 
the function of a society” (Attoh-Okine 2009). As shown in table 1 below, this is a little 
too wide ranging for the purposes of this research. The International Infrastructure 
Management Manual 2002 goes further in defining infrastructure assets as “Stationary 
systems forming a network and serving whole communities, where the system as a whole 
is intended to be maintained indefinitely at a particular level of service potential by the 
continuing replacement and refurbishment of its components.” This is a definition 
specifically formulated to suit an asset management approach as it emphasises 
permanence and the provision of service.  
Academic papers often refer to critical infrastructure(s) which Utne et al (2011) define as 
“technological networks, such as energy supply, transport services, water supply, oil and 
gas supply, banking and finance, and ICT (information and communication technology) 
systems.” ‘Critical’ is used in the sense that the system is fundamental to civilised human 
urban existence although it can also be used to define the most important elements of the 
systems i.e. those which need particular protection or attention to ensure resilience.  
Other, mainly government publications, address varying scopes when they mention 
infrastructures, depending on which issues they are tackling and which professions are 
defining the scope. These are summarised in table 1 below: 
The United States (NIAC 2009) recognise 19 critical infrastructure and key resource 
sectors. Their use of the term ‘critical’ is largely guided by the risk of terrorist threat 
following the attacks on the twin towers in New York and appears to mean ‘of national 
importance’.  Not all of these are physical networks or systems. 
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Table 1 Infrastructure sectors 
Utne et  
Al 2011 
NIAC 2009 National risk 
register 2010 
UK  
infrastructure 
group 2010 
UK national 
infrastructure  
plan 2011 
Council for 
science and 
technology 2009 
Energy 
supply 
Energy Energy Energy Energy-electricity, 
gas 
Energy 
Transport 
services 
Transportation 
systems 
Transport Transport Transport-  roads, 
rail, airports, ports 
Transport 
Water 
supply 
Drinking water  
and other  
treatment systems 
Water Water Environment- 
water and  
sewerage, flood  
risk management, 
waste 
Water 
ICT Communications Communications Communications Communications Communications 
Banking 
and 
finance 
Banking and 
finance 
Finance    
Oil and 
gas 
 supply 
Chemical     
 Agriculture and 
food 
Food    
 Public health and 
healthcare 
Health    
 Commercial 
facilities 
    
 Critical 
manufacturing 
    
 Dams     
 Defense industrial 
base 
    
 Emergency  
services 
Emergency services    
 Government 
facilities 
Government    
 Information 
technology 
    
 National 
monuments and 
icons 
    
 Nuclear reactors     
 Materials and waste  Waste 
 
Incl in   
environment 
 
 Postal and shipping     
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The UK government has identified nine national infrastructure sectors which require 
protection against hazards or attack (National Risk register of Civil Emergencies 2010 
edition). The UK Infrastructure Group counts 5 civil engineering infrastructure sectors. 
The UK National Infrastructure Plan 2011 lists 10 infrastructure networks. These are then 
grouped into 4 larger sectors. 
The Council for Science and Technology (2009) define 4 national infrastructures to focus 
on; communications, energy, transport and water. These are the four national 
infrastructures with significant fixed civil engineering systems or networks. Because they 
are replicated across the other reports, this research will work with these classifications. 
Section 4 of this report further sub-divides these when reporting asset management 
progress. 
Now we have our infrastructures, why are they important? 
“Investing in infrastructure, ……. is vital to the UK’s economic growth. High quality 
infrastructure increases productivity, lowers production costs and raises output. It also 
enables a skilled and healthy workforce and improved public services delivery, all of 
which are essential for the UK to remain competitive.” (CBI, Building strong foundations 
2011). 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) sets out that a key task is to improve resilience of 
the infrastructure most critical to keeping the country running against attack, damage or 
destruction (Cabinet Office: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure 2011).  
The Infrastructure Cost Review main report 2010 states “The Government’s National 
Infrastructure Plan 2010, published in October, describes planned investment in 
infrastructure of £200 billion over the next 5 years. Between £15 billion and £20 billion 
will be spent each year directly on renewals and capacity enhancement projects and 
programmes – principally civil engineering works. The ability to deliver infrastructure 
investment priorities efficiently and effectively is crucial to achieving the UK‟s growth 
objectives. “ 
“Good asset management strategies have the potential to decrease costs through 
minimising unplanned or unnecessary interventions” is cited as one way to help achieve 
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efficiency savings of up to 15%, by increasing resilience and reducing unplanned 
maintenance expenditure (Infrastructure Cost Review July 2014).   
Table 2. 
Examples of infrastructure assets (Table 1.1 from CIRIA Report C677, 2009) 
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2.1.2 Interdependencies and vulnerabilities 
 
As physical infrastructures become more refined, particularly with more sophisticated 
control arrangements in order to either avoid or minimise more expensive renewal or 
expansion, this creates connections between systems. An example is the increased usage 
of driver advice signposting on motorways which creates connections between 
communications, electrical and transport systems. 
 
These interconnections create dependencies between networks which have the potential to 
create a ‘domino effect’ i.e. a breakdown or rupture in one network has the potential to 
disable a dependent or interdependent network. Rinaldi et al (2001) identify 3 drivers 
towards the increased prevalence of interdependencies in the United States: the increasing 
use of IT, shedding of excess capacity following deregulation of sectors, and company 
mergers reducing redundancy and overheads. Understanding these interdependencies and 
installing redundancies (spare capacity) or ‘firebreaks’ must be an important factor in 
ensuring resilience by setting boundaries to damage resulting from a destructive event.  
 
There is progress among researchers in modelling interconnections between parallel 
networks and work has been done in analysing what level of damage can be sustained 
before functionality is destroyed. This is also addressed and summarised in the Cabinet 
Office paper Natural Hazards and Infrastructure of March 2011. 
 
An early paper (Rinaldi et al 2001) analyses networks and interconnections and frames 
modelling challenges which spawn later papers. Much of the categorisation and 
terminology (see Figure 2) has been taken up by later authors using mathematical models 
and statistical tools. 
 
Rinaldi introduces the fundamental concept of infrastructures as complex adaptive 
systems. This allows resilience to have more than a ‘bounce back’ dimension. In terms of 
interdependencies, 4 classes are identified: physical, cyber, geographic and logical. A 
definition of inter-dependency is proposed: “A bidirectional relationship between two 
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infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to 
the state of the other”. A dependency is where the relationship is unidirectional. Examples 
of interdependencies are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2 Infrastructure categories (Rinaldi et al (2001) fig 1) 
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Figure 3 Infrastructure interdependencies (Rinaldi et al (2001) fig 3) 
 
Further useful classification terminology from Rinaldi et al (2001) is the spatial scale 
extended from Perrow’s taxonomy (see the glossary). 
 
Examples of attempts to model interdependencies mathematically with a view to 
quantifying vulnerabilities and hence resilience can be seen in papers by Attoh-Okine et al 
(2009) and Utne et al (2011). 
 
Utne et al use Johansson and Jonsson’s identification of “two types of approaches for 
dependency modelling/analysis - empirical and predictive approaches”. Their paper uses 
an empirical ‘risk and vulnerability analysis’ together with cascade diagrams to 
investigate actual incidents and quantify the resulting risks arising ‘downstream’ of the 
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incident. The empirical approach has the advantage of simplicity for practitioners, lends 
itself to the use of ILS techniques in analysis and is more in line with the approach 
favoured by Scottish Government resilience forums (Scottish Government CNI group 
2011).  
 
Attoh-Okine et al (2009) attempt to formulate a resilience index, starting from an index 
derived through earthquake engineering and using ‘belief function frameworks’ to cope 
with the usual practical situation where failure and event data is incomplete and subject to 
change with time. It depends upon expert engineering input to quantify essential factors, 
as would any over-arching methodology seeking a practical application. The hypothesis of 
this current MSc thesis is that ILS techniques can be used to marshal that expert input – 
i.e. that ILS can provide the essential ‘bottom up’ input to best utilise a modelling 
methodology.    
 
In terms of differentiating between the characteristics of national infrastructures, an 
important observation is made in the Natural Hazards and Infrastructure (2011) report 
between the network design standards of the electricity transmission and distribution 
networks (very effective in their ability to prevent disruption) and the lack of ‘freeboard 
capacity’ in the water and transport networks, due to the far higher costs of providing 
redundancy therein. 
One especially relevant feature of increasingly complex interdependent networks is their 
propensity to fail quickly with little warning (Ferguson 2011). If physical infrastructures 
are to become increasingly complex to the extent that they mimic natural, economic and 
political systems then an accompanying characteristic is the risk that they become non-
deterministic and fail in an unpredictable fashion. This is exactly the most catastrophic 
failure type which a resilience analysis must guard against.   
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2.2 Resilience 
2.2.1 Definition and contemporary importance 
 
“The concept of resilience is central to any systematic approach for protecting the nation’s 
critical infrastructure systems from both natural disasters and intentional acts” 
(Willingham 2008). Definitions of resilience have been formulated by a range of authors 
writing in this field. Early definitions came from the biological use of the term, i.e. a 
measure of the ability of plant life to endure in the face of external attack. Attoh-Okine et 
al, (2009) quotes Holling’s definition “resilience determines the persistence of 
relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb 
change state variable, driving variables, and parameters and still persist”. The term can 
also be used in a sociological and economic context and Dawley et al (2010) apply it to 
peripheral geographic areas in terms of their ability to withstand economic shocks. This 
brings out the ‘adaptive capacity’ strand of resilient behaviour i.e. an ‘elastic bounce’ is 
not the only type of recovery. Resilience engineering is an emergent academic discipline 
(Hollnagel 2006) although it has strong links to reliability and safety engineering. This 
research is concerned solely with improving resilience of civil engineering infrastructure, 
where definitions have been formulated in both academic and government publications. 
Most of these have two aspects; protection against failure and recovery after failure.  
 
One of the most succinct is attributed to the 17th century French poet Jean de La Fontaine 
(Willingham 2008) “I bend but do not break”. This captures the ‘bounce back’ nature of 
resilience but only relating to personal performance under pressure.  “the ability of the 
community, services, area or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident” 
is quoted by the Pitt Report in 2008. This again captures the broadly understood gist of the 
term but a more precise and focussed definition is required for current purposes.  
 
A more fulsome attempt is made (Allenby and Fink, 2005) with ”the capacity of 
infrastructure, service and social systems potentially exposed to hazards from technical, 
natural or intentional events to adapt either by resisting system degradation or by readily 
restoring and maintaining acceptable levels of functioning, structure and service following 
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an event” This introduces aspects of the threats which must be combated (hazards from 
technical, natural or intentional events), the elements of restored service (functioning, 
structure and service), and the twin resilience functions of protection (resisting system 
degradation) and recovery (restoring and maintaining). It is probably too wide ranging for 
use here as it includes ‘service and social systems’ which we are not concerned with. 
“The ability of a network to defend against and maintain an acceptable level of service in 
the presence of challenges” is stated by Smith et al (2011) and has the advantage of 
including the concept of service levels; an important aspect of performance measurement 
in relation to infrastructure networks. Smith et al (2011) go on to attempt to model the risk 
exposure which challenges resilience as a multiple of 3 aspects: the probability of a 
challenge occurring, the probability of that challenge causing failure and the impact 
(consequences) of a failure. This sets up a priority list against which resilience measures 
can be put in place. 
 
Rosenkrantz et al (2009), in common with others working in the field, use model 
networks of nodes and links to investigate how many nodes and links can be destroyed 
before service is affected. This allows them to use redundancy (i.e. duplicated or spare 
nodes and links) to increase resilience. This is unlikely to be cost effective for civil 
engineering aspects of infrastructure systems where spares provision (being more 
expensive than small tele/electrical items) is likely to only be part of the answer.  These 
models are generally based on electrical and telecom networks. Notions of service 
oriented networks, node resilience, service continuation despite damage, and graphical 
representation of resilience have application potential for civil engineering. 
 
Ridley (2011) looks at adding resilience as a strand of existing corporate social 
responsibilities (CSR) of companies. The argument is that the understanding of the 
relationship between government and businesses already inherent in a corporate social 
responsibility approach could be put to use in analysing the resilience of infrastructure. 
This is interesting in the context that much of the civil engineering infrastructure in the 
UK (and US) is run by private companies (OFT 2010 report). Depending on the 
regulatory method there may or may not be a direct route to apply pressure on these 
companies to ensure a resilient service. While loss of reputation is a major consequence of 
service failure (Yorkshire Water supply shortfalls in 1996 drought, Northern Ireland water 
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supply shortfalls in 2010, Highway winter protection problems in 2010 in Scotland), the 
need to report resilience as part of the CSR duties would increase its priority. Ridley’s 
paper includes no analysis of examples of this claimed benefit however. 
This issue of the market value of resilience is picked up by Collins, (2011), who 
recognises “Unless the market puts a value on resilience under extreme conditions it is 
unlikely that any unregulated operator will invest in a capability to provide it, and a 
regulated one will only do so if instructed”. Collins also gives an overall background as to 
why system resilience is important; because “their operation is now very highly 
optimised, tightly scheduled and modally interdependent”. “Awareness by the general 
public of vulnerabilities in the national infrastructure is low, but reactions are swift and 
often heated when things go wrong” (Council for Science and Technology 2009). 
 
 The double functions of protection and recovery are continued with a 4 part UK 
government breakdown of the term (Cabinet Office: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure 
2011). Figure 4, taken from the report, is shown below: 
 
Figure 4 Features of Resilience (Cabinet Office: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure 2011) 
 
The resistance and reliability elements are essentially concerned with protection against a 
known range of events, generally specified to an ‘expected’ standard. Response and 
recovery, plus redundancy allow consideration of behaviour following failure arising out 
of an extreme event. It is possible to regard redundancy as part of the protection group, 
but only if the replacement functional service operates after failure of a part and before 
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failure of asset service levels. For our purposes the 4 elements may be considered 
separately. The bulk of the Cabinet Office guide goes on to examine elements of figure 3 
in their report, repeated in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
Figure 5 Sharing Information on Resilience (Cabinet Office: Natural Hazards and 
Infrastructure 2011) 
 
Most of the guide examines organisational methods of bringing people together to identify 
vulnerabilities and tackle resilience. Improving security against progressive failure, in 
particular, is the principal aim.  Interdependencies must be understood with the aim of 
avoiding a domino effect.  
 
In contrast, the NIAC report of 2009 removes protection from a resilience definition thus: 
“Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of 
disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends 
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upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and/or rapidly recover from a potentially 
disruptive event.” 
One further feature of resilience is that it is necessarily threat specific i.e. the nature and 
scale of the threat must be known or decided upon before any resilience engineering is 
undertaken or assessed. A system which is resilient against a 1 in 200 year flood event 
may be anything but in the eventuality of a 1 in 300 year flood. 
 
Looking at system resilience from an engineering designer viewpoint; the need for cost 
effectiveness guides us towards ensuring that protection against high probability events is 
managed by adherence to a design specification. Society must take a view on whether 
specifications cover low probability, high consequence events and in many cases (e.g. 
flooding of nuclear reactors), protection will be designed in. As it is generally not cost 
effective to design protection against low probability events the system will normally be 
designed to fail in these circumstances. It is this functional failure that the response and 
recovery element (figure 4) of resilience must seek to mitigate. This has two measurable 
dimensions; impact and duration.   
 
These two aspects are treated slightly differently elsewhere (Vugrin et al 2011) as 
systemic impact and total recovery effort. This recognises that the effectiveness of the 
effort put in after a disruptive event can control the duration of the consequent lack of 
service. These two metrics are defined, graphically illustrated and used to cost different 
recovery strategies. Vugrin includes a definition of resilience thus “Given the occurrence 
of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the resilience of a system to that event 
(or events) is the ability to reduce efficiently both the magnitude and duration of the 
deviation from targeted system performance levels”. This ignores the ‘protection’ element 
of resilience but recognises the two elements of ‘deviation’ and ties resilience firmly to 
specific events. One improvement might be to substitute ‘service levels’ for ‘performance 
levels’.   
 
Willingham usefully recognises that failure protection is usually focussed on “high 
probability events” with a range of consequences between high and low scale damage. 
From a designer viewpoint the inclusion of ‘protection’ in a definition of resilience is 
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potentially problematical as a standard specification ought to protect against high 
probability events. 
 
Cabinet Office: Natural hazards and Infrastructure (2011) states that “resilience of 
infrastructure is provided through (a) good design of the network and systems to ensure it 
has the necessary resistance, reliability and redundancy (spare capacity), and (b) by 
establishing good organisational resilience to provide the ability, capacity and capability 
to respond and recover from disruptive events. The latter is gained through business 
operations and appropriate support for business continuity management.”  This definition 
usefully reminds us that organisational improvements are as important as engineering 
ones and, indeed, ILS can be applied to processes as well as physical assets. 
 
In essence then, normal design standards should cover protection against failure by high 
probability events. Resilient design needs to concern itself with the effects of failure 
following low probability events (prioritising the high impact end of the range). The ILS 
exercise will need to consider failure modes (how will it fail?) plus how to minimise 
magnitude and duration of the deviation from required service levels.  
 
This research will primarily investigate the recovery aspect, (i.e. the NIAC approach). 
This research will also emphasise the physical engineering aspects or features rather than 
the (equally important) communication, management arrangements and emergency 
services organisational aspects, both because ILS is better suited to these types of 
solutions and because organisational arrangements are already being tackled by 
governments (e.g. the Scottish government’s resilience committee). Both these boundary 
conditions (recovery aspect plus physical engineering aspects) lead to the selection of 
Vugrin’s definition as being the most relevant and useful, albeit with the substitution of 
service levels rather than performance levels. 
 
“Given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the resilience of a 
system to that event (or events) is the ability to reduce efficiently both the magnitude and 
duration of the deviation from targeted system service levels” is this author’s preferred 
definition of resilience and is included in the glossary. 
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Vugrin also categorises system features which are affected by resilience enhancements. 
These are absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity and restorative capacity and these offer at 
least the prospect of a qualitative framework to compare events and resilient responses. 
Resilient infrastructure is a high priority for western governments. An appreciation of the 
critical level of support to society, complex interdependencies between systems and the 
vulnerability to external threats combine to require action at the top level.  The NIAC 
(2009) report, for example, recommends “The White House should leverage its authority 
and leadership on resilience to coordinate and adjudicate conflict among regulatory 
agencies and actions in each sector to support the established resilience goals”. 
 
The UK government is similarly focussed with its Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
Programme, National Resilience Extranet and the consultation paper ‘Natural Hazards and 
Infrastructure’ of March 2011. This is supplemented by direct guidance to the regulated 
utilities in the ‘Interim Guidance to the Economic Regulated Sectors’ on how to build and 
maintain resilience. Much activity is also underway between emergency organisations, 
utility companies and local government in terms of information exchange, policy 
development and mock emergency exercises. The Scottish Government, for example, has 
published a ‘Secure and Resilient’ report in 2011 which demonstrates much liaison 
activity. Much of the detail is necessarily restricted to limited circulation but the approach 
is to set up committees and communication networks involving utility representatives for 
example, rather than to draw together and record sensitive data about infrastructure which 
is particularly vulnerable.  
2.2.2 Threats 
 
Against what threats must infrastructures be made resilient? As mentioned in section 
2.2.1, any attempt to measure resilience can only be made in relation to foreseen threats.  
These threats can be classified into natural and man-made hazards. The aim of this section 
is to propose boundaries to the list and magnitude of threats to be considered.  
 
Natural threats can be listed as: earthquake, tsunami, landslide, volcano, tornado, 
hurricane, tidal surge, fluvial flooding, fire, environmentally driven chemical or biological 
deterioration, drought, freeze, snow and ice, monsoon or heavy rain, longer term climate 
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change risks. Man made threats can include nuclear explosion or radiation, bomb, war 
damage, traffic accident, environmental or process problem, consequences of economic 
shocks, longer term change of societal need, cyber-attack, civil disobedience, acts of 
deliberate aggression, chemical or biological deliberate attack and lack of maintenance. 
There can also be collateral damage from adjacent structures arising out of either natural 
or man-made causes. 
Resilient design efforts can still improve the recovery capability of a failed system 
following the impact of an unforeseen event but it would be unclear how cost effective 
any measures might be if we do not have a magnitude and probability of event to measure 
against. In other words, the benefit could not be quantitatively assessed.  
 
The UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review identifies 
international terrorism, cyber-attacks, major accidents and natural hazards as the four 
most serious risks. Of these four, detailed consideration of cyber-attacks would require 
information technology expertise which is beyond the capability of this researcher. In 
addition, UK readiness to deal with acts of terrorism is necessarily restricted in terms of 
open access to information so this would not allow in depth research either. This 
resilience assessment of threats to particular sections of infrastructure will therefore 
consider in detail only natural and accidental damage. 
 
The UK government (National Risk Assessment Team run from the Cabinet Office) has 
undertaken a national risk assessment to select the likelihood and potential impact of 
threats on a national scale (National Risk register 2010). These are shown graphically in 
figure 6 below. 
 
Both axes measure increases in the arrowed direction. Only major risks operating to a 
national scale are included i.e. those which require a co-ordinated response by central 
government, hence the low likelihood of a transport accident requiring a national 
response, for example.  The likelihood is based on an expert assessment of historical, 
statistical and scientific data, albeit the results do seem to give high consideration to 
terrorist attack. The impact is measured in terms of fatalities, personal illness or injuries, 
social disruption, economic damage and psychological impact in terms of disruption to 
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behavioural patterns. In terms of impact upon infrastructure the Centre for the Protection 
of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the relevant responsible body. 
 
 
 Figure 6, Nationally Significant Risks (National Risk register 2010) 
 
Suggested threat levels for natural hazards (only) to be guarded against is listed in the UK 
discussion paper (Cabinet Office: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure 2011). These are 
proposed as ‘reasonable worst case scenarios’ for the purpose of eliciting feedback and 
summarised in Table 3: 
 
There is little background evidence in the discussion paper for arriving at these proposed 
levels. They were derived by the Cabinet Office National Risk Assessment Team in 
conjunction with the Met Office, Environment Agency and the British Geological Survey 
and they appear to correspond to specification standards which should be protected 
against, rather than abnormal threats which a resilience exercise would measure recovery 
abilities against. Some amendments are likely, at least, in order to take account of 
geographic climate variability across the UK (e.g. wind speed limits look low when wind 
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speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour were recorded at the Tay road bridge in the first 
half of December 2011). 
 
 
Table 3 UK proposed threat levels 
Inland Flooding 1 in 200 year event 
Coastal Flooding Coastal defences breached over a wide area 
Wind Storm For at least 6 hours, mean speeds 70 mph 
and gusts to 85mph 
Cold Snowfall for 7 days, depth of 30cm and 
daily mean temperature of minus 3 degrees 
centigrade 
Heat For at least 5 days, max temperatures of 32 
and no lower than 15 degrees centigrade. 
Dry Periodic water supply interruptions for 10 
months. Emergency drought orders in place. 
Volcanic Ash Entire UK mainland affected for 10 days 
Severe Space Weather Duration to be decided. (Assume equivalent 
to volcanic ash meanwhile – author insert) 
Geological Threats Relevant factors listed 
 
 
Some cognizance of the consequences of failure also needs recognition when setting 
threat levels as a bridge’s failure to allow the passage of high sided vehicles requires 
much less recovery effort than the prospect of physical bridge damage. In effect there 
needs to be varying thresholds married against failure consequences, and checked against 
regional weather extremes, ideally on a whole life cost basis. In the meantime, they are a 
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current guide as to the cost effective limits which the UK government consider reasonable 
to consider the resilience of civil engineering infrastructure against. 
 
These levels of threat are a snapshot of contemporary risks. For any resilience measures to 
be durable and long lasting it would be advantageous if they exhibited intrinsic adaptive 
capacity. To estimate future environmental trends, it is possible to use climate change 
forecasts and future planning scenarios. 
 
In terms of climate change, a recent audit of Scottish progress,  “How well is Scotland 
preparing for climate change?” published by the UK adaptation sub-committee (2011) 
includes specific consideration of utility and transport networks. In overall terms the 
forecast includes warmer and drier summers, wetter and milder winters, together with a 
hard-to-quantify increase in frequency and impact of extreme weather events. Features of 
Scottish geography, society and organisation which have been particularly noted are: 
1/ Concentration of population in coastal urban centres 
2/ A number of vulnerable crowded transport and communication network corridors 
between population centres 
3/ A human population with a slightly older age profile compared to the rest of the UK. 
 
In terms of future planning scenarios there are Chatham House reports by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (Unsettled times, 3 stony paths to 2015, 1996; Navigating 
uncharted waters, constructive approaches to complexity, 1997) plus more specific 
forecast scenarios including infrastructure effects from the Urban Futures research project 
2008-2012. 
 
The value of these forecasts is that the range of directions of travel (the design conditions 
envelope) can be used to list extremes against which future resilience of infrastructure can 
be tested i.e. it is not necessary to take a view on the most plausible ‘direction of travel’; 
only to test network service levels against reasonable limits in any direction. In other 
words, if the possible average temperature increase can range from zero to 4 degrees and 
winter precipitation increase from zero to 10 percent then resilience against heavy 
snowfall would take the zero degree, 10 percent higher precipitation route. Similarly, if 
traffic intensities were forecast to increase between minus 20 and plus 50%, say then the 
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most onerous could be used to test resilience in combination with climate change 
forecasts. 
 
Therefore, it is envisaged that natural and accidental events can be quantified to test 
resilience by modifying the cabinet office report limits in line with a combination of 
forecast climate change effects and sociological future planning scenarios. 
2.3 The role of asset management 
2.3.1 Definition and purpose 
 
The Publicly Available Specification (PAS) 55 definition of asset management is “the 
systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organisation 
optimally and sustainably manages its assets and asset systems, their associated 
performance, risks and expenditures over their life cycles for the purpose of achieving its 
organisational strategic plan.”  
 
The European Federation for National Maintenance Societies has a simpler definition, 
reported in Lloyd (2010), “the optimal lifecycle management of physical assets to 
sustainably achieve the stated business objectives.”  
 
The draft ISO 55000 definition of asset management is (Asset Management – an anatomy) 
“the co-ordinated activities of an organisation to realise value from assets”. 
 
The UK Institute of asset management website states the profession “deals with the 
optimal management of physical asset systems and their life cycles. It represents a cross-
disciplinary collaboration to achieve best net, sustained value for money in the selection, 
design/acquisition, operations, maintenance and renewal/disposal of physical 
infrastructure and equipment.” 
 
An earlier International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM), 2002 edition, 
definition is “The combination of management, financial, economic, engineering and 
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other practices applied to physical assets with the objective of providing the required level 
of service in the most cost-effective manner”. 
 
Due to the comprehensive supporting details available within PAS 55, and the 
contemporary work taking place to develop this into an international standard, this author 
proposes to use the PAS55 definition for the purposes of this research. This is also 
consistent with the use of the same reference for the cross-industry asset management 
comparison outlined in section 3.1. 
 
The range of definitions reflects both the ‘big picture’ character and lack of maturity in 
this field. None of these definitions is particularly helpful in assisting our understanding 
of the detailed improvements which good asset management seeks to promote. A better 
explanation follows from consideration of a list of questions which effective asset 
management should help organisations to answer (Institute of Asset Management 2011: 
Asset Management – an anatomy), reproduced below: 
• Do you understand the risk profile associated with your asset portfolio and how this will 
change over time? 
• Do you understand the business consequences of reducing your capital investment or 
maintenance budgets by  ten percent over the next five years? 
• Can you justify your planned asset expenditures to external stakeholders? 
• Can you easily identify which investment projects to defer when there are funding or 
cash flow constraints? 
• Do you have the appropriate asset data and information to support your Asset 
Management decision-making? 
• Do you know if your people have the right competences and capabilities to manage your 
assets? 
• Do you know which Asset Management activities to out-source? 
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The same source goes on to state that asset management “converts the fundamental aims 
of the organization into the practical implications for choosing, acquiring (or creating), 
utilizing and looking after (maintaining) appropriate assets to deliver those aims. And it 
does so while seeking the best total value approach (the optimal combination of costs, 
risks, performance and sustainability).” 
 
The broad basis of asset management, combined with the range of origins of technical 
specialists whose work brings them into contact with the developing discipline, mean that 
any definition must be wide ranging. The ‘meaning’ of the discipline is best captured, as 
above, by listing elements of its purpose.  
 
A recent analysis of the scope and content of asset management is listed in the contents of 
‘Asset Management – an anatomy’ which includes 39 subjects in 6 groups as shown in  
Table 4. Resilience Analysis is specifically included in group 6, subject 2, where it is 
described in business continuity terms.   
 
Table 4 Anatomy of Asset Management 
 SUBJECT GROUP SUBJECT 
Asset Management Strategy and Planning Asset Management Policy 
Asset Management Strategy 
Demand Analysis 
Strategic Planning 
Asset Management Plans 
Asset Management Decision-Making Capital Investment Decision-Making 
Operations & Maintenance Decision-
Making 
Life Cycle Cost and Value Optimisation 
Resourcing Strategy and Optimisation 
Shutdowns & Outage Strategy and 
Optimisation 
Aging Assets Strategy 
Lifecycle Delivery Activities Technical Standards & Legislation 
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Asset Creation & Acquisition 
Systems Engineering 
Configuration Management 
Maintenance Delivery 
Reliability Engineering and Root cause 
analysis 
Asset Operations 
Resource Management 
Shutdown/Outage Management 
Incident Response 
Asset Rationalisation & Disposal 
Asset Knowledge Enablers Asset Information Strategy 
Asset Knowledge Standards 
Asset Information Systems 
Asset Data & Knowledge 
Organisation and People Enablers Contract & Supplier Management 
Asset Management Leadership 
Organisational Structure & Culture 
Competence & Behaviour 
Risk and Review Criticality, Risk Assessment & 
Management 
Contingency Planning & Resilience 
Analysis 
Sustainable Development 
Weather & Climate Change 
Assets & Systems Performance & Health 
Monitoring 
Assets & Systems Change Management 
Management Review, Audit and Assurance
Accounting Practices 
Stakeholder Relations 
 
Those same 6 groups are alternatively shown in the conceptual model shown in Figure 7. 
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Fig 7 Institute of Asset Management Conceptual Model (from Asset Management - an 
Anatomy) 
 
2.3.2 Whole life costing and whole life risk analysis 
 
Consideration of a life cycle view and decision making on a whole life cost basis are 
recognized as critical to effective asset management and “is now accepted by the civil 
engineering community throughout the world” (Frangopol and Furuta 2000). This 
accounts for a complete group of life cycle delivery activities and a ‘life cycle cost and 
value optimisation’ topic being in the asset management anatomy considered in 2.3.1 
Indeed, one of the core principles of asset management is the duty to consider the 
value/cost of alternatives or intervention strategies on a life cycle basis. This principle 
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also applies to any resilience analysis, vulnerability and threat analysis or any other risk 
analysis where competing outcomes or actions are compared, in as far as detailed data are 
available to support decision making. There is some contractor and commissioning client 
experience of assessing whole life costs arising out of the UK private finance initiative 
(PFI) programme of capital works.  
 
A multidisciplinary approach to obtaining maximum economic benefit from physical 
assets over their complete life cycle, or terotechnology, was developed in the UK around 
1960 (Boussabaine & Kirkham 2004). It involves systematic application of engineering, 
financial, and management expertise in the assessment of the lifecycle impact of an 
acquisition. This was followed by a development of terminology (Boussabaine & 
Kirkham 2004) to ‘cost-in-use’, ‘life-cycle costing’, ‘whole life-cycle costing’ up to the 
ISO 15686 terminology below. 
 
Definitions of whole life cost (WLC) and life cycle cost (LCC) are included in ISO 
15686, part 5, as below: 
 WLC is the “methodology for the systematic economic consideration of all whole life 
costs and benefits over a period of analysis as defined in the agreed scope”.  It thus 
includes all relevant costs and benefits (including LCC, non-construction costs, income 
and externalities) but can be applied to any duration under analysis. 
LCC is the “cost of an asset, or its parts throughout its life cycle, while fulfilling the 
performance requirements”. The duration is ‘set’ but all economic factors are not. These 
costs are directly attributable to the element in question, over the construction, 
maintenance, operation, occupancy and end of life periods. 
 
Whole life costing typical stages for infrastructure assets are listed in table 5 below. 
 
It is worth noting that ‘life’ can mean economic, functional, legal, physical, social or 
technological life. 
The need for a common work breakdown structure as a means of comparing and trading 
off capital and maintenance works in order to arrive at the lowest WLC determination has 
been recognised. Marenjak (2004) has proposed a structure for building work. 
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Table 5 Life cycle phases (Source: CIRIA report C677, 2009, Table 1.2) 
 
 
 
 A corresponding structure for consideration of infrastructure elements needs to be 
developed and this could be based on an adapted Civil Engineering Standard Method of 
Measurement. McNicol (2008) has tackled this and the proposal could be the basis of any 
framework. Any whole life cost exercise for highway works will take account of proposed 
depreciation and accounting rules outlined in the CIPFA Code of Practice on Transport 
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Infrastructure Assets 2010. Some of the advice on discount rates and asset lifespans will 
be more widely applicable. 
 
The companion need to ensure that staff time spent on analysing elements of assets is cost 
effective (that the analysis exercise adds more value than it costs) is also important if asset 
management tools and principles are to be widely used. One way of focussing resources 
on the most important elements is to use the ‘theory of significance’ used by Marenjak 
(2004). This demonstrates low percentage errors in overall cost turnouts when costs are 
optimised only for elements which individually total higher than the average element cost 
for the project i.e. only the most cost significant elements need be assessed in any 
comparison or analysis.   
There is a considerable body of academic papers and textbooks concerned with bridge and 
structure maintenance on a whole life basis (Frangopol & Furuta 2000, Ang 2008, 
Frangopol & Liu 2007). These usually include statistical treatments of risks, loading, 
environmental factors and load carrying capability.  
 
A whole life costing web based tool has been developed in the University of Dundee; 
marketed by a spin off company called Whole Life Consultants Ltd, complies with ISO 
15686, and is flexible enough to be applied to infrastructure elements. This could be used 
to undertake whole life cost comparisons and associated sensitivity analyses.  
While whole life costing is a major element of asset management, the main objective of 
stages 1 and 2 of this research is to assess progress in implementation of asset 
management in the UK. It will therefore also be useful to look at the history behind the 
world-wide growth of the discipline of asset management.  
 
2.3.3 Development of asset management 
 
The modern discipline of ‘asset management’ of physical (as opposed to financial) assets 
has developed in the English speaking world but has now spread world-wide with the 
publication of international standard ISO 55000 in 2014 and the formation of the Global 
Forum on Maintenance and Asset Management, which is an umbrella group for national 
associations. Members include the Society for Maintenance and Reliability Professionals 
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in the USA started in 1992 and the UK Institute of Asset Management, founded by utility 
companies in 2004. 
 
Two examples of the origins of asset management should suffice to explain the drivers 
behind this discipline. Foster & Monkman (2000) list several factors behind the 
importance of asset management in New Zealand, leading to the publication of their first 
asset management manual in 1996. These factors are: 
 Large amounts of similar aged infrastructure requiring renewal at the same time.  
 Difficult decisions on prioritising expenditure; arising from the above. 
 Political recognition and support of the importance of planning for the long term   
viability and maintenance costs of infrastructure. 
 Paying for historical deferred maintenance; i.e. a backlog had built up 
 Regulatory issues; local authorities required infrastructure owners to quantify and 
fund asset depreciation adequately. This included the requirement to compile 
asset management plans. 
 
Their National Asset Management Steering Group (NAMS) now supplies an International 
Infrastructure Management Manual 11th edition and is a combined effort of New Zealand 
and Australian professional bodies. 
 
Al-Hajj and Al-Saadi (2002) describe the origins of asset management in the North Sea 
oil and gas sector for Shell Group. The twin shocks of a drop in oil price along with 
increased safety costs arising from the Piper Alpha disaster in the second half of the 
1980’s demanded a rethink of organisational and operational costs which resulted both in 
the implementation of ILS techniques together with an ending of ‘silo working’ in the 
industry. Their asset reference plans encourage team-working and provide single point 
accountabilities which allow improved control over expenditures. Overall benefits are 
claimed “The asset management process enables one to maximise the value of an asset by 
making use of resources, i.e. staff, money and technology, over the life cycle of the asset. 
It will certainly enhance efficiency, integrity, productivity, reserves replenishment and 
ultimate recovery (growth) of a company and therefore profit” 
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The CIRIA C677 report (2009) gives a range of examples of the application of asset 
management across utility and infrastructure sectors in the UK. Case study examples of 
rail, marine, roads and water applications give a flavour of recent use.  
A view of the dissemination of asset management practice in the UK is described in 
section 4.1. 
 
2.3.4 Application to resilience and future threats 
 
Along with a life cycle view, the analysis tools suggested within asset management guides 
are the technical ‘engine’ behind value improvements arising out of adoption of an asset 
management philosophy. ILS techniques are one set of these tools and are specifically 
included in sections 5.2.2 (Operations and maintenance decision-making) and 5.3.6 
(Reliability engineering & root cause analysis) of ‘Asset Management – an Anatomy’. 
Their potential value in failure analysis and related decision making is therefore 
acknowledged by asset management practitioners.  
One of the major changes in emphasis between ‘Asset Management – an Anatomy’ and 
the earlier PAS55 is the inclusion of an element of looking to the future as well as 
identifying future ‘shocks’ from a business continuity viewpoint. Thus sections 5.1.3 
(Demand analysis), 5.6.4 (Weather & climate change) and 5.6.2 (Contingency planning & 
resilience analysis) are given increased emphasis. The current summary of the state of 
understanding of the remit of asset management in the UK therefore specifically entreats 
practitioners to address the resilience of their operations in the face of future business 
threats. Reference is made to BS 25999 Business Continuity Management. The 
application of ILS techniques to threat and vulnerability studies, as part of the BS 25999 
business continuity framework is where ILS can contribute to resilience improvements. 
Woodhouse (2001) assesses a range of tools against a 5 part ‘total business impact’ score 
of measurable success including; reliability/risk management, efficiency, longevity, 
compliance and ‘shine’ factors. The tools are Total Quality Management and Six-Sigma, 
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Reliability-centred Maintenance, Total Productive Maintenance, Risk Based Inspection, 
and Root Cause Analysis. He makes the case for using a combination of these tools under 
an overall asset management programme. It is vital, therefore, to use the strengths of 
FMECA and RCM in resilience analysis, while being aware of the availability of other 
tools. It is also vital that enough detailed historical failure data is available and in this 
respect the importance of asset management in promoting collection and organisational 
improvements should be clear.    
 
2.4 The role of integrated logistics support 
2.4.1 History and application to civil engineering infrastructure 
 
Integrated logistic support (ILS) can be defined as: a structured management approach 
aimed at ensuring that assets are designed and maintained to deliver maximum whole life 
value whilst achieving the required levels of performance and reliability (based upon 
Blanchard & Fabrycky 1991). Availability, reliability, durability, maintainability, 
supportability and safety are all considered in as much detail as possible, normally by an 
expert panel. ILS comprises a suite of tools including failure modes, effects and criticality 
analysis (FMECA); reliability centred maintenance (RCM); Availability, reliability and 
maintainability analysis (ARM); level of repair analysis (LORA); fault tree analysis 
(FTA); logistic support analysis (LSA). These are defined in the glossary. 
The application of ILS techniques has developed from US military requirements, through 
development in the US aeronautical industry, to more widespread adoption by oil and gas 
companies, followed by worldwide utilities. These techniques can be seen as a tool chest 
and have proven their effectiveness in practical applications. Definitions, rules and 
guidance are included in U.S. military standards, e.g. MIL.STD-1388 (US Department of 
Defense 1983). They have traditionally been applied to electrical and mechanical systems 
as these systems have a/ regular failures of small components which can disrupt 
functionality, b/ regular time consuming maintenance needs, c/ shown failure patterns and 
predictable design lives through study of comprehensive failure data. This research aims 
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to discover whether this organisational focus on reduced maintenance costs can be 
replicated when applied to resilience of civil engineering infrastructure. A demonstration 
of the applicability of FMECA and RCM (the other tools generally require more data than 
has been available for civil engineering and building elements) to building elements (El-
Haram & Horner 2002) has demonstrated the potential for significant overall cost savings. 
Marenjak (2004) has also applied these techniques to whole life costing of building 
structures and repeated the demonstration of savings, albeit the effectiveness of 
application is hindered by lack of systematic recording of failure data. 
 ILS techniques therefore depend on the availability of relevant data regarding life 
duration, maintenance regimes, condition surveys and these are all more likely to exist in 
an organised form when an asset management strategy is in place. 
FMEA is essentially a structured method of assessing failure modes and their effects, 
using a group of experts who have access to historic failure data. An RCM exercise takes 
the results of the FMEA analysis and establishes optimum maintenance practices to 
minimise overall costs.   
The purposes of an FMECA are (Jones 2006): 
a) Hazard elimination 
b) To identify where the loss of function results in the loss of whole system 
functionality  
c) To provide a clear method for determining when a loss of function has occurred 
and to aid in diagnosing which item has to be repaired 
d) To provide a basis for support planning (i.e. to resurrect the system in case of 
failure) 
The objectives of an RCM exercise are (Anderson & Neri 1990) 
1/ to make certain that equipment achieves the defined reliability level 
2/ to reduce unscheduled maintenance and eliminate ineffective preventive maintenance 
3/ to focus maintenance consideration on a system that may affect safety, environment, 
economics or operation 
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4/ to increase system availability 
Documented records of the application of ILS techniques to civil engineering 
infrastructure are patchy. The impression is given that FMEA has been applied on limited 
examples (Atkins and Arup 2011 reports for the rail industry). Penetration has been 
deepest in the energy supply sector (oil, gas, nuclear) and regulated sectors (energy and 
water distribution plus telecommunications).  The rail industry use of ILS is described in 
papers by Marquez et al (2007), Quigley et al (2006) and Reynolds (1998). Two 
International Atomic Energy Agency papers (Hezoucky 2007 and IAEA 2008) cover the 
nuclear generation industry and Komari (2009) covers information technology. Water 
company applications are often mentioned in their annual reports to the regulator.  
  
2.4.2 Barriers to successful transference 
 
In order to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of transferring ILS techniques to civil 
engineering infrastructure it will be necessary to compare resources expended (input – 
mostly staff time) against economic advantages arising from the exercise (resulting from 
maintenance practice changes and increased resilience to threats). This requires a whole 
life cost comparison which depends upon the use of a common costing framework for 
construction and operational activities. 
 
Data sufficiency is a major potential impediment. Historically, people responsible for civil 
engineering construction and maintenance have not been focused on accurately recording 
failure data. It may be that the successful application of ILS techniques will provide an 
incentive for better record keeping in future. 
 
There is a general perception that the range of environmental and loading factors which 
combine to cause civil engineering failures are so variable and site specific that an 
exercise in fault identification may not be transferable to similar sites and future 
applications. In other words, the staff time expended in an ILS assessment may not yield 
overall benefits. The theory of significance (see the glossary) may obviate this by 
allowing concentration on the most important elements only.  
50 
 
 
It is accepted that mechanical and electrical systems include components which will fail 
and require replacement at approximately predictable intervals. The increased wear due to 
motion or electrical use makes this inevitable or at least cost effective. Many civil 
infrastructure elements or structures, however, have larger factors of safety against failure 
because either the consequences of failure or service interruption are large or the scale of 
resources required to replace failed elements is large. Often these two factors are 
combined. Some infrastructure elements are effectively designed for an infinite life e.g. 
some major trunk roads, providing regular maintenance is undertaken (carriageway 
surfacing). In essence, an over-design is necessary to cope with ill-defined environmental 
and loading conditions and this over-design minimises the subsequent maintenance needs. 
The perception is that this reduces the scope for offsetting construction and maintenance 
costs which may arise from an ILS exercise.  
These characteristics of civil engineering elements make local knowledge of 
circumstances more useful than an accurate quantifiable analysis of, say, mean time to 
failure for any element. For example, two identical diesel engines in two different 
enclosures/buildings may be expected to have similar lives; the same may not be true of 
two identical bridges in different rivers or different climatic zones. This leads many civil 
engineers to prioritise judgement over calculation whereas this priority is likely to be 
reversed for mechanical and electrical engineers.  
This ‘long life’ characteristic also means that the lifespan of civil engineering elements 
may be determined by obsolescence in economic, social or functional ways as alternatives 
to physical failure. This will also need to be taken into account in any ILS analysis.  
 
Marenjak (2004) identifies defining characteristics of the aerospace and construction 
industries as; 
 Traditional construction industry normally allots design and production into 
separate, defined responsibilities but in the aerospace industry design and production are 
highly integrated through the use of IT systems 
 In the construction industry, traditionally, tendering is normally decided on price 
instead of value, whereas in the aerospace industry the opposite is true. 
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 In the construction industry, traditionally, suppliers are rarely consulted early in 
the design phase, whereas in the aerospace industry suppliers are involved from concept 
design to assembly. 
 Traditional construction industry practice does not always fully consider whole 
life costs during design, whereas in the aerospace industry performance, whole life cost 
and ILS are very important 
 
These differences are being blurred to some extent both by enlightened construction 
clients plus the increasing use of electrical and IT systems in conjunction with civil 
infrastructure. The increasing interdependencies arising are more suited to an ILS 
analysis, particularly one focusing on resilience.   
 
2.4.3 Application to ensure resilience 
 
FMEA and FMECA are risk assessment tools. Their purpose is to allow systematic 
investigation into failure modes and consequences. While this is usually followed by an 
RCM exercise to determine cost effective maintenance needs in order to guard against 
failure, the technique is equally pertinent to a study of the resilience of a system. If 
protection and recovery are both included within the definition of resilience the ILS 
analysis needs to extend to include the recovery element. If recovery only is being 
considered this is also applicable.  
‘Asset Management – an Anatomy’ suggests a threat and vulnerability study be 
undertaken as the main analytical stage of a resilience analysis. The ILS suite seems 
suited to such an exercise.  
 
This suite of tools allows a disciplined ‘bottom up’ way of using a risk analysis approach 
to a/ assess system vulnerabilities and resilience both within a sector and also to b/ 
compare and prioritise vulnerabilities of cross sector interdependencies in terms of their 
effect on overall systems resilience. Results can either be used directly within a local area 
or, longer term, used as input to network models in order to establish resilience indices or 
similar. 
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2.5 Summary 
2.5.1 Problem statement 
 
 Such is the complexity of modern physical infrastructure, and their interdependencies, 
that expert input to vulnerability and threat analyses is required in order to identify 
systemic resilience inadequacies. ILS techniques can empower these analyses but depend 
on the availability of relevant data regarding life duration, maintenance regimes, condition 
surveys and these are all more likely to exist in an organised form when an asset 
management strategy is in place. 
This literature review has shown the current state of progress in the application of 
resilience, ILS and asset management upon the management of physical civil engineering 
infrastructure. The hypothesis of this research is that ILS techniques can be used to 
marshal expert input – i.e. that ILS can provide the essential ‘bottom up’ input to best 
utilise a modelling methodology in order to enhance resilience in a cost effective manner, 
within the bounds of corporate asset management planning. Section 4.1 shows progress in 
comparing asset management plans (AMPs). This has acted as a ‘way in’ to company 
AMPs which illustrates progress in useful areas such as data collection and existing use of 
ILS.  
 
A promising use of ILS may be in formalising the risk analysis of system 
interdependencies and vulnerabilities. A successful case study exercise has the potential to 
highlight gaps in resilience which can then be prioritised in order of whole life cost 
benefits. 
 
2.5.2 Boundaries and assumptions 
 
 Technological improvements as opposed to organizational and communication 
improvements will be prioritized. ILS is best suited to this and recommendations 
arising are more likely to be useful at a pan-organization level.  
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 Both protection and recovery aspects of resilience will be considered but more 
emphasis will be directed towards recovery as major incidents will require this 
focus. 
 Security threats (e.g. from terrorism) requiring specialized or confidential 
knowledge will not be specifically considered. 
 The exercise depends on enough detailed data on costing and business 
consequences of alternative solutions being made available from participating 
utilities in order to make an ILS exercise worthwhile. 
 
2.5.3 Parallel research 
 
The current importance of infrastructure resilience is being addressed by a number of 
wide ranging UK research centres and programmes, generally in a ‘top down’ manner. 
These include: Salvo project, Salford University Centre for Disaster Resilience, 
International Institute for infrastructure renewal and reconstruction (IIRR). University of 
Leeds Institute for Resilient Infrastructure, Cranfield University Resilience Centre, Living 
with Environmental Change, Stockholm Resilience Centre, University of Glamorgan 
Disasters and Resilience Centre, Loughborough University Centre for Organisational 
Resilience, UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium, Macro project. 
This University of Dundee research project will, in contrast, be ‘bottom up’ and will aim 
to establish the value of ILS techniques in assessing the resilience of physical 
infrastructure.   
 
2.6 Stage 1 
 
The UK government has identified nine national infrastructure sectors which require 
protection against hazards or attack: water, energy, transport, communications, health, 
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emergency services, finance, food and government (National Risk register of Civil 
Emergencies 2010 edition). The UK Infrastructure Group (2010) counts 5 civil 
engineering infrastructure sectors – the first four above; and waste.  Searching for 
evidence of asset management planning in the waste sector was unsuccessful and, while 
disruption to this industry would have national consequences, it differs from the other 4 
sectors in as much as the few fixed assets (tip sites and mechanical plant) are not usually 
regarded in system or network terms.  Civil engineering infrastructure assets are less of a 
business priority in this sector.  Also in terms of the criticality of resilience concerns, 
waste is probably the least important as there should be a period of grace before it 
becomes a problem. (Keeping the country running 2011). The waste sector has therefore 
not been considered further. 
Asset management principles and techniques are now spread globally through the 
auspices of the Global Forum on Maintenance and Asset Management.  Notable 
organisations contributing to this include the New Zealand Asset Management Steering 
Group (formed in 1995 and the organisation behind the International Infrastructure 
Management Manual), the UK Institute of Asset Management (formed in the early 1990s 
and the organisation behind PAS55) and the US Federal Administration Office of Asset 
Management. 
A literature search of publicly available asset management publications relating to the 4 
remaining UK sectors uncovered some difficulties. Whereas asset management is seen to 
be of primary importance for infrastructure owners in Australia and New Zealand, the 
relative youthfulness of the concept in the UK means that organisations describe their 
asset management benefits and progress as part of publications whose primary purpose is 
something else. The best example of this is the English and Welsh water companies who 
include much asset management information in their 5 yearly business plans.  Highways 
authorities (councils) similarly often include their highway asset management 
arrangements within a management plan which includes other departments and properties 
too.  Energy distribution companies usually produce maintenance plans rather than full 
asset management plans.  While direct access to water, transport and energy supply asset 
management planning information was confused by nomenclature, direct access to other 
energy and communications infrastructure sector plans suffered through lack of publicly 
available information. The shortage of primary sources meant that secondary sources had 
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to be relied on, which included textbooks, conference presentations, academic papers, 
interviews and articles included on the Institute of Asset Management (IAM) website.  
Assistance from a French transfer student for 3 months has contributed to this research 
effort by comparing stage 1 asset management implementation across the energy supply 
utility sector. 
Both IAM textbooks (Deadman and Lloyd) give authoritative overviews of asset 
management implementation. Both include appraisals of the  most appropriate 
applications of ILS and RCM tools, in comparison with rival techniques. Deadman 
introduces an ‘Asset Management Capability Model’ which shows how the best fit 
model for any company varies with business climate, sector complexity, regulatory 
goals, analytical tools required, company organisation and size, and team make up. This 
analysis of the factors affecting the shape of AM implementation is beyond the scope of 
this ‘snapshot’ of progress across the 4 main infrastructure sectors, however, but is very 
useful background where publicly available primary material is hard to uncover. 
2.7 Stage 2 
 
Asset Management Plans (AMPs) from the following organisations have been reviewed: 
Anglian Water, Yorkshire Water, Herts County Council, South Yorks Transport 
Partnership, Highland Council Roads, Transport Scotland, Glasgow City Council, 
Highways Agency, Scottish Water Delivery Plan, Stirling Council Roads, Newcastle City 
Council Highways, Bournemouth Highways. 
Dundee Transport Strategy and Moray Transport Strategy have also been reviewed. 
Detailed report sheets have been produced, comparing AMP progress against the 
requirements of PAS55, for the following organisations and these are included in 
appendix A2: 
Scottish Water, Anglian Water, Hertfordshire County Council Highways, South Yorkshire 
Highways, Transport Scotland. 
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From the above records, general comparisons and observations can be made and these 
are listed in section 4.2. 
2.8 Stage 3 
2.8.1 Resilience and reliability 
 
The contemporary importance of resilience to civil engineering infrastructure is related to 
(Rinaldi et al, 2001): 
 increasing interconnectedness between different systems (e.g. information 
technology and power supply networks supporting infrastructure) and the less 
obvious vulnerabilities which result. 
 Lengthened supply chains combined with budgetary pressures which can result 
in reduced capability headroom in the event of unforeseen circumstances. 
 Increased risks and uncertainties due to both human agency and environmental 
hazards. 
 Reduced public acceptance of failures, with consequential reductions in public 
standing of the relevant organisation and industry. 
 
Resilience can be understood as having 4 aspects; resistance, reliability, response and 
recovery, redundancy, (Cabinet Office, March 2011). Design or operational improvements 
can address any of these four elements. A fuller definition, adopted for use in this report, 
is: ‘Given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the resilience 
of a system to that event (or events) is the ability to reduce efficiently both the magnitude 
and duration of the deviation from targeted system service levels’ (adapted from Vugrin et 
al, September 2011).  
 
If it is wished to increase resilience then either resistance must be increased or, more 
usually, the “magnitude and duration of the deviation from targeted system service levels” 
must be reduced (Vugrin et al, 2011) In other words, recovery effort must be minimised. 
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One method of doing this is to introduce redundancy to the system. Another method is the 
use of ‘firebreaks’ to prevent large scale catastrophic collapse. “Service levels” in this 
instance have been equated to ‘availability to users’ in the system level FMECA exercise. 
FMECA methodology in particular, is designed to assess and prioritise the effect of 
failure causes on a system. It is a short step to use it as a central part of a resilience 
analysis. 
2.8.2 Case study description 
 
Designed by William Fairhurst and built by William Logan, the Tay Road Bridge 
construction was begun in March 1963 and was completed by August 1966. The River 
Tay is a tidal firth at this location with a width of 7365 feet, a maximum water depth of 60 
feet and a maximum tidal race of 6 knots. The bridge takes vehicles, services and 
pedestrians between Dundee and Fife. The Fife end (South) connects to a rural dual 
carriageway; the Dundee end to the city centre. 
The bridge consists of 42 spans of various lengths, although many are 180 feet. Each span 
consists of twin steel box girders with a concrete deck, supported on twin concrete 
columns. Total concrete weight is 140,000 tons, reinforcing bars 4,600 tons and structural 
steel 8,150 tons. Otherwise independent girders are linked with cross beams and the dual 
carriageway decks support a central precast concrete pedestrian walkway. The bridge 
supports one ten foot wide pedestrian/cyclist lane and two 22 foot wide dual 
carriageways. 
There is a continuous gradient rising from Dundee to Fife and the 4 navigation spans are 
towards the Fife end. Three piers at the two main navigation channels have recently been 
protected against ship collision damage by the construction of separate concrete bulwarks. 
Approximately 9.2 million vehicles are carried annually and there is a navigation 
requirement to allow ships to transit to and from Perth harbour. The nearest alternative 
Tay crossing is 25 miles distant; Friarton bridge at Perth. Therefore, a maximum 50 mile 
diversion would be necessary if the bridge ceased to function. 
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Operation and maintenance is the responsibility of the bridge manager and his 35 staff. 
Engineering control is vested in the chief engineer of Dundee District Council. Bridge 
affairs are managed by a board of councillors taken from the local councils of Dundee, 
Fife and Angus. Until February 2008 they were funded through traffic tolls but are now 
funded directly by the Scottish Government. Management arrangements are therefore 
separate from Transport Scotland’s trunk road management duties. This allows a tailoring 
of nationally recommended inspection and maintenance regimes to the specific needs of 
the bridge. 
Main replacement/augmentation works undertaken during the life of the bridge have been: 
Toll booth removal, all main bearings replaced, running surface heating cables installed 
near toll booths, viewing platforms removed, self-propelled maintenance gantries 
installed, North bank ramps realigned, collision protection to main navigation piers 
constructed, water main and throughput services cables removed, spalling concrete on 
columns repaired and cathodic protection system installed.  
Most of this information is taken from Scottish Screen Archives, 1967; Borthwick 1966; 
Tay Road Bridge website. 
2.8.3 Collection of records 
 
Documents and data have generally been supplied or verified by the bridge manager. The 
main sources are listed below. 
1/ Drawing TAY-REF-100-01: used to construct a unit based model of the physical 
structure.  
2/ Drawing TAY-REF-006-01: used to construct a unit based model of the physical 
structure. 
3/ Replies to Question list 26/04/12: used to verify the physical model and as background 
knowledge for the FMECA.  
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4/ Notes of meeting with bridge manager 25/04/12 and ICE bridge site visit 24/05/12: as 
for 3 above  
5/ Note of meetings with bridge manager 22/03/13 and 05-04-13: to verify both FMECAs 
and to give feedback on the RCM exercise.  
6/ Component function list and general data sheet gleaned from website, text book and 
film of bridge construction; Appendix B1: used to construct a unit based model of the 
physical structure. 
7/ Bridge management reports and records; the Tay Bridge website: used for the system 
FMECA exercise. 
8/ Operational restrictions between January 1999 and February 2013 inclusive: used for 
the probability, severity and detectability ratings for the system level FMECA. 
9/ Email responses to questions, of 29-01-13: used to inform the unit level FMECA and 
RCM exercises.  
10/ A list of major capital works expenditure to repair, replace and maintain parts of the 
bridge: used in section 2.8.5 to compare maintenance costs.  
 
2.8.4 Availability records 
 
Item 8 in section 2.8.3 includes all recorded periods of restriction or closure of the bridge 
to the nearest minute. These are reported at the 3 monthly Board meetings and summaries 
are made publicly available on the bridge website.  
These data have been analysed (Paraskevopoulos, 2013) and split down according to 
cause, duration and time of day or night. The principal causes of closures pictured in 
terms of closure durations are shown in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8 Causes of traffic restrictions  
The majority of the wind restriction periods have been in winter. The maintenance closure 
percentages have been raised due to one-off activities on the North ramps in 2010 and 
2011; but for this, the 22% would have been significantly reduced. Therefore, the 
principal cause of traffic restrictions, measured by time period, is due to high winds.  
By relating these to representative daily traffic flow numbers, an assessment of 
diversionary journey numbers and durations has been made in order to estimate the 
overall social costs of bridge closures and restrictions.  These social costs are based on 
Transport Scotland Value of Time guidance with a base year of 1999. The findings are 
summarised in Table 6. 
 
High Winds 
73.44%
Natural (rest) 
0.02%
Maintenance/
C 
Contractor 
Work  
   22.42% 
Human Causes 
(rest) 3.64% 
Causes of traffic restrictions
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Table 6 Total cost of traffic restrictions 
Total cost of traffic restrictions 1999-2012 £28,247,506 
Portion due to maintenance  £16,016,409 
Portion due to high winds £10,858,280 
Others £1,372,817 
 
Most of the restricted periods due to high winds impact on only a portion of vehicles, 
according to the wind speed trigger points below.  
Operational protocols for the bridge, in terms of wind speed, are listed below. 
Table 7 Wind speed thresholds 
Wind Speed Threshold Traffic Modifications 
45 miles per hour  No Double-Decker Buses  
60 miles per hour  No High-Sided Vehicles, Pedestrians, Cyclists  
70 miles per hour  Only cars allowed  
80 miles per hour  Total Closure  
This accounts for the wind costs being less than social costs due to maintenance, because 
maintenance closures usually affect all traffic. The maintenance costs are also increased 
due to unrepresentative years in 2010 and 2011, when major alterations were carried out 
to the North abutment spans. 
An annual summary of restricted periods due to high wind speed is shown below.  
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Figure 9 Wind speed restrictions 
In round terms there are 20 full days per year where traffic restrictions due to high winds 
are in place. As this is the major cause of traffic restrictions on the bridge, a search was 
undertaken to establish whether this problem had been tackled for other long bridges. The 
value of wind deflectors has been recognised for other long bridges such as the existing 
Severn bridge and the new Queensferry crossing so the effectiveness of these in 
improving the availability of the bridge to users has been recognised elsewhere. The Tay 
bridge stoppage data were therefore used to undertake a cost benefit exercise to assess the 
value of retrospective installation of wind shielding and the results are shown in section 
4.3.4. 
There are a number of qualifications to the employment of the data to this exercise, of 
which three of the most important are listed below: 
1/ Double decker buses have been assumed to divert via Perth rather than be replaced by 
single deckers. This may over-estimate the resultant costs. 
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2/ The financial model has taken no account of additional congestion in Dundee due to 
bridge restrictions. This may under-estimate the resultant costs. 
3/ A structural check on the ability of the bridge to carry the additional loading from the 
windshields has not been undertaken, therefore the feasibility has not been established. 
2.8.5 Records of expenditure on maintenance projects 
 
A list of significant expenditure on repair, replacement or enhancement projects since 
bridge construction in 1966 has been supplied or verified by the bridge manager. These 
have then been aggregated into categories, adjusted for construction inflation and shown 
at common 1966 rates in order to display relative costs at a common scale. A summary 
breakdown is shown in Table 8 below. There is no record, or awareness, of major 
expenditure on bridge maintenance prior to 1982 so all the costs have been incurred in the 
past 31 years. 
This summary allows the main maintenance requirements over the period 1982 to 2012 to 
be highlighted. 71% of the initial construction cost has been expended on major 
maintenance works up to year 46 of a 120 year design life. This excludes ramp 
realignment at the North bank, where the need for the works was prompted by the Dundee 
Waterfront development (and funded separately from the bridge board). The 
‘strengthening work’ includes both works to cope with heavier lorries plus the collision 
protection works at the navigation span piers. 
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Table 8 Maintenance expenditure summary 
Expenditure on 
Maintenance Projects Spend on 1966 equivalent base 
year (thousands) 
Percent of 
maintenance 
spend 
Parapet replacement 21.78 0.64 
Concrete repair 681.79 19.99 
Steel painting 342.24 10.04 
River surveys 2.15 0.06 
Maintenance access 251.09 7.36 
Joints 233.75 6.86 
Accommodation 14.84 0.44 
Surfacing enhancements 32.91 0.97 
Visitor improvements 23.33 0.68 
Control improvements 155.74 4.57 
Bearings 816.30 23.94 
Strengthening works 834.02 24.46 
Sub total 3409.93 100.00 
(Initial Construction) 4800   
Total 8209.93   
 
The value of this table is that it focusses management attention on the major lifecycle 
maintenance costs. Although not carried out under this project, both detailed FMECA and 
focussed RCM assessments could therefore be targeted at the major cost items in greater 
depth.
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Stages 1 and 2 
 
In order to compare asset management planning across sectors at stage 1 a common 
assessment benchmark is required.  Four templates were considered following a search of 
authoritative industry guidance.  The International Infrastructure Management Manual 
(IIMM) was considered but the structure didn’t readily lend itself to a ‘tick sheet’ list of 
headings to compare company progress. Difficulties acquiring an up to date copy also 
raised doubts about it being sufficiently up to date. 
There is a web based asset management maturity checklist from the Institute of Asset 
Management ( theiam.org ) but this is more useful as an audit tool where access is 
available to all company tools, techniques, case studies and staff interviews. For our 
purposes it is a little too detailed. A spreadsheet based list of headings (see appendix 
A1.2, from Lloyd (2010), based on Network rail regulation headings) was then trialled 
against a list of subject headings in Publicly Available Specification(PAS) 55.  
Reproducibility was checked by having 2 different researchers use them on the same 
reports and the checklist of PAS55 headings was found most manageable and had the 
most rigorous back up details (from the PAS55 text) to provide explanations to ensure 
consistency in application. These checklists were applied to asset management planning 
documents at stage 2 (see Appendix A2) and are listed in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 PAS 55 Asset Management Comparison Template 
4.1 (reference 
numbers from 
PAS 55) 
General requirements: Define and document the scope of the system; 
Control of outsourcing 
4.2 Asset management policy 
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4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
4.4.6 Information management 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
4.4.9 Management of change 
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4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and non-conformities
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance (with legal and regulatory requirements) 
4.6.4 Audit 
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
4.6.6 Records 
4.7 Management review 
 
3.2 Stage 3 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this assessment of the Tay Road Bridge operating and technical 
management arrangements is to apply Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) analytical tools 
with a view to assessing the extent to which they are helpful in identifying vulnerabilities, 
maintaining reliability and enhancing resilience. 
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The Tay Road Bridge had the following advantages as a civil engineering asset for an ILS 
case study: 
1/ The structure is a repetitive simple span structure. It is local and high profile, with 
easily defined physical and operational boundaries. The governing board was solely 
focussed on the bridge. 
2/ Bridge staff were open to sharing technical details, historic availability and 
maintenance spend records. They were willing to apply the necessary ‘real life’ checks on 
the results. 
3/ Cost penalties for restricted availability were easily calculated in that traffic numbers 
and diversion routes were easily defined. 
4/ Bridge staff were in the process of applying asset management thinking to their asset so 
the results of the exercise could be of operational benefit. 
 
Industry standard assessment methodology and associated forms have been tailored as 
necessary in order to highlight resilience and reliability as opposed to their normal 
function of risk control and minimising whole life costs. 
Two tools are applied; Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and 
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM). This arose out of earlier research (Marenjak 
2004) which identified these two as most likely to provide benefits when applied to 
physical infrastructure. Other ILS tools listed in 2.4.1 have potential value in specific 
circumstances but are less widely applicable.  
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was applied at two levels: a 
unit level and a system level. In addition to allowing comparison of the two sets of results, 
this dual approach allows consideration of the asset both as a conveyance system for 
users, and a physical or structural model to carry loads. Possible failure causes are also 
split into two: those affecting only reliability (i.e. those which the design might reasonably 
have been expected to include consideration for) and those arising from unforeseen and 
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less probable causes which are generally outwith normal design considerations. Both 
affect resilience. Both can cause functional failure. Widening the boundaries to include 
less frequent failure causes is particularly appropriate in long life, high cost investments 
such as civil engineering assets. That is, the failure costs to society are of such impact that 
consideration of less frequent failure causes is worthwhile. It is considered that 
consideration of a more detailed, say part, level (see “Infrastructure Spatial Scale for 
Analysis” in the glossary) will only be necessary if failure causes or modes depend on 
analysis at that level. An outline cost-benefit analysis of a physical improvement to aid 
resilience of the bridge is included to demonstrate that real improvements can arise from 
the application of ILS tools.  
The second tool, Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) is deployed on failure modes at 
a unit level. This results in recommended maintenance responses. Financial or operational 
improvements arising therefrom will always be application specific and can only be 
evaluated over time. There is the opportunity for results from these two exercises to be 
incorporated into the bridge asset management plan as that develops into a detailed 
document. The findings of the RCM exercise can feed into bridge staff efforts to increase 
or maintain bridge condition indicator scores. 
3.2.2 Case study boundaries 
3.2.2.1 Physical boundaries 
 
The bridge system has been considered in this assessment as including a number of 
subsystems; bounded as below. 
1) Physical structure: the southern limit is the white lining where bridge lanes meet the 
roundabout perimeter. The northern limit is the equivalent where the ramps meet traffic 
originating from or destined for different routes. Included within this are the bridge 
offices and the sea bed down to underside of foundation level. Foundations for all load 
bearing units are included insofar as they are necessary for the support of these units. 
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2) Electrical: All electrical systems owned and operated by bridge operational and 
maintenance staff, up to and including the back-up generator and the meter for the 
electricity supplier. 
3) Mechanical: Includes deck inspection gantry and pedestrian lifts. Excludes vehicles and 
marine craft. 
4) Instrumentation, control and automation: all these systems on the bridge, plus the 
control room.   
5)/ Operational support: all guidance and administrative systems to support human control 
of bridge operations. Travel to work routes have been excluded.  
This study is principally concerned with the physical structure between the perimeter of 
the roundabout at the South end and where bridge traffic leaves or joins other traffic at the 
North end. The immediate physical environment is considered only where it affects the 
above five systems by way of failure causes. 
While the capability of the ILS tools is such that they could be applied at a more detailed 
level to test the resilience of the supporting systems, this study concentrates on the 
operation and maintenance at the level of the system, subsystems and units. Parts could be 
investigated if needed in order to understand and diagnose failure modes and causes. 
Consideration of catastrophic collapse of the entire roads infrastructure is not part of 
this exercise. For example, neither the consequent congestion impact of a bridge 
closure, nor the effect on bridge traffic of a major road closure outside the bridge 
boundaries, is considered. This would have required use of the Dundee council traffic 
management model. 
 
3.2.2.2 Limits on failure causes 
Section 2.2.2, covering the classification of failure causes, which commonly affect 
infrastructure systems, identified 4 types: terrorism, cyber-crime, natural events and 
events with human causes.  This use of integrated logistics support is not going to 
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consider terrorism (involves national security concerns) or cyber-crime (would require 
technical skills beyond the scope of this writer). It may be that ILS tools are capable of 
also addressing these types of failure causes provided that expertise exists amongst the 
practitioners.  Natural events have been renamed ‘environment’ in the system level 
FMECA exercise and human causes have been subdivided into human, maintenance 
shortfall and socio-economic failure categories (refer Appendix B4).  
Failure causes which would decimate infrastructure in large areas outwith the bridge 
environs e.g. meteor strike or nuclear explosion have specifically not been considered on 
the grounds that, if these events occurred, bridge reinstatement would not be top of the 
priority list. 
Failure causes which are within the control of other management bodies have also been 
excluded on the advice of the bridge management team; e.g. a drifting ship smashing into 
a column, while under the control of the Harbour Authority. The FMECA exercise could 
be expanded in future to include similar failure causes if desired.  
Many failure causes have a range of effects over a wide scale. For brevity, a ‘most 
likely’ scale and impact have been applied. 
3.2.3 Application of ILS tools 
 
Two ILS tools have been applied; failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
and reliability centred maintenance (RCM). The application of these tools to a civil 
engineering asset such as the Tay Road Bridge has required some careful consideration of 
term definitions, boundaries, functions and feasible failure causes. 
The step by step process is described in Appendix B5.3 and applied to the bridge as listed 
below:  
FMECA: This has been tackled at two levels; a system level and a unit level. For each 
level the process is the same. 
(i) Construct a physical model of the bridge. (Appendix B2) 
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(ii) Construct a functional model of the bridge. (Appendix B3) 
(iii) Cross map the physical and functional models so that the impact of failure of a 
component on performance can be identified. 
(iv) Compile failure modes which prevent bridge functions. 
(v) Conduct a STEEPLE analysis, covering social, technical, economic, environmental, 
political, legal and ethical factors, to define a list of causes of failure modes. Edit out very 
unlikely and mega scale causes. Protecting against highly improbable causes is unlikely to 
be considered cost effective by public opinion and if geographically wide scale or 
exceptionally severe causes occur, protection or restoration of a single bridge is not likely 
to be the highest priority. Categorise failure causes into resilience and reliability groups. 
i) Match failure causes to failure modes. 
ii) Undertake the FMECA exercise, line by line for each failure cause. Identify 
causes, effects, probability of occurrence and criticality of failure modes. Prioritise failure 
modes by allocating a risk priority number.  
iii) For the highest ranking failure modes, compare whole life financial costs and 
benefits of retrospective design improvements to prevent these. 
 
RCM: Maintenance regimes are designed to maintain the function and appearance of 
particular bridge units. The RCM assessment has therefore been undertaken at the unit 
level where failure modes can be linked to specific bridge units. An attempt was made to 
develop an RCM assessment based on the system level FMECA but this proved 
impractical as many of the failure modes were not directly related to any single unit 
therefore maintenance regimes could not be focussed and analysed.  
The RCM exercise aims to choose the most appropriate maintenance regime type so 
considers failure modes and consequences rather than causes. The classical steps are listed 
in Appendix B8.7 and are applied to the bridge as below.  
i) List failure modes from the unit level FMECA exercise. Define failure condition 
carefully in each case. 
ii) Define logic diagram for selection of failure consequences. Allocate 
consequences to each mode. 
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iii) Define logic diagram for selection of type of maintenance regime. Allocate 
regime to each mode.   
Compare decision with current maintenance practices to identify any benefits of altering 
the regime. 
3.2.4 FMECA methodology 
3.2.4.1 The Tay Bridge Physical Model 
 
The bridge structure has been split into substructure-foundations; superstructure-columns 
and abutments; superstructure-deck; fittings; and services. 37 physical elements are listed 
under these 5 headings and the one model applies to both FMECA exercises. Relating 
back to the systems listed in section 2.8.1, the physical structure is the main focus of 
attention. 
The full model is in Appendix B2 and the model elements (termed as units in the spatial 
scale listed in the glossary) are listed below. Those units in brackets are only considered at 
the RCM stage, where additional detail was deemed useful. 
Later relatively minor additions and corrections were made as part of the review process 
and these have been reflected in the units listed above. Further detail was considered only 
at the RCM assessment stage and these are shown in brackets above. A comparison of the 
FMECA and RCM physical models is included in Appendix B8.1.  
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Table 10 Units of the Physical Model  
Foundations Columns 
and 
abutments 
Deck Fittings Services 
Piles 
(cofferdam) 
 
Pier 
Abutment 
foundation 
Column 
Deck main 
bearing 
 
Abutment 
structure 
 
Abutment 
drainage 
 
North bank 
traffic 
ramps 
Box girders 
 
Composite slab deck 
(deck upstand) 
 
Girder diaphragms 
 
Expansion joint unit 
(north viaduct joint) 
 
Carriageway surfacing 
 
Footpath precast 
concrete slab 
 
Kerbs 
(kerb backing) 
 
Services bay 
 
White lining 
 
Manhole access to box 
girders 
Painting to box girders 
and diaphragms 
Girder restraints at 
column bearings 
Girder restraints at 
abutment bearings 
Bolted connections 
between box girders and 
diaphragms 
Cathodic 
protection 
Anti-collision 
protection 
Footpath 
handrail 
(+ fixings) 
 
Parapet 
handrail 
(+ fixings) 
 
Traffic signs 
(variable 
signage) 
(+ fixings) 
 
Mobile under 
deck access 
platform 
(moving 
platform) 
(vertical 
access to 
platform) 
(motor for 
platform) 
 
Pedestrian 
lifts 
Telecom cables 
 
Gully 
 
Gully drain pipe 
 
Emergency 
communications 
system 
(+ fixings) 
 
Weather   
stations 
(+ fixings) 
 
Lighting for  
traffic signs 
 
Lighting  
junction box 
 
Lighting column 
and fitting 
Lighting cable 
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3.2.4.2 The Tay Bridge Functional Model 
 
Functional block diagrams, or functional flow diagrams (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1990) 
are developed to ‘structure system requirements into functional terms. They are concerned 
with what is to be accomplished, versus the realisation of how something should be done’. 
The functions of each main physical element have been cross mapped so that an 
engineering understanding of the bridge is portrayed. The full model is in Appendix B3. 
The model includes groups of structural, operation and maintenance, plus protection; with 
structural being the primary group.  The system level FMECA prioritises availability or 
service levels while the unit level FMECA will primarily consider structural capability; 
both within a resilience framework for assessing the effects of hazards impacting on the 
bridge. This structure complements an asset management approach in that the intrinsic 
structural capability supports the resulting service level performance.  
In terms of a recent water related resilience framework (UKWIR 2013), both assessments 
are bottom-up approaches in that they depend on detailed knowledge of the bridge 
structure, operation and maintenance.   
 
 
3.2.4.3 System Level Functions and Failure modes 
 
The system level FMECA function table below illustrates that the bridge has been viewed 
as a conveyance system with three main functions: to move vehicles; to move pedestrians 
and cyclists; and to supply services to and along the bridge.  
This provides the skeleton or structure of the system level FMECA analysis. 
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Failure causes are then listed against each mode in Appendix B4. 
Bridge functions which are outside the operational control of bridge management were 
initially considered but later excluded by agreement with bridge staff. This includes, for 
example, the passage of marine traffic. 
Table 11 System level functions and failure modes 
SYSTEM 
FUNCTION 
 Failure modes 
To allow the 
movement of 
vehicles from one 
bank to the other. 
 A1.1.1    
2-way 
closure 
A1.1.2  
1 - way 
closure 
A1.1.3                
 
Capacity  
restriction 
A1.1.4                   
 
Speed  
reduction 
A1.1.5                
 
Size  
restriction 
   To allow the           
movement of cyclists   
and pedestrians from   
one bank to the other 
 A1.2.1            
Closure 
A1.2.2            
 
Capacity  
restriction 
  
To supply services 
along the bridge 
 A1.4.1        
 Breakdown 
A1.4.2             
Capacity  
restriction 
  
 
 
3.2.4.4 Unit Level Functions and Failure Modes 
 
Four functions have been identified in the functional model in Appendix B3. Three main 
failure mode groups were identified which applied across the 4 functions and these 
informed the unit level FMECA. 
77 
 
 
Table 12 Unit level functions and failure modes 
ITEM FUNCTION FAILURE MODES 
Structural or load bearing 
function 
Reduction of safety 
factor below    
design minimum 
Physical collapse   
or complete 
breakdown 
Deterioration 
beyond economic 
repair 
To maintain long term 
durability in the face of 
environmental or physical 
threat 
To allow inspection and 
management 
To maintain safety and 
control for bridge users 
 
To avoid excessive complexity and timescale, only 1st level units of the physical model 
have been assessed in the unit level FMECA and no consideration has been given to a 
finer level of detail. FMECA is traditionally employed down to a fine level of detail but 
this is best suited to detailed analysis of particular troublesome elements or units where 
the staff time and effort could be justified. Again for time and cost efficiency, only the 
most likely failure mode has been listed for each unit. This has generally been either a/ for 
structural load carrying units, a reduction in load carrying capability to reduce the safety 
factor below that recommended by design codes (i.e. enough to prompt engineering staff 
to impose traffic restrictions) or b/ for mechanical units, a mechanical or physical failure. 
The failure modes are shown in Appendix B7.  
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This row by row assessment of physical unit and failure mode has been replicated for the 
RCM exercise, but with a range of failure modes being considered for each unit. The 
process can best be understood as invoking a greater degree of detail at each subsequent 
stage. 
 
3.2.4.5 Failure Causes 
 
The system level FMECA spread sheet in Appendix B4 identifies 43 possible failure 
causes, originating from a STEEPLE analysis. This was essentially a brainstorming 
activity but also drew upon the records of bridge restrictions. These categories were then 
reduced to environmental, human, maintenance related and socio-economic groups, for 
ease of use. This shows the results of the assessment of which causes were reasonably 
possible for each failure mode. The causes are selected for their effects on bridge 
operation (or service levels) and include, amongst others, high winds, traffic accidents, 
planned and reactive maintenance, and future traffic increases.  
This forms the detailed layout of the system level FMECA analysis and is dependent upon 
a detailed knowledge of the bridge physical structure and operating arrangements. For 
instance; two-way traffic movement on a single carriageway is not allowed because lane 
widths do not meet current safety standards, even for temporary works. Causes are 
occasionally listed twice in the analysis where the outcomes might readily show scale 
differences e.g. a marine collision where the consequences could range from a ‘scrape’ to 
a structural collapse.    
The unit level FMECA spread sheet in Appendix B4 lists 26 possible failure causes and, 
similarly, forms the basis for the unit level FMECA exercise. The causes are categorised 
into environment, human, mechanical, physical and electrical groups. Because failure 
modes show consistency across many of the units, this table relates causes to units (rather 
than failure modes). The causes are selected for their effects on particular units and 
include, amongst others, large tidal waves of tsunami or seiche form, corrosion of 
different types, malicious damage, water ingress and electrical failure. Attention to 
structural and mechanical functionality, as opposed to maintenance of overall service 
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levels for the system level analysis, led to a slightly different group of failure causes at 
this level.   
 
3.2.4.6 FMECA Risk Priority Numbers 
 
The FMECA exercise prioritises threats according to a risk priority number (RPN) which 
is a multiple of the following three subjective judgements, each rating numbers on a scale 
of 1 to 5. The first measure is the (approximate) probability of occurrence within one of 5 
bands. This is the approximate probability of the failure cause (hazard) occurring; 
otherwise known as risk according to the Health and Safety Executive definition (see 
glossary). Sufficient differentiation of RPNs is given by the five bands, which obviates the 
need to attempt accurate return periods between events, which would give an unjustifiable 
accuracy, given the available data. The second measure is a severity level i.e. a hazard 
scale, or consequence in terms of both human injury and duration of unavailability. The 
third measure is the likelihood of detection i.e. whether the failure mode (the consequence 
of the hazard occurring) is likely to be detected after it occurs. 
Care in interpretation, and consistency in applying these rating numbers is critical to the 
direction, outcome and value of this study. Guidance is included in Appendix B5 and 
below. Inevitably some judgement is involved. Repeatability concerns have been reduced 
by practitioner consistency checks applied to the risk priority numbers i.e. self-checking 
that similar modes in similar situations achieve similar scores. Reproducibility concerns 
have been reduced by bridge staff reviewing the results. 
Resilience is specifically addressed by: 
i) Judging ‘probability of occurrence’ to take account of increasing, or decreasing 
risk in future due to climate or social change. 
ii) Similarly, with the severity scale. 
iii) Judging ‘likelihood of detection’ taking into account existing inspection and 
maintenance regimes. In other words, looking at the limits of these regimes and increasing 
the rating numbers where conditions or threats may remain undiscovered. 
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The third measure, likelihood of detection, is subtler than the other two and reflects the 
generally increased consequences of a failure mode if it is initially undiscovered. This is 
particularly pertinent with regards to a bridge where prompt discovery of a problem will 
lead to bridge closure and therefore maintenance of public safety. Preventative or 
precautionary work reduces availability, but with less social impact than would otherwise 
be the case, particularly if closures are managed to avoid peak traffic flow periods. 
Standard guidance notes for rating are included in Appendix B5. An example of their 
application is given in sections 3.2.4.7 and 3.2.4.8.  Particular notes on their application, 
largely relevant to the system level FMECA, are set out below. 
 
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 
Guidelines:  
a. Existing control arrangements are critical; for example, the occurrence of ice and 
snow is taken to be the probability of these failure causes temporarily defeating the 
management arrangements of temperature monitoring, use of a snowplough and use of 
potassium acetate when low temperatures are forecast. This has been assessed as remote 
rather than probable because snow/ice which is managed by the bridge staff is not a 
failure mode; only when they result in unsafe conditions for bridge users do they become 
failure modes. 
b. A judgement on the frequency of occurrence has often relied upon past records of 
disruptions to bridge traffic flow as a guide. In particular, the record of frequency and 
duration of historical stoppages has been used as guidance. 
Future projections; long term but predicted events (e.g. sea level rise) are recorded as 2 
(unlikely but possible in any year); long return period events either 1 (so unlikely that it 
can be assumed that it will not occur) or 2, dependent upon historic likelihood. This 
scoring regime does not depend on an accurate estimate of return periods (an accuracy 
which is often not justifiable). 
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SEVERITY LEVELS 
Severity level descriptions consider two independent variables; human injury and duration 
that the bridge functionality is restricted or out of action. Environmental damage is not 
specifically included but can be allowed for in terms of the length of time the bridge 
would be out of use while environmental problems were dealt with. 
In terms of the two independent measures contributing to the severity rating number, there 
are failure causes which can be high in injury and low in function impact (e.g. attempted 
suicides) and ones which are the reverse (e.g. unauthorised protests). Wherever the 
potential for injury and disruption leads to different ratings, the higher number of the two 
has been taken. 
Guidelines: 
a. For most failure modes there are a range of failure effects, measured in severity terms. 
Rather than list all possible effects, we have taken a view on the most likely. Sometimes 
two effects in the range are listed, mostly only one, rarely more than two. 
b. Many police incidents take place on the bridge. These have been rated as 5 because a 
fatality could be involved. It is acknowledged that the incidence and severity of these is 
largely independent of management or maintenance arrangements on the bridge but there 
may be preventative measures which could discourage incidents of self-harm (e.g. netting 
above the parapet railings). 
c. The severity level assumes normal bridge management arrangements are in place and 
effective e.g. for wind speeds in excess of 80mph when all traffic would be prohibited, a 
severity rating of 2 (restriction of bridge functionality for maximum of one day) has been 
selected as the historical duration of high wind speeds has generally been less than one 
day. If traffic had not been prohibited a rating of 3 or 4 would have been appropriate as 
injuries resulting from traffic accidents would have been likely. 
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LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION 
The definition of ‘detection’ has been taken as ‘detection that failure has occurred’ i.e. 
that failure would be noticed once it had occurred.  
Guidelines: 
Any natural phenomena which is monitored, or the consequences of which can be clearly 
seen, is rated as 1(control will almost certainly detect a potential failure mode). For 
example, as wind speed is monitored then detection of a trigger level is rated as 1.  
a. Any problem or incident which occurs at carriageway level has been rated as 1 
on the basis that CCTV cameras plus direct observation allows bridge staff a good 
oversight of what is happening. Operational guidance also requires staff to undertake 
more regular vehicular patrols in the event of a camera breakdown.  
 
These guidelines lead directly to 4 of the top 5 risk priority number scores in the system 
level FMECA being for ‘below deck’ issues. Refer to section 4.3 for the highest scoring 
issues. 
 
One measure of the flexibility of the FMECA tool is that ‘detection’ could be replaced by 
‘prediction’. This would then score more highly those failure modes where prediction 
measures are not in place. To take the example of wind speeds: while we can score this as 
1 under the ‘detection’ rule, this would likely move to 3 if likelihood of prediction was 
applied. Applying the ‘likelihood of prediction’ rule tends to prioritise low probability 
natural events, some of which may be more likely in future decades. This has not been 
followed through but may be of interest if reducing the cost implications of failure due to 
high consequence, low probability natural events is to be addressed. The ‘detection’ case 
doesn’t highlight natural causes of failure which are the unpredictable, ‘black swan’ 
(Taleb 2008) events with the potential to cause the highest failure effects. 
3.2.4.7 System level FMECA example 
The bridge operational functionality as a whole is under consideration, i.e. impediments to 
the bridge function as an overall asset. This can be regarded as an assessment of the 
resilience of the bridge. The failure causes are, generally, external constraints on the 
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effective functioning of the bridge as a conveyance mechanism. In this respect the 
functional block diagram (appendix B3) is the starting point. Appendices B4.2 and B5.2 
feed into the appendix B6 FMECA assessment and the relevant row is reproduced below.  
Table 13 System level FMECA example 
   Item Id. No.   A1 
  Item Identification   Bridge 
Item Function Id. No.   A1.1 
  Item Function   To allow the movement of vehicles 
from one bank to the other. 
FF Id. No.   A.1.1.5 
Failure Mode    Reduction in capacity by way of 
vehicle size limit  
FC Id. No.   E1a 
Failure cause   Wind speed 45-60mph 
Failure Effects Local Effect  Double decker busses prohibited 
  Next Higher  Bus company reverts to single deckers 
  End Effect Bus passengers inconvenienced for, 
generally, a short period 
Criticality Analysis  Occurrence 4 
  Severity 3 
  Detection  1 
Risk Priority Number   12 
 
Following through the process one row at a time, from top to bottom: 
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The item under consideration is the bridge as a whole. The function under consideration is 
the facilitation of vehicle movement. The failure mode (first visible manifestation of 
failure) is a limitation on vehicle size using the bridge. The failure cause is a moderate 
wind speed which results in the failure mode. There are then a series of failure effects, 
each leading on to the next and generally increasing in scale at each step. By this thought 
process the practitioner is driven to appreciate the ‘chain of effects’ which result from the 
failure mode. Note that when a ‘chain of effects’ is described there is consideration of a 
greater field of view at each step. This is in contrast to a timeline ‘chain of effects’ which 
would be characterised as consequences rather than effects.   
Once there is an understanding of the end effect, it is simply a matter of applying the 
rankings listed in Appendix B5. The fairly broad range descriptions applied to the three 
rating metrics have the advantage of not requiring a precise quantitative calculation before 
scoring. Applying a precise number to say, the probability of occurrence can lead to a 
false sense of security in that it depends on the quality of the data used. It could also lead 
to the model results being too volatile if new data was considered.   
 The record of restrictions due to wind speeds in the range of 45-60 miles per hour over 
the 1999-2012 period results in a score of 4 for probability of occurrence. Reference to the 
same data shows that the duration of a vehicle size restriction for this wind speed tends to 
be no more than a small number of days. Therefore, the level of severity score is 3. Note 
that this is dependent on bridge operational protocols as listed in the wind speed 
thresholds included in table 7. For example, if double decker buses were not prohibited 
from travelling in this range of wind speeds then the scoring could be 5, assuming the 
potential for a bus to topple over. Therefore, the scoring is predicated upon the current 
bridge operational regime. It follows that changes to the operational regime can affect the 
risk priority number, which is as it should be. 
The likelihood of detection score requires a judgement as to the likelihood of the bridge 
operational staff failing to register a high wind speed. As they have access to tailored 
daily weather forecasts, there are wind speed monitors on the bridge, staff are 
permanently based on site and undertaking regular patrols, it is considered almost certain 
that a wind speed of 45 miles per hour will be detected. So the score is 1. 
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Therefore, the risk priority number (RPN) is 4x3x1=12. 
This number is a measure of relative importance in risk terms and allows the highest risk 
issues to be addressed to check if measures can be taken to reduce the RPN. 
3.2.4.8 Unit level FMECA example 
 
The approach of the unit level FMECA has a different emphasis from the system level, 
overall approach. The bridge physical model remains as before but the functional model is 
different (see Appendix 3) and the relationship between the two has a higher priority. This 
FMECA is a more conventional one and leads into the RCM exercise. Attention is 
focussed on each physical item in turn and the results are largely concerned with 
reliability.  
Appendices B4 and B5.1 set the framework for the FMECA assessment. Appendix B4.1 
now relates failure causes to items, rather than causes to modes for the bridge as a whole. 
Only one function and failure mode has been examined for each item; but a number of 
possible failure causes. There will in practice be subsidiary functions and failure modes 
but the resulting failures will be less serious therefore have been neglected in this 
assessment. 
The functionality of each item is considered in turn and the failure causes include both 
externally acting (environment and human) and internally acting events or processes 
(mechanical, physical and electrical). The box girder item will be used as an example to 
describe the process and the relevant rows are reproduced below in Table 14 Unit level 
FMECA Example.  
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Table 14 Unit level FMECA example 
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Following through the process one row at a time, from top to bottom: 
The item under consideration is a representative box girder spanning between columns 
and supporting the bridge deck plus live loads. The function under consideration is the 
load carrying capacity of the girder. The failure effect varies with the cause (either a 
partial or complete traffic restriction) but the failure mode (first visible manifestation of 
failure) is taken to be a structural assessment by the bridge engineer which concludes that 
load carrying capacity fails to meet current codified standards. For each of the five failure 
causes there are a series of failure effects, each leading on to the next and generally 
increasing in scale at each step. The anticipated failure pattern or mechanism is described 
there. There is inevitably some judgement involved in the allocation of failure causes to 
each item shown in Appendix B4.1, but failure causes can be re-visited at any time during 
the life of the asset.    
Once there is an understanding of the end effect, it is again a matter of applying the 
rankings listed in Appendix B5.2  
In terms of probability of occurrence, a steel temperature above 32 degrees centigrade (the 
upper limit for the calculation of movement joint gaps) in this temperate coastal location 
has been judged improbable in table 1 of Appendix B5.2. Similarly, the occurrence of a 
wave high enough to impact the deck has also been judged improbable. There is evidence 
of a flood wave at Dundee harbour in the 1700s but the return period is likely to be long. 
Both of these failure causes are scored 1.  
Corrosion is an ongoing process but the frequency of inspection and level of ongoing 
minor paintwork repairs means that, in any one year, the probability of corrosion 
advancing quickly enough to reduce the girder carrying capacity sufficiently to cause 
imposition of a weight limit must lie between ‘once a year’ and ‘so unlikely it can be 
assumed it will not occur’(again to the table 1 bands in Appendix B5.2.  So that failure 
cause is scored 2. Fatigue cracking follows a similar logic. The imposition of heavier lorry 
loads has already occurred during the life of the bridge and may happen again as vehicle 
technology advances.   So it would seem eminently likely that this may happen again; but 
not every year. So that is scored 2. 
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In terms of level of severity scores; these are more uncertain in that there is a range of 
scale and impact for any of the causes. The scoring here follows the logic below. 
A large wave is likely to be sudden and unexpected. The likelihood is that the bridge 
would be open to traffic at the time. Fatalities would almost certainly result therefore a 5 
is appropriate. Corrosion rates would almost certainly be monitored and repairs or the 
imposition of a  weight limit could be planned for. There is unlikely to be a complete 
closure of the bridge. Owing to the long planning time involved, it has been estimated that 
an engineered repair scheme could be undertaken in days rather than weeks so this has 
been scored 3. Following this same logic, both short term high temperatures and the 
discovery of fatigue cracks are likely to lead to emergency weight limits with a longer 
repair time hence are scored 4. If legal weight limits are increased in future the effect 
would be to require major strengthening works with significant periods of weight 
restriction therefore is scored 4. 
In terms of the likelihood of detection; again this is defined as ‘the likelihood of detecting 
that failure has occurred’. Girder movement or buckling could not pass un-noticed where 
permanent staffing arrangements are in place. They are scored 1. The imposition of 
heavier weight limits is similarly 1. Corrosion is such a slow steady process that it is 
unlikely that regular inspections will miss this so a score of 2 has been assigned. Cracks 
caused by fatigue are harder to detect and can occur over a shorter timeframe – i.e. they 
could occur between inspections. This could be a 3 or a 4. A 4 has been allocated 
meanwhile but targeted inspections to particular areas of risk such as points of contra 
flexure where girders are continuous over the navigation piers could reduce this to a 3 or 
even a 2. This would reduce the high risk priority number to a 24 or a 16. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5 RCM Methodology 
 
3.2.5.1 General 
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The RCM methodology analyses the consequences of each failure mode from the unit 
level FMECA exercise, “and identifies an applicable and cost-effective maintenance 
regime. It does so using the principle that a maintenance task is worth doing if it deals 
successfully with the consequences of the failure mode which it is meant to prevent” 
(Kumar et al, 2000). The approach is based on a decision logic process set out in the logic 
paths included in Appendix B8. The overall objective is to identify which maintenance 
tasks are unnecessary because they are only needed for aesthetic purposes, or they are 
ineffective in reducing failure risk.  
The primary purpose of this ILS tool is to reduce maintenance costs by adopting the right 
maintenance regime, while meeting health, safety and environmental standards and while 
meeting economic, operational and appearance requirements. Where selection of a 
maintenance regime is insufficient to meet the standards, as can be the case for enhanced 
resilience needs, then a redesign or engineered improvement will be the required outcome 
of an RCM exercise. 
The RCM exercise can be split into three steps: step A implications of functional failure, 
followed by step B selection of inspection task, then step C selection of repair task. 
 
STEP A: IMPLICATIONS OF FUNCTIONAL FAILURE 
The flowchart setting out decision steps is included in Appendix B8.2 and figure 10 
below. The seven consequence classes are described below, in order of importance: 
M1 Safety and health for users and operators: any failure mode with the potential to cause 
death or harm of a person, either from structural failure or a dangerous incident. 
M2 Legal obligations to inspect the asset or part at set intervals. 
M3 Environment: any failure mode which results in environmental damage, e.g. air or 
water pollution.
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Figure 10  
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E1 Operational: any failure mode with the potential to adversely affect the operational 
performance of the bridge systems or serviceability of the bridge elements. 
E2 Economic: any failure mode with the potential to incur a significant economic effect 
due to the cost of maintenance or repair. This includes direct costs to the Bridge Board, 
e.g. for bridge repairs, in addition to wider societal costs, for example due to traffic 
diversions. If the cost of failure and its consequential damage is greater than the cost of 
preventing the failure, then preventive action is worthwhile. 
L1 Appearance: any failure mode with the potential to adversely affect the aesthetic 
quality of elements of the bridge. 
L2 No significant consequence. 
Group M – it is mandatory to act to avoid failures. 
Group E – actions to mitigate failures are to be based upon lowest overall cost 
maintenance regime. Costs are to include wider societal costs of failure. 
Group L – consequences are of low significance. 
Guidance notes for selection are listed below: 
1) The 7 classes are a hierarchy inasmuch as priority should be given to the category 
mentioned nearest the top of the list e.g. if M1 and E1 can both apply to any failure mode, 
include it as M1. The exception is the E1/E2 choice where selection depends on which 
one is a more important consequence, in the judgement of the engineer. Operational 
consequences have been prioritised meanwhile as this is expected to be the Bridge 
Board’s priority. 
2) The most severe direct consequence is selected. For example, steel painting could be 
allocated to an appearance consequence whereas, in time, there is obviously a safety 
consequence. For this study the safety consequence applies. There is a case for dividing 
the RCM rows into a range of different scale failure modes, possibly related to bridge 
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condition grades, but this has not been undertaken at this stage. Refer to the notes on the 
spread sheet where high uncertainty exists.  
 
3) Whether failure is hidden or evident can depend on the cause of failure mode. For 
example, corrosion in columns might not be noticed (unlikely, due to cathodic protection 
system) whereas the effects of impact damage on a parapet rail almost certainly would be. 
If there is a good chance of a hidden failure, it has been recorded as such. 
 
4) What is failure? Moubray (1997) defines ‘functional failure’ as ‘A state in which a 
physical asset or system is unable to perform a specific function to a level of performance 
that is acceptable to its owner or user’. This has been defined as when the structural load 
carrying safety factor is reduced so far that the bridge manager, on the advice of the 
bridge engineer, decides to place restrictions on (or close the bridge to) users. In other 
words, Functional failure occurs when informed engineering knowledge judges that 
it is no longer safe to continue the full availability of the bridge for public use. This is 
a useful definition but has had to be supplemented by the three definitions below. 
 
5) Failure can be defined in three ways (El-Haram, 1995).  
i) an element has suddenly become completely inoperable and can no longer perform its 
required function(s) 
ii) an element is still operable but incapable of fulfilling some or all of its intended 
functions at the level of performance originally specified 
iii) an element has gradually deteriorated to an unsatisfactory level of performance or 
condition, and its continued operation is either unsafe, uneconomical or aesthetically 
unacceptable. 
 
6) Definitions (Moubray 1997): Evident failure – a failure mode that will on its own 
become evident to the operating crew under normal circumstances. Hidden failure – a 
failure mode that will not become evident to the operating crew under normal 
circumstances if it occurs on its own. Mowbray selects categories assuming the absence of 
an inspection regime as the thrust of his exercise is to define a regime from basic 
principles. 
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7) Given notes 4 and 5, many failures are hidden. If failure was to take the form of a 
collapse, then most would be evident.  For reinforced concrete where corrosion or impact 
damage would be necessary then surface crazing or rust would be evident therefore 
deterioration would be evident but not necessarily at the point of failure. However, 
investigation would be prompted prior to the failure point. Therefore, for publicly visible 
reinforced concrete, failure has been taken as evident. 
 
 
STEPS B & C: SELECTION OF INSPECTION AND REPAIR TASKS 
The flowchart setting out decision steps is included in Appendices B8.3 & 4 plus figures 
11 and 12 below.  The selection hierarchy in this case is condition based maintenance, 
time based maintenance, then either re-design or reactive maintenance. 
The ‘practicability of condition based maintenance’ hinges on whether deterioration along 
the time-line to failure can be assessed. This has been taken to be affirmative for 
reinforced concrete, for example. This is a critical judgement in defining the type of 
maintenance task. 
The application of RCM to a major bridge has been tailored in two respects: 
i. The costs incurred in inspections can be high and warrants separate 
consideration. In addition, reactive maintenance still requires time based inspections. Also 
there are legal requirements which govern some inspection intervals, for example for 
lifting equipment. Indeed, inspection regimes are essential to protect management against 
legal action in the event of catastrophic failures.  
 
ii. There is normally an economic ‘test’ applied to the choice of a condition or time 
based maintenance regime i.e. are the overall costs worthwhile in comparison to the 
option of doing nothing (replace on life expiry rather than repair). In the case of this 
bridge it has been assumed that at this stage of its life the economics will favour the repair 
option. This also meets public expectations.  
In practice, the same unit has a number of possible failure modes; therefore, a range of 
maintenance regimes for any unit can be appropriate. 
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RCM  Step B 
Figure 11 Inspection Task  
Selection Flowchart, based on failure modes. 
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RCM  Step C 
Repair Task  
Figure 12 Selection Flowchart, based on failure modes. 
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The general selection guidance is summarised below: 
Table 15 RCM Inspection and Maintenance Task Guidelines 
TYPE OF 
DETERIORATION 
MECHANISM 
TYPE OF INSPECTION 
REGIME 
TYPE OF ACTIVE TASK 
NEEDED 
Measurable, predictable, 
medium to long term interval 
between failure mode and 
failure function points 
Time based prior to failure 
mode; condition based after. 
Condition based repair 
Unpredictable, short term 
interval between failure mode 
and failure function points 
Time based; owing to 
‘random failure’ nature. 
Reactive repair or 
replacement 
Frictional degradation (i.e. 
mechanical wear and tear) 
Time based - generally legal 
requirement for access and 
lifting gear 
Time based – e.g. greasing  
or similar 
Age related deterioration of 
electrical units 
Time based; increasing 
frequency with age 
Time based repair or 
replacement 
3.2.5.2 The Tay Bridge RCM application  
 
Whereas the FMECA assessments are intended to identify and protect against failure 
causes, the RCM assessment is geared towards identifying effective and efficient 
maintenance regimes. The RCM takes the unit level FMECA as the starting point and 
considers each unit in turn. The example uses the box girders again and both tables below 
show the workings for only that unit. The methodology and principles are the same for all 
the other units. 
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The RCM assessment has considered functionality and failure modes to a higher level of 
detail and multiplicity than the unit level FMECA. This has been done in order to more 
fully understand these properties of each unit. The resulting cross mapping of functions 
and failure modes consequently appears complex and there have had to be reversions to 
dominant types at stages in the process. 
Appendix B8 shows decision diagrams for guidance. Appendix B8.1 is the RCM 
spreadsheet for the bridge units. Appendix B8.6 is a diagrammatic representation of the 
structural load paths through the bridge. There are usually two steps to an RCM 
assessment, which lead to a recommendation for a maintenance regime type. Due to the 
relatively high expense of inspection alone on this civil engineering asset, a 3rd step has 
been introduced i.e. inspection and repair have been separated. Appendices B8.2, B8.3 
and B8.4 show the 3 steps in isolation and B8.5 shows how they link together. 
The RCM requires decisions to be made on the basis of both functions and failure modes 
for each unit to be maintained. The functions and failure modes do not directly map across 
to each other, although there are many cross links, which is why the spreadsheet considers 
both separately and is ‘hinged’ in the middle at the black column in Appendix B8.1. Both 
parts are shown separately in the two tables below. 
While the flow charts show the hierarchical decision making process, the tables show 
simplified questions in the headings and describing the process below will aim to clarify 
and explain.  
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Table 16 – RCM step A; Selection of failure consequence 
Subsystem Unit Primary  
functions 
Function service 
level or 
performance 
Functional failure 
(consequence of 
failure mode) 
Impact of 
functional failure 
Implication of 
functional failure 
Superstructure: 
deck 
Box girders To span between 
column bearings 
Limit deflection to 
design limits 
Deflection greater 
than design limits  
Weight limit 
imposed 
Operational 
To carry bridge 
loads and  
distribute to 
column bearings 
No visible 
corrosion or 
cracking 
Load carrying 
capability of box 
girder is reduced 
such that the factor 
of safety is reduced 
below an 
acceptable limit 
Weight limit 
imposed 
Operational 
To allow internal 
access 
Safe and ready 
access 
Interior is unsafe 
for humans 
Additional 
precautions 
required prior to 
access 
Economic 
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Table 17 Example of RCM steps B & C  
Failure modes
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Pitting of steel N Y Y Y O Y Y
Condition based inspection 
frequency with local repairs
Cracking of 
steel
N Y Y Y O Y Y
Condition based inspection 
frequency with local repairs
Flaking of steel N Y Y Y O Y Y
Condition based inspection 
frequency with local repairs
Deformation N Y Y Y O Y Y
Condition based inspection 
frequency with local 
strengthening
Poisonous 
internal 
atmosphere
Y N N/A E N Y Atmosphere tests before entry
Weld 
weaknesses
N Y Y Y O Y Y
Condition based inspection 
frequency with local 
strengthening
Shear 
connector 
weakness
N Y Y Y O Y Y
If non- destructive testing is 
available then implement, 
followed by condition based 
maintenance; otherwise 
opportunity testing
Table 16 - steps B & C
Key: N = No; Y = Yes; O = Operational; E = Economic
Inspection evaluation - step B Maintenance intervention - step C
Proposed task
 
100 
 
 
For the girders, 3 primary functions are identified in table 15; the abilities to span between 
columns, carry load and allow access for maintenance. Required service levels and failure 
levels are identified for each of the three. The impact or consequence of failure is listed. 
This is again predicated on current bridge supervision levels. For example, if the load 
carrying vulnerability of the girder was not recognised and a weight limit imposed then 
there would be a safety implication. There are two operational and one economic 
implications for this unit and the one which links most directly to the steps B&C failure 
modes is selected in that process. For example, the failure mode of an internal poisonous 
atmosphere has an economic implication in table 15; following on from the function of 
allowing internal man access. 
Seven likely failure modes are identified in table 16. For each one, the steps in 
Appendices B8.3 and B8.4 are followed.  For example; the steel pitting failure mode.  
Normal visible assessments cannot be made inside the girder so specific inspections are 
necessary. The slow and predictable progress of deterioration can be monitored between 
inspections so a condition based inspection interval is applicable i.e. more frequent 
inspections for severe cases.  For similar reasons, condition based repairs are appropriate. 
In practice, any one unit may have a number of failure modes, some of which can have 
their deterioration monitored and some not. In other words, they can fail due to either 
slow deterioration mechanisms, (e.g. corrosion) or fast failure mechanisms (e.g. impact).  
The dominant task for the girders however is a condition based regime and this is 
transferred to line 3.1 in the RCM summary table in section 4.3.3 
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4 Results 
4.1 Stage 1: Cross sector asset management study 
4.1.1 Transportation sector 
 
This can be subdivided into road, rail, water and air transport. 
Roads - There are a number of guidance publications in this area (County Surveyors 
Society 2004, CIPFA 2010, UK Roads Liaison Group 2005) but implementation of 
guidance and recommendations is mixed. A view of this sector shows that asset 
management (AM), while developing, is not of central importance.  Glaister et al (2009) 
indicates that the roads sector is a utility in need of a strategy. Certainly there is limited 
penetration of an asset management (AM) culture so far.  
The UK highway authorities can be split geographically and in terms of the asset 
ownership. Trunk roads are the responsibility of the Department for Transport in England 
and Wales; Transport Scotland in Scotland. Remaining public roads are the responsibility 
of councils. AM thinking and dissemination through the organisations are notably further 
advanced within the trunk roads authorities. Amongst the councils the picture is very 
mixed: some have advanced the production of plans far enough to encompass roads within 
sectors encompassing other assets (e.g. property and parks) while others have barely 
started on addressing data capture requirements associated with asset management plans 
(AMPs).  Progress may be slightly behind in Scotland generally although the mixed 
picture makes it hard to be definitive as any council to council comparison will not show 
the national picture.  
A detailed comparison of the highways and water sector follows in 4.2 but this sector lags 
the water sector generally due to: the lack of competition and the absence of the 
commercial focus of a regulator plus the indirect commercial relationship with road users. 
There appears to be less recognition of the potential benefits of the application of asset 
management principles, perhaps coupled with staff shortages impeding implementation. 
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Rail – The UK rail industry owns many of the oldest civil engineering assets in the 
country, many of which date from the middle of the 19th century. Many of these have 
indeterminate life characteristics (e.g. earth embankments and cuttings plus masonry 
bridges and culverts) where maintenance is critical in deferring the need for replacement.  
This industry is therefore particularly suited to the application of ILS and AM. The 2010 
Mouchel paper by Stratford et al indicates evidence of ILS application to AM in the rail 
industry. The 2011 Institute of asset management (IAM) paper by Kirwan & Newby also 
indicates that AM principles and techniques are in use. The Office of the Rail Regulator 
(ORR) have accepted in 2008 that Network Rail have a compliant asset register. A 
Network Rail AMP or AMPs do not appear to be completed yet (Arup 2011,1.1.13) 
therefore a direct assessment of this has not been possible. The Arup report notes that 
Network Rail are preparing 300 AMPs, one for each UK strategic route. The same report 
(1.1.14) recommends the use of FMEA for asset assessment and makes some comparisons 
with the Highways Agency and London Underground asset management. A similarly 
recent report (Atkins 2011) reports uneven AM practice across the company and claims 
potential savings of up to £400 million if asset management techniques were fully applied. 
 The Office of the Rail Regulator does explain how asset management progress is 
monitored, as below. 
“An asset management assessment framework forms the basis of the on-going 
development and improvement reviews carried out by the ORR to ensure that Network 
Rail complies with licence condition 1, asset management. In summary, the framework 
considers Network Rail’s asset management performance, capability and maturity in the 
following 6 areas: 
 Strategy & Planning 
 Whole-life cost justification 
 Lifecycle management & delivery 
 Asset knowledge management 
 Capability development 
 Review & improvement 
With regard to Network Rail’s asset information strategy, the ORR and the part B (Asset 
Management) Independent Reporter monitor asset systems and data through regular 
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auditing. 
 
The ORR retain a list detailing the development and improvement recommendations from 
the audits. 
 
The ORR is monitoring Network Rail’s asset information strategy. We review progress on 
a regular basis to ensure that Network Rail is making progress to achieve appropriate 
asset systems and data for the business and in particular for good asset management.” 
In conclusion, it appears that Network Rail is making efforts to drive an asset 
management approach but the scale of the task is making this a slow process. 
Ports authorities – Neither Forth Ports nor Associated British Ports indicate any asset 
management information on their websites. 
British Waterways Board: No detailed guidance is available from their website but they 
appear to implement some asset management principles in their ‘steady state’ spending 
prioritisation model which takes into account customer service standards, deterioration 
levels and failure risks. Service standards are detailed, and monitored by an advisory 
panel selected from canal users. Complaints are taken into account in setting these 
standards. There are also other user group panels and forums, with different priorities. 
Operational risks and priorities include the need to ensure sufficient water supply, 
dredging of sediment, vegetation control, litter control and safety for staff and public. 
They have an asset inspection system with condition based targets. There are specific 
customer surveys but nothing mentioned about surveying customer assessment of 
infrastructure condition. They have only just started allocating ongoing maintenance funds 
on the basis of condition improvement needs (core waterway programme in their 2011/12 
corporate plan). Major works funding is prioritised on a risk basis. Infrastructure 
condition is planned to be held at a steady state (corporate plan 4.2). The corporate plan 
makes no mention of introducing an overall asset management plan in the near future. The 
organisation is planning to split into two entities, with the English and Welsh entity 
looking to achieve charitable status. Currently the single organisation is responsible to 
(and funded by) the Scottish Government in Scotland and DEFRA south of the border. 
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British Airports Authority: Their capital investment plans (CIPS) are publicly available 
and split according to airport. The Heathrow airport CIP 2011, for example, includes 
major expenditure programmes, which are regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority. 
While there is evidence of scrutiny of programmes, and the CAA requiring evidence of 
customer feedback and views over facilities, there is no mention of an overall asset 
management planning style approach to identifying expenditure requirements. 
Manchester Airport: Their master plan to 2030 makes no mention of a clear asset 
management approach to maintaining assets.  
 
4.1.2 Water sector 
 
This UK sector can be split geographically at the England/Scotland border. Southern 
private water companies have defined geographical areas and are regulated by the Office 
of the Water Regulator (Ofwat).  Scotland has one public sector water organisation which 
is monitored by the Water Industry Commissioner for Scotland (WICS). Apart from the 
lack of competitors, and the public ownership of Scottish Water, this organisation does 
seek to emulate, and compare favourably with, the private English and Welsh companies.  
While AMPs are not separately published by the water companies, AM is considered so 
important by Ofwat, and is therefore so central to their organisations that much detail is 
included in their business plans for the 5 year review periods.  More detail is included 
than is available for other infrastructure sectors and this reflects how seriously AM is 
taken by the water industry. Ofwat have measured water company progress in asset 
management techniques since 2004 (Deadman). They consequently appear to be 
vigorously implementing AM, while being slightly behind Ofgem regulated companies 
(see 4.1.5). There are few clues as to the prevalence of ILS use though. 
Particularly impressive are the measures taken to solicit and incorporate customer views, 
plus the integration of data management systems with asset deterioration modelling.  
Progress in these areas is driven by competition between the companies to avoid the 
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regulator imposing budget penalties.  Asset management philosophy and techniques are 
regarded as fundamental to their business model and their commercial success.   
Specific aspects of AM implementation in the water industry, compared to the roads 
sector, are covered in 4.2.  
4.1.3 Energy sector 
 
 A literature search of documents relating to asset management implementation has been 
largely unsuccessful in uncovering publicly available AMPs in this sector. However, 
many maintenance plans are freely available and some of these are listed in Appendix A1. 
Secondary sources have been useful in giving an overview of the industry and the Institute 
of Asset Management textbooks by Deadman and Lloyd have been especially useful. 
Ofgem have required the electricity and gas supply distribution and transmission 
companies’ asset management capability to be measured since 2002 (Deadman). In 2006, 
Undertakers agreed to report progress against PAS55(2004) requirements (Deadman). All 
regulated companies were certificated to this standard (since 2008 – Lloyd) Scottish 
Power was the first to be accredited to the later 2008 edition PAS, in March 2009. This 
utility sector accordingly seems to be furthest advanced in AM implementation, albeit 
details of specific company systems are difficult to access. 
Oil: The oil and gas exploration and production sector is credited (Lloyd) with originating 
much of the thinking behind asset management and PAS55. No AMPs have been located 
but Lloyd chapter 2 goes into detail about how the oil resource companies in the North 
Sea during the 1990s achieved a step change in efficiency gains through devolving 
decision making powers back down to smaller units, each of which in Shell’s case, has an 
Asset Reference Plan (ARP). A more detailed description of the development history of 
ARPs is given by Al-Hajj and Al-Saadi (2002).  
Gas: Deadman’s UK experience has been that ‘the gas (supply) industry pioneered the 
adoption of many modern asset management techniques, such as a requirement for asset 
registers, asset risk modelling, ‘no-dig’ street working techniques and customer billing 
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and trading systems’. Their lead in this field was attributed to the high safety requirement 
as well as the relative simplicity of their networks and capital works. The dissemination of 
these techniques into other utility sectors was through ‘the movement of gas industry staff 
into other utility industries and the shared use of contractors’. 
Wind and Wave power: This is a less mature industry and less system based than the 
main supply and distribution utilities. It has been shown (Andrawus 2008) how asset 
management, FMECA and RCM can be applied to optimise maintenance of wind 
turbines. It is stated that the wind industry lacked an asset management framework in 
2008 so, unless dissemination through the industry has been rapid, it is likely to be fairly 
lightly developed so far.  
Electricity: No AMPs have been located but the Ofgem remarks, above, apply. The 
National Grid Annual report and Accounts for 2010/11 includes an objective of executing 
best practice initiatives e.g. asset management but makes no other specific reference to 
asset management. Interestingly they have also tested their network resilience against 
climate change scenarios published by the UK government.  
Nuclear: No AMPs located but this sector is a world leader in risk management, for 
obvious reasons. Hezoucky in IAEA-TECDOC-1590 gives a good description of RCM 
which has been used, in conjunction with FMECA, in the industry since 1984. EDF state 
that they have developed the use of RCM since 1989. 
 
4.1.4 Communications sector 
 
BT’s Annual Report 2011 makes no specific reference to asset management. The Ofcom 
website has no headline interest in the subject either. BT staff are not listed attendees at 
recent IAM conferences, either as speakers or attendees. The inference is that BT is more 
concerned with new technology than maintenance of fixed assets.  A similar narrative can 
be applied to the cable company Virgin Media. Again there may be evidence ‘buried’ in 
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maintenance/operation manuals but the lack of visibility at annual report level would tend 
to limit the business priority of asset management. 
 
4.2 Stage 2: Comparison of water and road sectors 
4.2.1  Features of water AMPs 
 
1/ An AMP is fundamental to their business model. 
2/ The budget is adjusted by the regulator’s view of their AMP quality. 
3/ Targets are set by an external regulator. 
4/ There is a threat of competition to their customer base. 
5/ There is more customer input to define priorities. 
6/ Service levels are more prominent. 
7/ Tools and thought processes are more advanced. 
8/ More staff resources are devoted to the AMP production. 
9/ Companies are closer to a sustainable economic state: i.e. asset serviceability is steady. 
10/ There is more vertical visibility of drivers and service levels. 
11/ Resilience actions and climate change thinking is more detailed. 
12/ AMP practice is generally embedded within their working practices. 
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4.2.2 Features of road AMPs 
 
1/ Business drivers for AMP implementation are much weaker. 
2/ There is less customer consultation and input into service levels. 
3/ Expenditure is more budget constrained: maintenance plans are based on the available 
budget rather than the budget being built up from detailed needs and they are able to 
repair worst cases only. An exception is Hertfordshire council who appear to be more 
advanced in their thinking. 
4/ The asset inventory is less accurate, with greater gaps. 
5/ There is more scope for upwards integration into transport plans or general public 
service/environmental improvement plans. The Highways AMP can sit as part of a family 
of plans. 
6/ The AMP practice is not generally embedded  
 
4.2.3  Cross border water company comparison 
 
1/ The Anglian Water (AW) report is much more detailed than the Scottish Water (SW) 
one and shows evidence of being further advanced. They started the asset management 
process earlier. 
2/ SW are not directly competing with other companies in a commercial sense and 
reporting shows less evidence of ‘bursting to demonstrate capability’. 
3/ Customer consultation: impressive evidence from AW and less detail from SW. 
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4/ SW strategy is to continue on their learning curve so they’re in the upper quartile of the 
English and Welsh companies. The AW strategy is more focussed and clearly lists risks to 
future performance. 
5/ AW objectives are to maintain service levels at least cost. SW objectives are to tackle 
performance improvements; reflecting the different maturity stage the companies are in. 
6/ SW contingency planning is about combatting flood and drought. The AW equivalent 
is to design the capital programme to meet operational risks. They also make allowance 
for resilience and redundancy. 
7/ Liaison with customers: SW monitor complaints and issue questionnaires. AW have 
various ‘focus groups’ of different types – a deep regime of customer consultation which 
then clearly impacts on their strategy/tactics. 
8/ Documentation: not enough detail to compare in earnest 
9/ Risk assessment methodology: there is much more detail available from AW, who 
mention pipe deterioration models, service impact modelling, main burst predictive 
modelling, split between service levels and physical problems. They also include an 
element for social costs. Polynomial regression modelling is used. Economic replacement 
ages are modelled. The SW plan mentions none of these. 
10/ The AW capital plan is modelled by way of iterative runs of options. The SW plan is 
merely concerned with improving service levels. 
11/ Both organisations have listed business/financial risk items. 
12/ Methodology for accounting for asset depreciation: neither are clear on detail (e.g. 
will CIPFA guidance be implemented?) 
13/ AW have correlated their failure models with reality and have meshed them with 
service level needs. There is no indication that SW have done this. 
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14/ Both have forecast future risks going forward. One example of SW having more 
autonomy might be their proposal to charge customers on a drained area basis. AW are 
probably constrained by Ofwat in this respect.  
15/ Investigation of asset related failures: AW state they feed the results back into the 
deterioration models. There is no mention that SW does this. 
16/ Continuing improvement: SW looking to try electric and heat generation on their sites. 
There is no mention of this from AW. 
17/ Contingencies/management review: SW have on-going supervision over a programme 
of ill-defined work. There is nothing equivalent mentioned for AW.  
 
4.2.4 Comparison of trunk roads and local roads 
 
1/ Specifically Transport Scotland (TS) and Highland Council (HC) asset management 
plans are compared. Both have the potential to widen and raise the scope of the AMP: TS 
to include other transport modes (rail/air/water) and HC to include other physical stock 
which they manage. HC also have a corporate asset management plan. Both are first 
attempts with no further publication yet. TS will develop a work plan and finance plan 
following from capital works derived through this AMP. 
2/ TS will generally delegate more duties on a long term basis (to the operating 
companies) than HC. 
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4.2.5 Detailed comparison of Scottish Water and Transport Scotland 
 
1/ The AMP for Transport Scotland (TS) deals with roads and bridges only. In common 
with the councils, there is scope to expand the AMP to cover at least the whole road 
system, arguably even the whole organisation and what it’s responsible for. The Scottish 
Water (SW) AMP, in common with other water companies, deals with the whole of the 
company’s remit. 
2/ The TS document is a first attempt and sets out what the intentions are with regards to 
implementation. The SW document has a lot more detail and history behind it. 
3/ For TS, government sets overall policy. The same is true for SW but it and its regulator 
seem more at arm’s length from government and it seems to have more scope to set a 
direction for the AMP/business plan. The TS one suffers more from ‘government speak’ 
in that it refers to other government reports more frequently; i.e. it’s more enmeshed with 
government. 
4/ Measurement of progress is set by TS; for SW it is set by the regulator. There is less 
evidence of external control and pressure on TS to meet performance standards. 
5/ SW objectives are detailed, measurable and many are driven by legislation. TS 
objectives are aspirational and the routes to achievement are unclear.  
6/ SW don’t actually have an AMP: we’re just looking at the business plan, i.e. a similar 
situation to the water companies in England and Wales. 
7/ Delegation of responsibilities for action: TS delegate much of theirs to the operating 
companies (regional contractors). SW have more direct operational control as operational 
staff are directly employed. 
8/ Contingencies/future risks: TS don’t mention controlling demand or climate change, for 
example. SW is further advanced. 
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9/ TS have a need to filter down learning to councils in due course: so there’s a level of 
dissemination both above and below its level. 
10/ Both organisations have improvement plans in place to address AM gaps. 
11/ Both organisations have customer surveys but the detail is not set out. 
12/ Information management: there is a strong sense that TS have more work to do in 
pulling together the data in an AM form. 
13/ Neither of them go into risk assessment methodology so a comparison is not possible. 
14/ Life cycle activities: there is not enough detail on the basis of valuation so it is not 
possible to compare with CIPFA guidelines or each other.  
15/ Monitoring and condition data production: TS have the advantage that most of their 
condition data, certainly carriageway condition is complete. SW condition data for 
underground assets is not directly gathered but based on sampling and extrapolation.   
16/ Investigation/rectification of failures: both have high public visibility but road failures 
have marginally higher profile. 
17/ Audits: TS pay for audits of the operating companies by an independent Performance 
Audit Group (refer to their 2010-11 annual report). SW is audited by the Water Industry 
Commissioner. 
4.3 Stage 3 results 
4.3.1 System level FMECA 
 
An FMECA exercise has been undertaken for the bridge at two levels of detail, in order to 
assess both overall resilience and unit reliability. A system level or resilience FMECA 
was attempted first, which treats the bridge as a whole unit and essentially considers 
failure or diminution of service levels.  
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A drawback of any FMECA analysis is the cost of staff time involved in carrying out the 
exercise to completion. There either has to be a clear opportunity for cost saving or risk 
reduction or resilience gains; or there needs to be prior guidance given as to what level of 
application (system or unit level) is appropriate, or prior guidance as to which elements of 
the structure need to be examined in detail. The twin level approach used here examines 
hazards or failure causes affecting both asset and service failures and is considered the 
minimum necessary in order to be able to consider all major failure causes. 
While the generic guidance in Appendix B5 suggests risk priority numbers (RPNs) of up 
to 30 are of little consequence, a lower threshold of 12 is used in this study to increase the 
size of the list and to allow better contrast with the highest scoring RPNs from the unit 
level FMECA exercise. 
For the system level FMECA, there is a consistency within the highest scoring failure 
causes across many of the functional failures. Although frequency and severity may vary 
for the same cause but different functions, the highest overall scores include:  
1/ Failure function E8b:  River bed scour undermining piers remote from navigation 
channel. 
2/ Failure function E1a:  Wind speeds of 45-60mph lead to prohibition of double decker 
buses. 
3/ Failure function M3d:  Seizure or other failure of major joint or bearing causes 
emergency reactive maintenance to close bridge to traffic while lengthy repairs are made. 
4/ Failure function M3c:  Consequences as above but due to failure of other mechanical 
component 
5/ Failure function H4:  Police restrict traffic movement while investigating incidents. 
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4.3.2 Unit level FMECA 
 
All the unit level FMECA results are in Appendix B7. 
The highest scoring RPNs include: 
1 Failure function A2: River bed scour undermining piers remote from navigation channel 
2 Failure function C1: Cracking to box girders, due to fatigue 
3 Failure function C3: Cracking to girder diaphragms, due to fatigue 
4 Failure function C4: Water ingress to deck due to failed surfacing joint for 
waterproofing  
5 Failure function C14: Cracking at girder restraint at column bearings, due to fatigue. 
 
It can be noted that, despite the list of failure causes being different, there is some 
commonality between the results of the dual level FMECA’s. System level 1 is similar to 
unit level1. System level 3 links to unit level 4 and 5. System level 4 links to unit level 2 
and 3. In fact only the system level, high scoring items which don’t pertain to specific 
physical elements are not reflected in the above list. This does provide evidence that there 
is a consistency of prioritisation between the two assessments.  
The complete unit level FMECA exercise is in Appendix B7. An assessment of the 
relative merits of the two FMECA’s is included in section 5.2. 
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4.3.3 RCM exercise 
 
The list of recommended types of principal inspection and maintenance regimes per unit 
of the physical model are listed below. The detailed results are in Appendix B8. The unit 
numbering system (1st column of the table) is structured as below: 
1 Sub structure 
2 Superstructure; columns and abutments 
3 Superstructure: deck 
4 Fittings 
5 Services 
 
 
 
 
Table 18 RCM Results 
Principal inspection and maintenance regime  
recommendations arising from RCM study 
Nr 
  
Unit 
  
Principal task per 
unit 
  
Presumed 
current 
maintenance 
regime 
Difference   
between RCM  
 Results and 
current regime 
          
1.1 Steel friction 
piles and 
Underwater depth 
survey 
bed survey No 
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surround 
1.2 Steel piled 
cofferdam and 
river bed 
material 
Diver survey 
(frequency based on 
condition) plus 
condition based 
repairs 
bed survey No 
1.3 Column pier  Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
1.4 Abutment 
foundation 
Drainage inspections 
and condition based 
cleaning 
Any? Possible 
2.1 Column Condition based 
inspection frequency, 
monitoring of 
cathodic protection, 
and condition based 
repairs 
As RCM No 
2.2 Main bearings Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and condition based 
replacement 
As RCM No 
2.3 Abutment 
structure 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and condition based 
repairs 
As RCM No 
2.4 Abutment 
drainage 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and condition based 
repairs 
Any? Possible 
2.5 Pedestrian lift Maintenance 
requirements are 
legally enforceable 
As RCM No 
2.6 Columns in 
north viaduct 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.1 Box girders Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.2 Composite slab 
deck 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
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3.3 Deck upstands Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.4 Girder 
diaphragms 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.5 Main deck 
expansion joints
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.6 North viaduct 
expansion joints
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.7 Carriageway 
surfacing 
Time based viewing 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.8 Footpath slab Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.9 Kerb Condition based 
viewing frequency  
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.10 Kerb backing Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.11 Services tray Condition based 
inspection frequency 
with local repairs 
As RCM No 
3.12 White lining Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.13 Box girder man 
accesses 
Condition based 
maintenance 
As RCM No 
3.14 Paintwork to 
steel 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.15 Girder fixings 
at bearings 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
3.16 Diaphragm 
fixings 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.1 Cathodic 
protection 
Routine monitoring 
with condition based 
repair/replacement 
As RCM No 
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i.e. upon occurrence 
of failure mode 
4.2 Pier anti-
collision 
protection 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.3 Footpath 
handrails 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.4 Fixings for 
above 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.5 Parapet 
handrails 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.6 Fixings for 
above 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.7 Traffic signs 
(conventional) 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.8 Variable 
message traffic 
signs 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.9 Traffic sign 
fixings 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
4.10 Maintenance 
gantry-
stationary state 
Time based 
inspection and 
reactive maintenance 
legal/regulatory 
requirements 
Possible 
4.11 Maintenance 
gantry-mobile 
state 
Time based 
inspection and 
reactive maintenance 
legal/regulatory 
requirements 
Possible 
4.12 Maintenance 
gantry - vertical 
access 
Time based 
inspection and 
reactive maintenance 
legal/regulatory 
requirements 
Possible 
4.13 Maintenance 
gantry - motor 
Time based 
inspection and 
reactive maintenance 
legal/regulatory 
requirements 
Possible 
5.1 Telecom cable Time based 
inspection with 
condition based 
replacement 
As RCM No 
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5.2 Gully Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
5.3 Drainpipe from 
gully 
Condition based 
inspection and repair 
As RCM No 
5.4 Communication
s system 
Time based 
replacement 
As RCM No 
5.5 Fixings for 
above 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
5.6 Weather station Time based viewing 
with reactive 
maintenance 
As RCM No 
5.7 Fixings for 
above 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
5.8 Light bulbs Condition based 
viewing with reactive 
maintenance 
As RCM No 
5.9 Lighting 
distribution box
Time based viewing 
with reactive 
maintenance 
As RCM No 
5.10 Lighting 
column 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
5.11 Fixings for 
above 
Condition based 
inspection frequency 
and repair 
As RCM No 
5.12 Lighting cable Time based 
inspection with 
condition based 
replacement 
As RCM No 
 
 
 
The above  comparison of maintenance arrangements is still to be subject to verification 
by bridge operational staff as their major maintenance works are based on the opportunity 
to share access and inspection arrangements with contractors carrying out improvement 
and replacement works. The and “no difference” results are therefore based on comparing 
the RCM recommendations with guidance in the bridge national inspection and 
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maintenance standards. The “possible differences” results reflect the lack of available 
documented maintenance procedures for these parts so no definitive conclusions could be 
drawn. The national standards already incorporate much of the philosophy of the RCM 
exercise so it is probably unsurprising that results are closely comparable. It is also 
pertinent to note that the RCM exercise usually assigns more than one regime to each unit, 
dependent upon the context, location and the consequences. Refer to Appendix B8 in this 
respect for the full list of failure modes. Only the dominant one for each unit is listed 
above.  
 
The frequency of inspection should bear relationship to the cost, consequences of failure, 
unit age and condition, and the anticipated timespan between onset of the failure mode 
and functional failure. In most civil engineering unit cases, where age related 
environmental degradation mechanisms are at work, a reduced frequency at early life 
would be justified. 
 
 
4.3.4 Proposal for retrospective increase in bridge resilience 
 
Analysis of the causes of availability restrictions to bridge users shows that high wind 
speeds are a major cause of downtime.  Resilience and availability would therefore be 
increased if user protection against high wind forces was improved.   
Details of the wind shields for the 2nd Severn Crossing, plus the findings of Kwon et al 
(2011), were used to sketch a type detail of wind shielding with the objective of reducing 
wind speeds by 50%. General wind speeds of 90 miles per hour would therefore be 
reduced to 45. The assumption was made that periods of restricted traffic use would be 
negligible under this regime. A budget cost for supply and installation was sourced from 
Holgate Infrastructure (Appendix B9) and this was estimated at £500 per linear metre of 
windshield, assuming the use of the maintenance gantry and no other operational costs 
being included. 4600 metres of windshield equates to £2.3 million. If an allowance for 
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access and operational input is added, a cost range of £3.5 to £5 million pounds has been 
taken. 
Paraskevopoulos (2013) has shown a year on year trend of increasing restrictions due to 
high winds, albeit with a pause in recent years. The average annual increase in periods of 
the higher wind speeds (70 miles per hour and above) appears to be more marked. 
Payback periods for initial investments of a/ £3.5 million and b/ £5 million have been 
calculated for i/ a continuing trend of increasing periods of traffic restrictions and ii/ no 
ongoing annual increase. 
The results are summarised in the table below.  
 
 
 
Table 19 Payback Periods 
 Increasing trend of wind 
speeds 
No increasing trend 
£3.5 million capital cost 3 – 4year payback period 5 – 6year payback period 
£5 million capital cost 4 – 5year payback period 8 – 9year payback period 
 
 
The payback period varies slightly depending on the discount rate used but the exercise 
demonstrates that, subject to the ability of the bridge to take the extra dead and wind 
load, the retrospective installation of wind shielding is worthy of serious consideration.
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5  Conclusions 
5.1 Stages 1 and 2 
OBJECTIVE 1/ To review asset management plans for different infrastructure sectors in 
order to understand a/ the extent to which risk based asset management is implemented 
and b/ to explore any difference in the maturity of asset management planning across 
different sectors. If differences are identified a secondary objective is to explore the 
reasons why. 
RESPONSE;  
The ‘sweep’ of asset management progress across the energy, transport, water and 
communications sectors suggest that gas and electric, water then transport is the order of 
‘distance travelled’, with transport bringing up the rear. Communications are likely to be 
between water and transport, certainly in terms of business visibility. This then feeds into 
stage 2 where most of the ‘learning transfer’ is envisaged to be from water to roads.  
These statements must be qualified due to gaps in data for the review. These gaps include: 
no access to internal workings of companies, little personal contact with practitioners, no 
open access to analytical tools in use. 
The extent of adoption of asset management progress in each sector appears dependent on 
the industry organisational model and the resultant commercial or political imperatives, 
expressed for example through the drive and authority of the regulator. There may also be 
a differentiator in terms of the ease of application of life cycle analysis tools, for example 
industries dependent upon electrical and mechanical fittings rather than long lived civil 
assets are perceived as having more accurately forecast design lives and therefore more 
reliable forecast costs. This is likely to be a factor in the early application of asset 
management practices to these sectors. An alternative way of expressing this is to high 
light the lack of historic detailed records on service interruptions and maintenance 
downtime in some civil engineering sectors. A good example of regulatory effectiveness 
arises from a comparison of the roads and water sectors where the regulator driven focus 
on asset management has driven the water companies well ahead. The PAS55 assessment 
sheets in appendix A2 give an overall picture where AMPs have been publicly available. 
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Appendix A1 includes spread sheets summarising utility sector structure and contacts; 
essentially acting as references to this section. 
In conclusion; in order to drive the widespread use of asset management tools throughout 
infrastructure sectors, better record keeping and increased emphasis on reducing life cycle 
costs are required. 
 
5.2 Stage 3 
 
OBJECTIVE 2/ To determine whether the application of integrated logistics support (ILS) 
to infrastructure projects offers a practical tool within the risk based approach 
recommended in PAS 55. 
RESPONSE 
These are ‘bottom up’ analytical tools and therefore depend, initially at least, on 
experienced and detailed knowledge of the asset under consideration. This needs to be 
supplemented by availability and maintenance records which are sufficiently detailed to 
be able to identify service and functional limits and the impact of environmental and 
loading factors on these. Many civil engineering assets will be found wanting in this 
regard and the application of these tools will be consequently restricted. An increasing 
awareness of the value of an asset management approach will encourage asset managers 
to tackle this shortcoming but adoption will only build if results are found to be valuable. 
 
The dual FMECA results from this exercise on the Tay Road Bridge need to be tested in 
practice over a period of time but the similarities of the two results; and the verification by 
means of reviews with the bridge board operations team, lend some confidence that the 
results would be both repeatable (other engineers attempting the same exercise with the 
same asset would reach similar conclusions) and reproducible to other civil engineering 
assets. 
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This is not to say that further experience of applying the FMECA tool to this asset would 
not lead to development of the model and a re-ordering of priority risks: it may well do as 
bridge improvements are made and the impact of further failure causes are experienced. 
There is also the real consequence of aging of the bridge which will re-prioritise risks.  
 
An example of a high scoring, system level FMECA failure cause (traffic restrictions due 
to high wind speeds) has been worked through to demonstrate the financial viability of 
specific resilience improvement proposals. This needs to be tested in engineering terms 
(i.e. can the bridge deck take the extra dead load) but goes some way to demonstrating 
possible practical outcomes from this risk exercise. 
 
The RCM exercise has yet to demonstrate value arising from this application. There are at 
least 2 main reasons for this a/ bridge inspection codes are already based on detailed 
research on failure modes, causes and deterioration timelines (hence the RCM results in 
table 17 do not diverge much from current practice) and b/ because of the costs of 
providing access, and the wider costs of restricting bridge availability, much of the major 
maintenance works is opportunity based i.e. when major maintenance/replacements are 
needed, the opportunity is taken to undertake necessary maintenance works too. Existing 
bridge inspection regimes of general inspections every two years, followed by detailed 
inspections every 6 years, is proven (through the low instances of bridge failures) to be 
able to meet public expectations of bridge functionality and reliability. 
 
 
OBJECTIVE 3/ To compare the results of an FMECA analysis at a system and unit level 
of detail for the risk based assessment. To assess what level of detail is required for the 
structural breakdown system in order to allow an effective yet robust FMECA analysis to 
be carried out. 
RESPONSE 
Why 2 levels of FMECA assessment? Because resilience is primarily concerned with 
avoiding or mitigating vulnerabilities arising from threats, the main danger arising to the 
functionality of assets is if an assessment misses or misjudges the impact of a possible 
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threat or vulnerability. If only one of the two types of ‘flow’ across the structure, traffic 
and loading, is assessed, there is a likelihood of missing an important issue. There is little 
value in improving the ability of the bridge to maintain service levels in the face of 
external threats if unit reliability is failing to meet an acceptable standard. This is borne 
out by the different (although similar) priority score issues arising from the two 
assessments. The resilience of a structure cannot be directly linked to an average score of 
vulnerability to threats; it only needs one significant threat in one area of vulnerability to 
cause a significant impact.  The choice of level of FMECA study does not appear to be an 
either/or. The dual approach also neatly links the intrinsic structure with its community 
value as a mode of traffic conveyance i.e. an asset in terms of its utility. However, it 
would be appropriate to start both levels with major risks then update and enhance 
regularly with periodic reviews. These reviews would need to include assessment of new 
threats as well as reconsideration of existing ones.  
The high scoring issues from both FMECA levels are linked but not completely 
interlinked. Failure to meet service level standards can be independent of minor structural 
failure. While it is tempting to propose that a system level FMECA be undertaken for the 
whole structure and a follow on detailed study be done for only selected units or elements, 
this does not seem to satisfactorily assess all the main risks, because the system level 
study does not comprehensively draw attention to vulnerabilities which may be exposed 
by the unit level study. There are a number of similarities in the 2 sets of findings for the 
Tay Road Bridge but this may not be repeated for other assets. 
Would a more detailed FMECA at parts level be useful? This is likely to be related to the 
scale of the asset; to drop into a more detailed look at parts of mechanical and electrical 
assemblies would arguably only be justified if particular failure causes required this. If 
smaller scale assets were being assessed this could be worthwhile.  
It proved difficult to see how an RCM exercise would work with the system level 
FMECA therefore this was based on the unit level FMECA only. One of the benefits of 
undertaking the RCM exercise was a fuller understanding of the series of steps which 
constituted the failure mechanisms involved; of which the failure mode was but one stage, 
albeit an important one. Identification of failure mechanisms; not just modes, was needed 
in order to correctly identify the appropriate maintenance task. In this way the RCM 
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exercise leads to a fuller understanding of failure modes and hence the accuracy of the 
FMECA exercise.  
 
OBJECTIVE 4/ To determine whether ILS can be applied efficiently to an assessment of 
the resilience of infrastructure assets. 
RESPONSE 
 
The answer will be critical in driving the dissemination of ILS techniques in infrastructure 
management sectors. The results arising from one application should not be expected to 
prove this one way or another and the best lessons arising can only point to some relevant 
factors: 
 
1. Results of a detailed analysis of the 13 years of bridge availability data have been used 
to inform some of the system level FMECA ratings and also used in the cost benefit 
exercise concerning the wind shielding. Were these data to be unavailable then the 
FMECA results would be more uncertain. The availability of good data and 
knowledgeable practitioners is therefore important.  
2. The lack of new recommendations arising from the RCM exercise in this case should 
not be equated to a general lack of value from this approach.  Application to a different 
asset may well prove fruitful, particularly as maintenance costs usually dwarf construction 
costs over the lifetime of an asset. 
3. While the staff time involved in constructing the ILS tools is significant; for an asset 
with a long design life, both FMECA and RCM can prove their value as follows: 
When the physical environment changes, the ILS worksheets can quickly be updated to 
reflect these. New priority risks and vulnerabilities can be highlighted, which focusses 
maintenance resources in the most effective ways. This is particularly pertinent with the 
threat of climate change, and in this instance the forecast increase in periods of high wind 
speeds. 
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The process of working through an ILS study can highlight gaps in records and blind 
spots in design awareness of vulnerabilities. This type of study can also provide a 
structure to address business risks, prioritise their threat levels, and provide a reasoned 
justification to make a financial case for resources to be spent in a particular area. If this 
structured, rigorous approach aids understanding of critical parts, it may encourage further 
application of remote monitoring techniques. The high scoring accorded to ‘invisible 
failure modes’ within the FMECA worksheet is particularly suited to driving this. 
4/ To sum up; the efficiency of this exercise should be measured over the life cycle of the 
engineering asset, not as a one-off exercise. 
5.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
1) Can this approach work across infrastructure sectors? The models, principles and 
philosophy applied to the Tay Road Bridge could be tested for their general applicability 
by using them in a different civil engineering sector; water treatment works or distribution 
networks could be used.  
 
2) Common lessons arising from a comparison of the two could then be brought out 
and used to form generic guidance for future applications. The aim would be to arrive at a 
resilience model which would be capable of widespread application to civil engineering 
assets, networks or systems. 
 
3) Further development of the resilience model is necessary in order to arrive at a 
dimensionless quantification of resilience readiness; so that asset and system relative 
vulnerability can be compared as a management aid when deciding resource allocations. 
 
4) Further application of the RCM exercise to another infrastructure type is 
necessary in order to measure value. 
 
5) Can value be proven over time? A period of exposing both FMECA and RCM 
recommendations to real life management and maintenance decision making would 
ideally feed back into the results and improve these.  
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Glossary 
 
Absorptive capacity  The ability of the system to endure a disruption without significant 
deviation from normal operating performance (NIAC 2009) 
Adaptive capacity  The general ability of institutions, systems, and individuals to adjust 
to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. 
ARM  Availability, reliability and maintenance analysis. An ILS process to quantify all 
three. 
Asset management (abbreviated to AM)  Defined in PAS55 as ‘the systematic and 
coordinated activities and practices through which an organisation optimally and 
sustainably manages its assets and asset systems, their associated performance, risks and 
expenditures over their life cycles for the purpose of achieving its organisational strategic 
plan’. 
Asset management plan (abbreviated to AMP)  A document specifying activities and 
resources, responsibilities and timescales for implementing the asset management strategy 
and delivering the asset management objectives (PAS55 part 1 page 2) 
Asset management (purpose of): on a more explanatory basis than above, another 
definition is attempted (Lloyd page xiii) as: ‘Asset management is a strategic discipline 
which gives rigour and accountability to the way organisations decide: 
 How, where and in what to invest 
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 Which assets are most critical.  
 What risks need to be managed 
 What demands must be served 
 What needs to be known 
 How this knowledge should be captured and circulated  
 How organisations should be structured and led 
 What types and teams of people they need  
 How activities should be carried out 
 How actual performance should be measured 
 That improvements are needed’ 
 
Availability
 The probability that an item is in a state of functioning at a given point in time 
(point availability) or over a stated period of time (interval availability) when operated, 
maintained and supported in a prescribed manner (Kumar et al 2000). This is normally 
measured as a ratio representing the proportion of the operational time during which the 
asset and/or system is available for operation. 
Bottom-up assessment of resilience - focusses on a systematic analysis of the effects of 
individual hazard events at critical assets. It examines the root elements of the system and 
how the impact of each hazard could propagate through the system, potentially triggering 
system failure and possibly loss of service. (UKWIR 2013) 
 
145 
 
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)
 Those elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a 
major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to 
severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life (CPNI website) 
Durability
 Ability of an item to perform a given function at any given time based on 
required performance 
Failure  A loss of function or reduced capability. There are three failure definitions (El-
Haram 1995).  1) an element has suddenly become completely inoperable and can no 
longer perform its required function 2) an element is still operable but incapable of 
fulfilling some or all of its intended functions at the level of performance originally 
specified and 3) an element has gradually deteriorated to an unsatisfactory level of 
performance or condition, and its continued operation is either unsafe, uneconomical or 
aesthetically unacceptable. Taken together, a functional failure is defined as the inability 
of any asset to fulfil a function to a standard of performance which is acceptable to the 
user (Moubray 1997). This leads directly to the report specific definition below. 
Failure consequences  
Describes what happens when a failure mode occurs; answers the question ‘how does it 
matter?’ (Moubray 1997). This can be thought of as the impact of the failure effects. 
Failure effects   
Describes what happens when a failure mode occurs – answers the question – what 
happens? (Moubray 1997). This can be thought of as the early physical symptoms 
following failure.  
Failure definition in the RCM process in this report  A loss of function or reduced 
capability sufficient to cause the bridge manager to impose limitations on bridge users 
(including bridge closure).  
Failure mode The way in which an item failure manifests itself to the user. In other 
words, the first visible physical sign of failure. 
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FMEA  Failure mode, effects and analysis. A systematic approach to identify all the 
possible ways in which failure of an element, service or piece of equipment can occur, 
together with its causes, and thus the failure’s potential effect on the network or 
structure’s elements, services and equipment.  
FMECA
 Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis. As above but with the addition of 
criticality analysis. The objective is to determine the ways in which equipment can fail, 
and the effects of such failures on other elements of the system. Output data are: List of 
all possible failure modes, causes and effects of each failure mode, list of critical elements 
and list of elements which require design improvement – then used as input data for the 
RCM analysis and for future development of the maintenance strategy. 
FTA Fault tree analysis. A top down approach which identifies ways in which a 
particular system failure can occur and the probability of its occurrence (Kumar et al 
2000). It allows quantification of low level failures which cause larger problems. 
Hazard An entity with the ability to cause harm. 
ILS 
 Integrated logistic support. A structured management approach aimed at ensuring 
that assets are designed and maintained to deliver maximum whole life value whilst 
achieving the required levels of performance and reliability. Availability, reliability, 
durability, maintainability, supportability and safety are all considered in as much detail 
as possible, normally by an expert panel. ILS comprises a suite of tools including failure 
modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA); reliability centred maintenance (RCM); 
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Availability, reliability and maintainability analysis (ARM); level of repair analysis 
(LORA); fault tree analysis (FTA); logistic support analysis (LSA).  
Infrastructure
 Nii et al state that infrastructure can be described as “the systems and 
organisations required for the functioning of a society”. This also allows inclusion of non-
stationary water treatment plant process units, for example. 
Infrastructure
 “a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems and 
processes that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a 
continuous flow of essential goods and services”. Critical Foundations 1997 
Infrastructure assets
 Stationary systems forming a network and serving whole communities, where the 
system as a whole is intended to be maintained indefinitely at a particular level of service 
potential by the continuing replacement and refurbishment of its components. The 
network may include normally recognised ordinary assets as components. (IIMM 2002). 
Infrastructure dependency: A linkage or connection between two infrastructures, 
through which the state of one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the 
other. (Rinaldi et al 2001) 
Infrastructure interdependency: A bidirectional relationship between two 
infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to 
the state of the other. (Rinaldi et al 2001) 
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Infrastructure resilience consists of 4 elements: resistance, reliability, redundancy, 
response and recovery (Cabinet Office Natural Hazards and Infrastructure 2011) 
Infrastructure spatial scale for analysis (based on Perrow’s taxonomy):  
Part: smallest component of a system that can be identified in an analysis (e.g. a bolt) 
Unit: a functionally related collection of parts (e.g. a bridge bearing) 
Subsystem: an array of units (e.g. the bridge deck) 
System: a grouping of subsystems (e.g. the complete bridge) 
Infrastructure: a complete collection of like systems (e.g. the complete regional road 
network) 
Level of Service
 The defined service quality for a particular activity or service area against which 
service performance may be measured. Service levels usually relate to quality, quantity, 
reliability, responsiveness, environmental acceptability and cost. (IIMM manual 2002) 
Life cycle cost (ISO 15686, part 5) LCC is the “cost of an asset, or its parts throughout its 
life cycle, while fulfilling the performance requirements” 
LORA 
 Level of repair analysis. A procedure which determines in a systematic way the 
cost of alternative maintenance options and maintenance levels, taking into account 
manpower costs, support equipment and spare parts (Blanchard & Fabrycky 1991). i.e. do 
we repair on site, off site, or discard – the result is to find the maintenance level which 
minimizes total support cost. 
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LSA 
 Logistic support analysis. The process employed on an iterative basis throughout 
system development that addresses the aspect of supportability in design. 
Maintainability A scientific discipline which studies complexity, factors and 
resources related to the tasks needed to be performed by the user in order to maintain the 
functionality of a system/product, and works out methods for their quantification, 
assessment, prediction and improvement (Knezevic 1997). Normally measured in terms of 
mean time to repair (MTTR), maintenance labour hours per maintenance task (MLH/MT), 
maintenance labour cost per maintenance task (MLC/MT).  
Optimize 
 achieve by a quantitative or qualitative method, as appropriate, the best value 
compromise between conflicting factors such as performance, costs, and retained risk 
within any non-negotiable constraints (PAS55 part 1 page 4) 
Perturbation a disturbance of motion, course, arrangement, or state of equilibrium. A 
small change in a physical system, most often in a physical system at equilibrium that is 
disturbed from the outside. 
Publicly available specification    A Publicly Available Specification (PAS) is a 
sponsored fast-track standard driven by the needs of the client organizations and 
developed according to guidelines set out by BSI.  
Key stakeholders are brought together to collaboratively produce a BSI-endorsed PAS 
that has all the functionality of a British Standard for the purposes of creating 
management systems, product benchmarks and codes of practice. After two years the PAS 
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is reviewed and a decision is made as to whether it should be taken forward to become a 
formal British Standard. (British Standards shop website) 
RCM  
 Reliability centred maintenance. A systematic approach for selecting applicable 
and effective preventive maintenance tasks for each item in a system, taking into 
consideration failure consequences. (Moubray 1996) It is a method for directing 
maintenance efforts to the areas of greatest importance for reliable system operation and 
arises from a rigorous analysis of the consequences of failure. 
Reliability
 ISO 60050 (191): the ability of an item to perform a required function under 
given conditions for a given time interval. Normally measured by mean time between 
failures (MTBF) or mean time to failure (MTTF). 
Reliability engineering
 consist of the systematic application of engineering principles and techniques 
throughout a product lifecycle to ensure that a system or device has the ability to perform 
a required function under given conditions for a given time interval. (taken from Asset 
Management – an Anatomy) 
Reliability/Resilience contrast  
The term ‘reliability’ is applicable only when the item in question is used within the 
conditions for which it was designed. Resilience is used in this report to include design 
conditions but also describe behaviour or characteristics under conditions beyond the 
design limits. 
Repeatability 
 The same exercise repeated by the same people gives the same results. 
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Reproducibility The same exercise reproduced by different people gives the same results. 
Resilience 
 “Given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of events), the 
resilience of a system to that event (or events) is the ability to reduce efficiently both the 
magnitude and duration of the deviation from targeted system service levels”. (adapted 
from Vugrin et al 2011) 
Restorative capacity (Vugrin 2011)
 The ability of a system to be repaired easily 
Risk  The probability that a hazard will cause harm (Health and Safety Executive 
definition). 
Robustness 
 “The ability of an item or system to maintain its function when subject to 
changes or perturbations and uncertain conditions”. (Blockley et al 2012) 
Serviceability 
 The ability of a system to be serviced easily. 
STEEPLE analysis  An assessment of positive and negative 
factors in the macro environment within the categories of social, technological, 
environmental, economic, political, legal and ethical factors. 
Structural system   Load bearing elements of a building or civil engineering works and 
the way in which these elements function together. 
Supportability
 The inherent characteristics of an item related to its ability to be supported by the 
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required resources for the execution of the specified maintenance task (Knezevic 1993). 
Required resources must be planned and developed; a main measure is mean time to 
support (MTTS). An assessment is defined by US department of defence 1983 standard 
1388-1A.  
Terotechnology
 Initiated by the UK Ministry of Industry in 1968. Also known as life-cycle 
costing. 
Theory of significance     In any set of data, the greatest amount of information is 
obtained for the least effort by considering only data whose value is greater than the 
mean. (essentially a variation on the 80/20 rule). 
Top-down assessment of resilience – This approach considers the overall system 
performance and identifies resilience attributes already present and, additionally, any gaps 
or shortfalls in resilience. (UKWIR 2013) 
Vulnerability   Susceptibility to damage or perturbation.  
 
WLC 
 Whole life costing. Definition taken from BS/ISO 15686. A methodology for 
systematic economic consideration of all whole-life costs and benefits over a period of 
analysis, as defined in the agreed scope 
NOTE 1 The projected costs or benefits may include external costs (including, for 
example, finance, business costs, income from land sale, user costs). 
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NOTE 2 Whole-life costing can address a period of analysis that covers the entire life 
cycle or (a) selected stage(s) or periods of interest thereof. 
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Appendices    
Appendix A: Stages 1 and 2                                       
A1 Stage 1 data sheets 
A1.1 Asset Management Plan subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements 
4.2 Asset management policy 
4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
4.4.6 Information management 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
4.4.9 Management of change 
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
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4.6.2    Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and       non-conformities 
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance 
4.6.4 Audit 
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
4.6.6 Records 
4.7 Management review 
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A1.2 Spreadsheet option for assessing asset management progress (option discarded so for illustration only) 
 
Asset Management Plan
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
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n
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delivery
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response
asset 
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knowled
ge and 
standard
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asset 
informati
on and 
systems
asset 
knowled
ge and 
data
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nce and 
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structure 
and 
culture
contract 
and 
supply 
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risk 
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nt and 
manage
ment
sustainab
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ment
weather 
and 
climate 
change
review 
and audit
policy 
and 
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Input 
from 
customer
s
Input 
from 
regulator
whole 
life cost 
element
whole 
life cost 
element
PAS 55 
life cycle 
activities
PAS 55 
life cycle 
activities
PAS 55 
life cycle 
activities
PAS 55 
life cycle 
activities
0.4/fig 4 0.4/fig 4 4.5.1.3 4.5.1
4.5.1.4 
and 
4.5.1.5 4.4.3 4.3.4
4.5.1.4 to 
4.5.1.6 4.6.6
4.4.5 and 
4.4.6 4.6.6 4.4.3 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.7 4.4.9 4.3.4
4.6 and 
4.7
4.2 and 
4.3.1
description
additional explanation
Map to PAS 55-2:2008 sections
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
A1.3 Summary of energy company maintenance guides 
 
inspection how often (inspection) replacement financial health and safety renovation audits maintenance test preventive sustainability productivity
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x
x x x xWestern power distribution
http://www.google.fr/#sclien
t=psy&hl=fr&source=hp&q=m
aintenance+plan+western+po
wer+distibution&aq=f&aqi=&
Electrical maintenance
Nuclear company
http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publicati
ons/PDF/te_1590_web.pdf 
Report of ILS in nuclear company, 
including maintenance solutions
National Grid
http://www.nationalgrid.com
/uk/Gas/OperationalInfo/mai
ntenance/
Maintenance plan National Grid
Scottish Hydro-electric
http://www.ukace.org/public
ations/ACE%20Research%20%
282001-12%29%20-
%20Directory%20of%20Energy
%20Services%20for%20Housin
g%20Associations%20%5BHan
dbook%5D
Document about Scottish hydro-
electric, including a little on 
maintenance (in particular 
replacement and renovation)
Scottish Power
http://www.google.com/sear
ch?q=asset+management+uk+
energy&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-
8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:fr:offi
cial&client=firefox-
a#sclient=psy&hl=fr&client=fi
refox-
a&rls=org.mozilla:fr%3Aoffici
al&source=hp&q=%22mainten
Annual report including economics, 
management and maintenance
information maintenance plan primary focus of 
company link of documents description
 
 
 The maintenance plan sub headings were derived on a heuristic basis, i.e. from a reading of the documents. 
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A1.4 Infrastructure sector asset management  
  
Energy Companies Relevant docs
sector
Electricity and Gas Ofgem http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Licensing/Work/Pages/Work.aspx
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Licensing/Work/Documents1/LicAp
pGuidance011008.pdf
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/About%20us/CorpPlan/Documents1
/Corporate%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%202010-2015.pdf
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/white_pa
pers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_2011.aspx
2011 elec reform-white-paper-exec-summary
Energy ownership database on Ofgem website 
Scottish and Southern Energy
Scottish Power
EON
EDF
Centrica
National Grid
Oil BP
Shell
Cairn Energy
Nuclear EDF
http://www.nuclearsupplychain.com/
Wave/wind Iberdrola/Scottish Power Andrawus thesis, Robert Gordons University
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Transport Companies Relevant docs
sector
Highways
Transport 
Scotland http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/media/article.php?id=164
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/01/20548/50337
Dundee City 
Council City Development Department Service Plan 2010-2012; from website
Local transport Strategy October 2000; from website
Highways 
Agency http://www.highways.gov.uk/aboutus/30779.aspx
England and 
Wales http://www.ukroadsliaisongroup.org/pdfs/090423%20-%20life-cycle%20planning%20doc.pdf
General
http://www.ukroadsliaisongroup.org/pdfs/060202%20-
%20Highway%20Asset%20Management%20Framework.pdf
http://www.performance-based-road-contracts.com/documents.htm
Leeds city 
council http://helg.org/admin/wp-content/uploads/Leeds-Asset-Management-Case-Study.pdf
Herts county 
council http://www.hertsdirect.org/infobase/docs/pdfstore/ltp2annexd.pdf
http://www.hertsdirect.org/services/transtreets/transplan/ltp/LTP3/ltp3docs/
Rail Network Rail rvfm-atkins-asset-management-250511
nr_efficiency_assessment_0910.pdf
rvfm-first-economics-asset-ownership-211210.pdf
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.2295
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.147
Air BAA
http://www.baa.com/portal/page/Investor/BAA+Airports%5EInvestor+centre%5EDocument+centre%5ECapit
al+investment+plans%5EHeathrow+CIP+2011/daf0e85abc790310VgnVCM10000036821c0a____/448c6a4c7
f1b0010VgnVCM200000357e120a____/%20centre
Manchester 
Airport http://www.manchesterairport.co.uk/manweb.nsf/All+Content/currentannualreport
http://www.manchesterairport.co.uk/manweb.nsf/alldocs/10F56C819A51454E8025739300388C1D/$File/
Masterplan.pdf
Waterways BWB http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/our-work/maintenance-and-improvement/customer-service-standards
http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/media/documents/cop_2011.pdf
http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/media/documents/Waterways_2025.pdf
http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/media/documents/Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2009-10.pdf
Ports Forth Ports http://www.halcrow.com/portal/default.asp
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Water Relevant docs
sector
companies
Scottish Water
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SWE_PGP_NEWS/NEWS_JUN11/NEWS_JUN11_ANN
_REP/ScottishWaterAnnualReportAccounts201011.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/DELIVERY%20PLAN%20-%20MAY%202006.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SWE_PGP_NEWS/SWE_PGE_NEWS/INFO_CLIM_CHA
NGE/Scottish_Water_Carbon_Plan_2010.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/SecondDraftBusinessPlanMarch09.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/National%20Sludge%20Strategy.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/Adopted%20WRP09%20Summary%20Document.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/SecondDraftBusinessPlanAppendicesMarch09.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SW_PAGE_GROUP_PS_ADMIN/SW_PUB_SCHEME_A
DMIN_HOLDING/TAB65572/201011DeliveryPlanUpdate.pdf
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SWE_PGP_PUBLICATIONS/SWE_PGE_PUBLICATIONS
/SWE_2_PUB_FOI_SEA/PUB_REP_SEC_DRAFT_BUS_PLAN
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/WICSPerformanceReport2010.pdf
http://www.watercommission.co.uk/default.aspx?VirtualHandlerName=Business_Plan_Guidance
Ofwat http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase2/pr09phase2letters/ltr_pr0923_amabaselinesetting
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/pricereviewletters/ltr_pr0932_capmaintex
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/pricereviewletters/ltr_pr0932_capmaintex_appendix.pdf
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/ltr_md212_assetmngplan
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/pricereviewletters/ltr_pr0938_serviceability
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/pricereviewletters/ltr_pr0937_ama
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/pricereviewletters/ltr_pr0937_appa.pdf
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/sub_fbp_pr09partasumm
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/sds/
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/structure/boardmeetings/min_obm20110616.pdf
England and Wales 
water companies http://www.anglianwater.co.uk/_assets/media/strategic-direction-statement.pdf
http://www.anglianwater.co.uk/about-us/statutory-reports/EF4060AF6BE345CE9F73F7F86158824C.aspx
http://www.unitedutilities.com/Documents/strategicdirectionstatement.pdf
http://www.unitedutilities.com/PR09FinalBusinessPlan.aspx
http://www.nwl.co.uk/nwlookingtothefuture.aspx
http://www.nwl.co.uk/finalbusinessplan.aspx
http://www.stwater.co.uk/upload/pdf/Focus_on_water_pdf_for_website_FINAL_14_DECEMBER.pdf
http://www.stwater.co.uk/server.php?show=nav.6408
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xchg/corp/hs.xsl/6759.htm
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xchg/corp/hs.xsl/6759.htm
http://www.southernwater.co.uk/Aboutus/library/strategicDirectionStatement.asp
http://www.southernwater.co.uk/Aboutus/library/businessPlan.asp
http://www.yorkshirewater.com/medialibrary/PDF%20files/Strategic_Direction_Statement.pdf
http://www.yorkshirewater.com/pr09
http://www.dwrcymru.com/English/Company/dwrcymru/SDS/index.asp
http://www.dwrcymru.com/English/library/Reports/companyreports/investmentplans/index.asp
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Companies Regulated Research Regulator Regulator Relevant docs Description People
Utility sector structure and contacts Private back up details website
Companies? centres
Telecoms BT BT Yes Ofcom
Cable Virgin Yes
IT
Waste Private companies Biffa Yes
(zero waste scotland) No
Viridor http://www.viridor.co.uk/
Greater Manchester http://www.gmwda.gov.uk/
Resilience http://thisbigcity.net/the-bionic-city-a-natural-blueprint-for-future-cities/ Bionic cities
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A2 Stage 2 data sheets 
 
A2.1 Asset Management Plan comparisons 
Findings under each heading are underlined. 
A2.1.1 Anglian Water 
Business Plan 2010-2015 
http://www.anglianwater.co.uk/about-us/statutory-reports/EF4060AF6BE345CE9F73F7F86158824C.aspx 
AMP subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements    
Define and document the scope of the system   
Control of outsourcing 
Scope largely controlled by Ofwat questions/requirements, aided by reporter scrutiny. Scope includes all the regulated elements of the business – little opportunity to 
scale it up to include wider responsibilities. B3,3.0.33 – Anglian rated highest by Ofwat in 2008. Outsourcing partners – see B3, 3.0.106. 
4.2 Asset management policy 
B1 shows an impressive level of analysis of customer affordability. No specifics seen on policy – likely to be in higher level documents. 
4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
Strategic direction statement covers this. Strategy includes metering etc. Strategic direction statement includes details on climate change, resilience and innovation. B1 
also looks at future issues which may impact upon plans. Projected population increases, fewer people per household, immediate recessionary pressures, ageing 
population, climate change, carbon limits, rising expectations, rising environmental standards, diffuse pollution, 1st time sewerage connections, increasing bad debt. B3 
page 23/24 also covers it. 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
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B2 shows increasing productivity evidence. B2/2.1.13. B3/3.0.11 service levels to be maintained, not increased. Risk levels also to be maintained. Business objective 
shown on B3, 3.0.102 – least cost option to maintain service levels. 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
Page B3 page 6 lists the key points – impressive range of deterioration, risk and financial models are in use, validated against actual problems and claimed to be 
statistically accurate. Overall 6 stage approach shown on B3, 3.0.34. 
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
B1 looks at the post 2010 environment. The capital maintenance investment programme is based on an assessment of operational risks. B3 page 6 allows for resilience 
and redundancy. B3 page 31 allows for future housing plans. 
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
B1, 1.3. B3 page 24 – PR0-9 executive group meet fortnightly. Individual reviews are held to make responsibilities clear (B3 3.0.58). Job role outlines (3.0.59) are used. 
Capital spend management detailed in 3.0.105 
 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
B3 3.0.86 – cost consultants. 3.0.106. Ernst and Young 3.5.18. IT support 3.5.27 
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
3.0.108 details briefly. Skills and behaviours framework and personal development plans. Not a lot of detail here though. 
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
B1, 1.4.36-1.4.39 summarise customer consultation and priorities arising. B3 page 23/24 show customer surveys. Overall policy of not increasing or reducing service 
levels is based on extensive customer feedback. 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
In a sense the business plan fulfils most of this requirement – any further AMP data is not accessible to us.  
4.4.6 Information management 
B3, page 6 – SAP asset hierarchy records. Not possible to access systems directly. C3 covers asset inventory. 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
B1, 1.3 lists risks; high and low level. B3, page 6 lists models. B3 page 11 shows that investment is targeted at equipment of most benefit to customers. They have a 
service measure framework. They employ site surveys to back up their modelling. 
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
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B3, page 6 includes 17 different pipe deterioration models, service impact modelling covering 81,000 km of pipes and 6155 sites. Service failure probability measures. 
B3 page 9 states the use of modelling for future water main bursts; allowing the targeting of pipes at greatest risk. B3 3.0.61 shows a separation of failure and service 
failures. B3 page 28 gives more detail. 
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
B1, 1.3 lists risks, high and low level. B3, page 6 lists probability based risk models as a basis for the capital budget. B3 page 11 – economic replacement point model for 
water meters of 13 years. B3 page 27 shows risk definition – includes an element for social costs. Deterioration is measured by evolutionary polynomial regression 
modelling. 
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
B3, page 6 lists models. B3 page 30/31 shows an objective of an optimised capital plan. The optimisation is reached by iteration, not by use of an optimisation tool. 
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
B1 is strong on financial risks and the impact of future legislation. 
4.4.9 Management of change 
B1 anticipates future changes and identifies whether they have been allowed for in budgets.  
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
B3, 3.0.91 – whole life costing basis.  
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
In a sense this is the above ground, non-infrastructure works; so is covered under other general headings.  
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
B3, page 6 shows that risk models are correlated with actual failure records. B3 3.0.77 and 3.0.80 link deterioration curves with service impact models. 
4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and non-conformities 
These are fed back into the deterioration models to make them robust.  
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance (with legal and regulatory requirements) 
The whole business plan is evidence of this; in terms of meeting regulatory requirements; and other legal constraints, e.g. water framework directive, are included.  
3.0.109 – trying for ISO 9001. 
4.6.4 Audit 
3.0.111 mentions validation of the investment plans. 3.0.114 mentions the reporters view. 3.1.2.32 mentions financial auditors. 
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
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3.1.2.37 – planned preventative maintenance being done – flushing of water mains. 3.1.2.38 – water main bursts expected to be constant.  
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
B1 shows evidence of continuing improvement of standards. 3.0.110 states that AWS are committed to it. 3.1.2.44 – unit cost reviews. 
 4.6.6 Records 
B3, page 6 mentions 300,000 items of equipment and 6155 separate sites. They use SAP ALM for non infra assets and a GIS background for infra assets. These come 
together in Asset plus (3.0.73) for a risk based investment plan. Further described in doc C3. 
4.7 Management review 
There are refs to the control arrangements for monitoring spend and progress but I can’t find refs to less frequent, major, reviews.  
 
A2.1.2 Hertfordshire County Council 
Transport Asset Management Plan  
Draft 1.2 October 2008 
(saved in task 1; dropbox) 
AMP subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements    
Define and document the scope of the system   
Control of outsourcing 
1st authority to produce a HAMP (Highways AMP); now developed into a TAMP (Transport AMP). There are annual reports to the highway committee but no evidence 
of intermediate plan updates. 1.5 - role of the TAMP is to reflect strategic goals in the operation plans (essentially a linking vehicle). P35 mentions the intention to 
produce a more detailed level 2 document (therefore this one is ‘high level’ only). Can’t find the level 2 document. Overall impression is that they’ve brought a 
consultant in to produce the HAMP but it’s difficult to see how deeply rooted the thinking has become since then. 
4.2 Asset management policy 
1.4 – policies and procedures are listed elsewhere. 3.1 shows origin of AM principles. 
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4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
1.5 – strategic goals are listed elsewhere; other docs are referenced.  
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
1.3 – core role of the plan is to encourage good decision making. Also refers to corporate objectives stated in the corporate plan and the local transport plan. 1.8.3 lists 6 
principles which guide the objectives. 1.9 lists the planned outcomes. 3.3 reiterate the 6 principles but they seem to be saying that AMP proposals cannot be ‘smart’ – the 
level of non-specificity is indicative of a lack of detailed work (and understanding)? 
 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
1.7 – intention is to create an evolving statement of practice. 3 levels of info – think we can only find level 1. 4.1 gives a 4 stage process for generic asset management 
planning. 
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
1.8.2 – lists future demands and acknowledges the need for flexibility.  
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
Some indication of the decision making process/structure (p32) but no link to manpower organisation. No detailed indication that there is a high level drive to make the 
case for pushing the AMP thinking forward. 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
 Page 26 – works programme is delivered by a highways partnership and other specialist contracts. 
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
Good call handling and customer service standards (p33) is cited as assisting service delivery – but there’s not much on disseminating asset management practice across 
the workforce. Co-located teams also cited as important.   
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
1.9.1 describes ongoing improvement. Plan to be kept on the council intranet site. P15 – MORI survey of customer concerns – used to set corporate priorities.  Detailed 
carriageway sheets – use customer surveys. 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
There is the draft plan; annual reports on progress; all on the intranet site. P35 shows an intention to produce a more detailed level 2 plan – ideally this is what we should 
be assessing against but it doesn’t exist yet.   
4.4.6 Information management 
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P30 – carriageway inventory and condition data is used to give an optimised works programme and future projections. Factors for ranking of footway and drainage 
schemes are listed.  P37 starts listing quantities. P36 lists examples from 6 sector asset group summaries. Detailed sector sheets give some indication of gaps in data 
storage – i.e. little data on drainage or footway condition. 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
1.6 – they use pavement deterioration modelling. 1.8.4 has 4 processes. 3.3 – actions will balance cost, service standard and risk – they ought to be aiming for meeting 
service standards at minimum cost and acceptable risk? 
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
1.8.4 – first mention of risk as a decision making influence. Page 29 – gives an aspiration of using methodologies to set optimum investment levels – i.e. budgets. 
Implication is that they are not at that stage yet. Weighted matrices are used. P30 – carriageway deterioration modelling is used.  
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
Only clues are in the detailed sector sheets at the back – and that isn’t much.  
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
1.9 lists the planned outcomes.  P32 – integrated works programme is the output (planned up to 5 years ahead) but it’s not clear in what way good asset management 
improves this process. 
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
Government guidance and other legal controls are mentioned as external factors.  
4.4.9 Management of change 
1.6 – achievements to date are listed. 1.9.1 – organic additions. 
 
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
P29 – option appraisal needs to demonstrate ‘long term value for money’. P31 is specific on the need to minimise whole life costs. P36 – there are some asset lifecycle 
plans, but others need to be developed. Carriageway sheets – looking to use a WLC viewpoint. 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
No data, apart from refs to national surveys of carriageway condition. 
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
1.8.4 – 4th process. Also mentioned (outline only) on page 26. 4.6 goes through the detail – measuring outcomes rather than outputs. P35 lists the reporting vehicles. 
Performance indicators to be reviewed but they are not listed in detail. More data in the sector sheets at the back – emphasis is more on the improvements needed to data 
capture systems. 
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4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and       non-conformities 
P30 includes the use of repair history and the claims history. Sector sheets have some info – e.g. bridge parapet surveys. 
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance (with legal and regulatory requirements) 
Some refs in the sector sheets – e.g. refs to new indicator systems for structures – but they are not comprehensive, only examples.  
4.6.4 Audit 
No info.  
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
Clues to data improvements needed in the sector sheets – other than that; no procedures listed.  
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
P31 – recognition of the need to combine work items to avoid causing congestion every time. P33 – improvements from the highways strategic alliance to be fed back 
into future arrangements. Sector sheets – gap analysis examples are given.  
 4.6.6 Records 
Not mentioned.  
4.7 Management review 
1.9.1 - no end date or specific review dates. 
 
 
 
A2.1.3  
Scottish Water 
Delivery Plan 2010-2015, published March 2010. 
AMP subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements    
Define and document the scope of the system   
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Control of outsourcing 
There is no asset management plan as such. Secondary documents state that SW reckon they have most of the building blocks in place but they just haven’t pulled it all 
together into one document. 20% of the capital programme due to be delivered by SW solutions 2 (P37/38). P40 – they want to go for PAS 55 accreditation. 
4.2 Asset management policy 
Section 2 - 6 aspirational pillars as part of their vision. Section 3 gives some customer opinions.   
4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
Section3 – minister’s direction is to achieve upper quartile performance in relation to the English and Welsh companies. They also (P12) want to stay in front of the 
demand curve, but not commit to specific assets until developers are committed. 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
Section 3 - Minister’s directions – upper quartile performance, plus a table of objectives showing improvements expected between 2010 and 2015. These include low 
pressure, malodours, sewer flooding, water quality (particularly crypto eradication). Demand management options are to be examined (note – only examined). Much of 
this programme is driven by EU legislation or remedial works. 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
None available but it could be argued that, like the English and Welsh companies, the delivery/business plan fulfils this role.  
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
P18 – security service standards in case of drought. Need to access the OPA measurement of security of supply. There is a quantified index. P24 flood protection works 
are planned (risks have been surveyed). Some mention of demand management like leakage control. P25 – aim to make network resilient to climate change. UKCIP 09 
mentioned. Water metering trials being undertaken (P26) 
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
No structure or names are given.  
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
Design and construction partners will be expected to conform to company systems. P37 mentions SW solutions II will deliver around 20% of the capital schemes. 
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
3.0.108  
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
Page 9 – complaint monitoring and customer questionnaires are used to set customer target service levels. They also consult with licensed providers and developers. P39 
– PACE programme plus new intelligent control centre. 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
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P39 – business change programme in place called DRIVE  
4.4.6 Information management 
 P40 – new capital investment system and processes (CISP project).  
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
For the investment risks, there is a contingency fund, to be managed by a 7 stage process, and overseen by a board.  
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
B3, page  
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
 Section 9 lists main commercial risks to the capital programme plus other investment uncertainties. Some mitigation measures are described.  
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
 Nothing this detailed is included.  
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
Minister’s directions have a legal basis?  
 
4.4.9 Management of change 
P32 – forecast priorities beyond 2015. Intention to undertake studies 2010-15 so that info is available to set and cost priorities for the following term. Begs the question of 
who determines the study topics? Some are included in ministerial directions but are all of them? 
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
Whole life cost analysis of Dalmuir options – p39. P46 etcetera, cash flow statement – what’s the basis for valuation of assets? Table 8.14 for example – what’s the 
calculation behind depreciation charges? 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
P35 – they have drainage models covering 85% of the population.  
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
P35 – infiltration studies are planned.  
4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and non-conformities 
Nothing mentioned.  
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4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance (with legal and regulatory requirements) 
Much of the report details how ministerial objectives will be met but not the process or principles which underlie the objectives. Some mention made of DWQR and 
SEPA. 
4.6.4 Audit 
No audit mentioned (but there must be?). 
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
Section 10 describes monitoring performance – outcomes, outputs and inputs. 
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
P27 – looking at increasing electricity and heat generation from their sites. P38 – now clustering and sequencing work programmes and looking too avoid the national 
peak resource demand. Looking also to develop a whole life costing tool to include carbon use.  
 4.6.6 Records 
Nothing described in detail. 
4.7 Management review 
There is a seven stage process to spend/monitor spend on issues which have not been fully investigated yet. Water industry commission monitor the overall measure of 
delivery (OMD) – there are working and monitoring groups (P56). Table 10.6 summarises the work programme. 
 
 
A2.1.4 
South Yorkshire local transport plan partnership 
South Yorkshire Highway Asset Management Plan September 2010 
AMP subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements    
Define and document the scope of the system   
Control of outsourcing 
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Exec summary – scope covers road assets only, and at a generic level. There will be separate transport asset management plans and local transport plans. Note the 
‘HAMP’ is broadly based on the County Surveyors’ Society Framework document. Note 2.1.8 – focuses on level of service rather than the system itself. 2.1.7 – list of 
included assets. Note this HAMP is due to be superseded by a TAMP (Transport AMP) by March 2011 (2.4.3). 2.4.4 deals in a limited way with capital improvements. 
2.4.5 lists other relevant docs. 2.8 includes rights of ways. One 
4.2 Asset management policy 
No over-riding policy statement included but 2.3.1 discusses seeking to optimise asset value over their whole life. 2.4.5 lists the other policy documents. half 
4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
2.5 local transport plan may include strategy, certainly 4 themes are listed. half 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
1.11 – more work to be done in defining service levels. Improvement action plans will be local authority specific and will drive continuous improvement of service 
delivery. 2.6 – high level objectives come from the local transport plan. 2.7 – wish to improve co-ordination with street works activities by utilities. Improvement plans 
listed in section 8. half 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
This is the first one therefore needs development. half  
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
Not specifically mentioned, other than climate change as a risk. Probably included in an emergency plan. zero  
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
 This is an overarching asset plan, which includes reference to other relevant documents but doesn’t mention the ‘internal’ set up. Therefore, no duty holders 
mentioned. Zero. 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
Not specifically dealt with but work carried out over last 5 years is tabled in section 4. Future plans include PFI. zero  
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
Nothing. zero  
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
External to the organisation, service levels are set by (section 3) reference to legal guides plus customer feedback through the national benchmarking group. The trans 
authority nature of this plan by implication requires high level co-operation but internal communication is mentioned only indirectly. zero  
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
This is an overarching asset plan, which includes reference to other relevant documents.  half  
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4.4.6 Information management 
National indicators for road condition are listed in 2.11, along with measurement tools. Winter services policy documents listed, plus road classification network lengths 
and a detailed hierarchy for both roads, footways and rights of way. Overall lengths/numbers for street lighting and signs are summarised in 2.18/19. Traffic signals, 
street furniture, structures, verges, trees, are also included. Note highway drainage and other underground assets are poorly recorded, and not even systematically 
inspected. 2.25.3 – each authority has, as part of their gap analysis, prioritised inventory collection. half 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
4.4.1 summarises the prioritisation processes which each authority applies to the survey data in order to come up with a programme of works. The summary is outline 
only, which leaves the way open for political input into the priorities? Risks are listed later but no detailed methodology is given. half  
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
4.4 makes clear that the maintenance is budget constrained and, further, that the method by which budgets are set is not explained – i.e. the prioritisation between sectors 
is not explained (probably largely political). zero    
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
The national guidance docs are listed but no more detail given. Section 7 gives main outline risks to the council overall highways programme. half 
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
No direct evidence of this – schemes are prioritised within the budget limits but no evidence of systematic balancing of priorities on a risk basis. zero 
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
Legal guides and documentation are mentioned. half 
4.4.9 Management of change 
2.2.5 An Improvement Action Plan will be published for each authority, with a three year lifecycle. Hamps will have an annual review. 7.4 shows appreciation (only?) of 
climate change effects. half 
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 confirm a life cycle approach. 6.2.1 mentions the highways efficiency toolkit which contains an asset management approach. 7.2 mentions that a WLC 
approach is used when comparing different treatments (but not to compare schemes in different areas?) half 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
4.4 – Scanner and scrim surveys used. half 
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
4.4 – Scanner and scrim surveys used along with safety and serviceability surveys. 5.2 – surveys customer feedback, internal objectives and benchmarking against other 
authorities.7.2 data is kept in order to evaluate best whole life cost surface treatment. 7.5 lists factors in a gap analysis carried out by each individual council. one 
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4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and non-conformities 
4.4 – Scanner and scrim surveys – no further detail. zero  
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance 
5.1 and 5.2 covers it. Section 6 checks for value for money. half 
4.6.4 Audit 
Indicators are checked. No mention of an actual audit though. Zero.  
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
List of improvement items. Some good overall sense of programme corrections following feedback. half 
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
Section 8 – includes PFI long term maintenance contract for Sheffield (only) which will encourage the provider to adopt WLC principles. one 
 4.6.6 Records 
2.25.3 – each authority has, as part of their gap analysis, prioritised inventory collection. Section includes overall asset valuation for each authority, but isn’t condition 
based. 2010/2011 is due to be updated according to the CIPFA report. half 
4.7 Management review 
The HAMP will be reviewed annually. Section 9 mentions a continuous review. One. 
 
 
 
 
A2.1.5 
Transport Scotland 
Road asset management plan for Scottish Trunk Roads April 2007 - March 2009 
AMP subject headings to PAS55 
4.1 General requirements    
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Define and document the scope of the system   
Control of outsourcing 
Operating companies maintain the 4? Areas. TfS split into 5 directorates – trunk roads network management is most relevant (and produced the ramp). The plan is 
version 1, will be developed in time, and be used to produce a work plan and a finance plan. 3.1.5 – this RAMP only applies to roads and bridges – scope to be widened 
for future ramps. Website claims that a second version will be published in 2011. In general, this sets out what is proposed, without giving the detail to do it. 
4.2 Asset management policy 
Separate government publication – Scotland’s national transport strategy sets out the vision for roads, railways, airports and ports. Government sets overall policy. Other 
drivers are listed in 1.4.7. 1.5.7 mentions the corporate plan and business plan. See 2.2 corporate aims. 
4.3.1 Asset management strategy 
1.4.11 mentions a performance management framework which is intended to measure progress – also lists immediate improvements expected. 4.4.5 mentions the national 
transport strategy plus corporate and business plans. 
4.3.2 Asset management objectives 
Exec summary – improved safety, journey reliability and more efficient use of money. Congestion caused by roadworks is an identified problem. 1.3.5 lists challenges to 
be met. 1.5.1 shows objectives are explained in the corporate and business plans. 2.3.1 lists objectives from other docs, only where relevant to AM. Table 3 links 
objectives to AM principles. 
4.3.3 Asset management plans 
Most up to date one is Apr 07 to Mar 09 – tends to imply that the initial motivation hasn’t extended to producing an update. Embedment is mentioned in 1.4.12 – asset 
management improvement programme. 
4.3.4 Contingency planning 
7.3.8 – emergency response times are included in the OC contracts – times set by Scottish ministers.  
4.4.1 Structure, authority and responsibilities 
A to I 5 directorates are in place but actual AM responsibilities are not outlined. 4.2 goes into more detail, including the operating companies plus DBFO contracts. 
Note PAG also audits the TRNMD directorate. 
4.4.2 Outsourcing of asset management activities 
4 Operating companies maintain their areas – how much autonomy do they have?  
4.4.3 Training, awareness and competence 
4.1.4 recognises that training will be needed.  
4.4.4 Communication, participation and consultation 
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1.4.2 mentions service levels set in consultation with customers.2.4 describes customer surveys in 2007. This is to be incorporated in the next RAMP. 4.1.6 recognises the 
need to filter down knowledge to the councils. 6.2.3. mentions research into links between service levels and engineering standards. 
4.4.5 Asset management system documentation 
Apart from the plan; largely to be considered during the AMP.page 21  
4.4.6 Information management 
SERIS is the name of the data management system. Section 3 gives the overall data. 3.1 – beginnings of an asset classification system. Appendix C goes into detail. 
4.4.13 mentions SERIS and TRBDB. Improvements are planned under the AMIP. 
4.4.7.1 Risk management processes 
Section 7 - There is a corporate risk strategy and a corporate risk register. Each directorate also has a risk register.  
4.4.7.2 Risk management methodology 
No detail given.  
4.4.7.3 Risk identification and assessment 
3.2.13 highlights an ageing of the older network (presumably because funds get used on the life expired roads. Also 20% of motorways are life expired!   
4.4.7.4 Use and maintenance of asset risk management 
Largely left to AMIP?  
4.4.8 Legal and other requirements 
The current plan arose out of a 3 year asset management improvement programme, starting in May 2006. 
4.4.9 Management of change 
1.4.13 and section 14 lists the packages arising from the asset management improvement programme.  
4.5.1 Life-cycle activities 
Exec summary – life cycle plans to be developed (i.e. not done yet). Section 8 – to be developed under the AMIP. Principles seem understood but work will be ongoing 
for years to develop the optimal interventions. Note they use a 30 year period in keeping with other authoritative industry guidance (I’ve forgotten the ref). Computerised 
models to be developed. 9.1.3 – carriageway maintenance options are currently compared on a WLC basis. AMIP to consider whole life value approach (sounds like 
vehicle to introduce resilience!) Prioritisation dealt with by value engineering processes. 
4.5.2 Tools, facilities and equipment 
Section 9 – decision support tools include value engineering.  
4.6.1 Performance and condition monitoring 
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6.3.4 references performance measures for operating companies. See ref 12. Performance targets not set yet. 7.3.2 – risk based inspection regime is proposed from the 
AMIP but operating companies currently working to a programme based regime. 
4.6.2 Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents and       non-conformities 
7.3.5 – safety defects have strict response time limits on rectification. Emergency response times are stated in the OC contracts. 
4.6.3 Evaluation of compliance 
PAG report on operating companies.  
4.6.4 Audit 
PAG acts as an independent auditor. 
4.6.5.1 Corrective and preventative action 
5.12 acknowledges that traffic volumes influence maintenance strategy. 8.4.1 mentions feedback of better info into lifecycle plans. 
4.6.5.2 Continual improvement 
Next RAMP is to include a work plan and a financial plan. Due to be published in spring 2009.  4.3.3. lists the tactical level as where AM can make most difference. 4.4.3 
lists the plan-do-check-act stages.10.1 – looking to move to a steady state maintenance regime which gives forward visibility to the OC’s, by way of a 5 to 10 year work 
plan. 
4.6.6 Records 
No detail given   
4.7 Management review 
No detail given. 
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A2.2 Highway interviews 
21st September 2011 
URS Scott Wilson/Halcrow/University of Dundee 
REPORT of meeting to investigate DBFO contract for M74. 
1.0  Attendees: David Fleming of URS Scott Wilson; Eddie McDowell of Halcrow; Mohammed El-Haram and Doug 
Thomson of University of Dundee 
 
2.0  Background info from URS Scott Wilson 
The design, build, finance and operate contract for the A74(M) runs from junction 12 to the English border (approximately 90km). There are 90km of dual 3 lane 
carriageways plus hard shoulders (motorway standard). Only 30km of the 90 is new construction – the rest was ‘adopted’ by autolink.  
 Autolink Concessionaires (M6) Plc were awarded a 30 year contract in July 1997. In other words, they are 14 years into their 30 year period. The current constituent 
companies are John Laing and Innisfree (infrastructure investment group/PFI specialists). The original contract signatories have all been bought out. URS Scott Wilson 
(SW) act on behalf of Transport Scotland (TS) in reporting on the performance of Autolink. SW are paired with Halcrow, who have similar duties re the 4 operating 
companies. SW do not produce a similar annual report to the PAG report. There are instead monthly briefing notes to TS, and regular audits.  
Autolink payment is related to traffic numbers measured at 13 points on the network (i.e. shadow tolls). This can be reduced depending on KPI performance (KPI topics 
are largely similar to the PAG ones). All operational risk is allocated to Autolink, along with just about all other risks – apart from inflation (which is applied to shadow 
toll rates) and extreme ‘force majeure’ events. Autolink pay lane occupation charges, which vary seasonally and between day and night. 
The contract requires Autolink to hand over the works to TS at the end of the thirty years with specific residual lives (e.g. 10 years for the carriageway, 20 years for the 
structures – etcetera). There is a specified handback process which commences 5 years before the contract end.  There are also minimum operational standards applied 
throughout the period – e.g. standard survey methods such as scrim and deflectometer tests are done and Autolink have to repair/restore as necessary.  
Autolink are only concerned with the M74. They have no similar contracts south of the border to share knowledge and resources with. 
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Golden River undertake the traffic counts. 
 
Headline differences in emphasis between Autolink and the operating companies are felt to include: 
a/ Autolink maintain the carriageway drainage more frequently; recognising the potential for more significant deterioration arising from poor drainage. They generally 
scarify the surface layer annually and replace the filter stone/pipes every 5 or 6 years. 
b/ Autolink use subcontractors for all civil engineering maintenance and accord more importance to quality/performance because poor quality (e.g. joints/waterproofing) 
has a direct financial cost. In contrast the operating companies have more scope to use cheaper subcontractors because problems may not become apparent until after their 
5 year period is over. 
c/ Landscaping and rubbish collection is given high importance due to their reputational risk, particularly as the M74 is the main gateway to Scotland. In general, the 
investors behind Innisfree get nervous if relationships deteriorate and penalties start being imposed therefore Autolink try to avoid defect notices etc. 
d/ Autolink are not subject to public sector annual budget limits and are therefore free to resurface, for example, at appropriate times of the year – generally 
spring/autumn as lane rental charges are higher during the peak tourist season in summer. The 30 year period again acts as an incentive to maintain durability and quality. 
Operating companies may have to undertake serious maintenance in winter. 
 
3.0  Questions and answers 
 
3.1 Contract and reporting (answers underlined) 
Can we have/see a copy? There are two thick volumes, much of which includes financial info, which will be commercially sensitive. DF suggest schedule 2 would cover 
most of the issues we are interested in – would need TS permission to release.  
Method specification or results specification? Combination of both, but based on standard Department of Transport specification. 
How much latitude do autolink have to vary maintenance on a risk assessed needs basis? Generally, inspection intervals are fixed and resulting maintenance needs are 
driven by the minimum specified condition standards. Autolink have the freedom to concentrate more on preventive maintenance if they consider this is in their best long 
term interests. Category 1 defects will have time limits for repair. Defects reported in road safety audits will need rectification.  
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Do maintenance time limits allow for resource sharing/transfer from south of the border? Not applicable as Autolink have no other responsibilities. 
What are the performance indicators and how often are they measured? (again in terms of what latitude do autolink have to vary their maintenance regime?) KPI schedule 
to be supplied but monitoring/measuring performance is continuous and detailed. There is some ‘freeboard’ between a reduction in KPI scores and financial penalties (to 
the extent that no financial penalties have as yet been applied).  
Are HGV’s rather than total vehicles given prominence in payment terms? (having more cost impacts on maintenance) Yes – there are two rates for shadow tolls – 
HGV’s and others. The rates also increase annually with inflation and mid-term to allow for carriageway reconstruction. 
Are minimum standards based on service levels; themselves based on ‘customer’ feedback? Standards are based on the DOT spec. Customer feedback registers as 
specific complaints. 
Are there only penalty limits (a stick) or is there a carrot as well? No carrot. The agreement can be varied if either party proposes a change with an associated financial 
trade off; which is then agreed by the other party. Many of the risks are transferred directly to subcontractors. 
3.2 Operation and construction 
Comparison with operating companies – are they organised differently? See headline differences in section 2. – are resources less/more? Autolink have 26 directly 
employed operatives who staff winter protection operations (8 snowploughs) and landscaping for the rest of the year.  – are improvements visible from year to year? 
After 14 years autolink are now on steady state maintenance operations – a routine has been established. How are learning points captured? Through the monthly reports 
and by addressing customer complaints. 
Were initial design standards beefed up to minimise future maintenance? Only 30km was new construction and Autolink used stone mastic asphalt (SMA) in one of their 
first UK applications. The 60km remaining length was hot rolled asphalt (HRA). Due to errors made in the laying of the SMA this is now having to be reconstructed 
therefore there was an attempt at innovation but they are reverting to HRA for the reconstruction. Autolink chose to omit crossovers from the new, central 30km because 
they were available on the other 60km stretches. 
Do autolink share resources with the M6? N/A 
Any condition based maintenance? (rather than time based) Inspection intervals are specified. Maintenance needs arising from these inspections are condition based. 
Any variation in carriageway construction standards along the route? Why? – and does this affect maintenance input? Only the SMA/HRA split as above. 
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3.3 Risk 
What’s the risk allocation profile between contractor and client? The contractor carries the vast majority of risks. The client increases the shadow toll rates in line with 
Baxter indices. The client is not allowed to construct a rival route which might pull traffic away from the M74. 
Who carries the risk of extreme natural events (beyond normal design standards) Autolink 
Who deals with major emergency plans? Autolink (also deal with abnormal loads) Is the performance of the emergency services (in terms of carriageway availability) a 
client risk? No – and autolink lose revenue whenever the motorway is closed. There is no ‘social cost’ penalty for road closures though. 
3.4 Cost 
Are life cycle costs as forecast? No detailed info but SMA problem is cancelled out by lower than expected costs on the other 60km. Certainly there are no signs of 
financial stress impacting on maintenance regimes.  
Are deterioration curves being updated? DF has no access. 
Is anyone comparing overall costs between operating companies and autolink? – are they directly comparable? Not to our knowledge. The DBFO contract would have 
been subject to public sector comparator limits but we have no idea if anyone in TS is monitoring comparative costs per km in relation to the operating companies. In 
terms of resources employed we may be able to compare resources/staffing between operating companies and autolink. 
Does the shadow toll bear a linear relationship to payment? There are two rates (HGV/other) and the rate varies with inflation and also halfway through the period. 
Is payment based on shadow tolls not just a source of financial uncertainty for both parties? The HGV element impacts on maintenance costs. 
3.5 Asset management 
Do autolink have an asset management plan? – accredited to PAS 55? No and no. They will have some elements of a plan but not in its entirety – largely due to the 
contract being 14 years old. DF has no visibility of initial assumptions of design lives. 
In terms of resilience, is there any priority given to availability of carriageway lengths/structures where there isn’t a viable diversion route? N/A as there is a parallel local 
distributor throughout the 90km length - suitable for short term use only.  
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4.0  Actions arising 
DT to circulate note of meeting. 
DF to forward list of autolink KPI’s 
Schedule 2 of the Transport Scotland/autolink contract – EM to ask permission from TS to make available. 
DF to forward autolink staff organogram (for use in comparing staffing levels with the operating companies) 
DF to forward example of monthly report from John Burns of autolink (subject to TS approval –EM to request permission) 
Can we dig out data to investigate any relationship between surfacing/reconstruction seasonal timings and subsequent durability? This would require agreement from TS 
and autolink. EM and DF to inquire. 
DT/EM to carry out a similar question/answer exercise on the operating companies. 
5.0  Possible comparators to be investigated (between autolink and operating companies) 
a/ Total annual cost to Transport Scotland per lane kilometre (or square metre of road surface). 
b/ Staff resources employed per lane kilometre or square metre. 
c/ Winter gritting capability in terms of gritters employed per lane kilometre or square metre. 
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Appendix B: Stage 3 (refer to Volume 2) 
 
 
 
 
